Globalizing Governmentality: Sites of Neoliberal Assemblage in the Americas by Weidner, Jason R
Florida International University
FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations University Graduate School
6-3-2010
Globalizing Governmentality: Sites of Neoliberal
Assemblage in the Americas
Jason R. Weidner
Florida International University, jas_weidner@hotmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons
This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Weidner, Jason R., "Globalizing Governmentality: Sites of Neoliberal Assemblage in the Americas" (2010). FIU Electronic Theses and
Dissertations. Paper 258.
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/258
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
Miami, Florida 
 
 
 
GLOBALIZING GOVERNMENTALITY: SITES OF NEOLIBERAL 
ASSEMBLAGE IN THE AMERICAS 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
by 
Jason R. Weidner 
 
2010 
 
To:  Dean Kenneth Furton 
College of Arts and Sciences  
 
This dissertation, written by Jason R. Weidner, and entitled Globalizing 
Governmentality: Sites of Neoliberal Assemblage in the Americas, having been 
approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.  
 
We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.  
 
 
  ________________________________ 
        Gail Hollander 
 
 
 
      ________________________________ 
         Ronald W. Cox 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
        Harry Gould 
 
 
 
      ________________________________ 
      Francois Debrix, Major Professor 
 
 
 
Date of Defense: June 3, 2010 
 
The dissertation of Jason R. Weidner is approved. 
 
 
 
      ________________________________ 
        Dean Kenneth Furton 
       College of Arts and Sciences 
 
 
      ________________________________ 
       Interim Dean Kevin O’Shea 
       University Graduate School 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright 2010 by Jason R. Weidner 
All rights reserved. 
 iii 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
In memory of my father, Frederic Clinton Weidner  
(1942 – 2002)
 iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This dissertation is the result of a long journey. I would like to express my 
deep appreciation and gratitude to those who accompanied and inspired me through 
this journey. To my major professor, Francois Debrix, whose patient support, 
encouragement, and expert knowledge provided important conditions of possibility 
for this dissertation. To Lisa Prugl, who has been a crucial source of friendship and 
support throughout the course of my Ph.D. To Gail Hollander, whose thinking on 
globalization has helped shape this dissertation. To the members of my committee, 
Ron Cox and Harry Gould, for providing thoughtful input into the final version of this 
dissertation. To Paul Kowert, who has provided enormously helpful advice and 
support throughout my time at  FIU. 
This work would not have been possible without the generous financial 
support that I received from Florida International University, the Graduate School, 
and the Department of Politics and International Relations. That support includes a 
Presidential Fellowship, Teaching Assistantships, and a Dissertation Evidence 
Acquisition Fellowship. 
I would also like to thank Nicholas Kiersey, a wonderful friend and source of 
intellectual stimulation. His thinking on Foucauldian IR and governmentality have 
been very influential in this dissertation. My thanks also go to Diana Ter-Ghazaryan, 
for her support and friendship. 
Special mention is also deserved for Michelle Real and Martha Rodriguez, for 
helping navigate the bureaucracy and for their support and friendship. 
 v 
 
I would like to thank my family, who have been extraordinarily supportive 
throughout this project and my entire graduate career. 
Most importantly, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my wife, Karin 
Weidner. Without her love and support, none of this would have been possible. From 
the beginning, when I first began graduate studies in Santiago, Chile (and she helped 
me get my application submitted in time!), Karin has been the reason that I have been 
able to move forward and get to this point. 
 vi 
 
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
GLOBALIZING GOVERNMENTALITY: SITES OF NEOLIBERAL 
ASSEMBLAGE IN THE AMERICAS 
by 
Jason R. Weidner 
Florida International University, 2010 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Francois Debrix, Major Professor 
This dissertation analyzes processes of globalization, through a critical 
examination of the dynamics of neoliberalism in the Americas. It employs and also 
develops a Foucauldian governmentality analytical framework, demonstrating how 
such a framework contributes to our understanding of world politics. This dissertation 
also develops the concept of a liberal political imaginary—consisting of the market, 
society, and the state—and utilizes this as an analytical framework for understanding 
the globalization of neoliberal forms of governance. The research suggests that 
discourses and practices of globalization, global civil society, and global governance 
represent a fundamental transformation in the way that contemporary social and 
political reality is understood, and that this has significant consequences for the kinds 
of political practices and relations that are possible. Moreover, the research suggests 
the globalization of a neoliberal form of competitive subjectivity that can be applied 
to a broad range of actors—from individuals to nation-states and international 
organizations—is reshaping contemporary world politics. The dissertation concludes 
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by suggesting how Foucauldian IR can move forward by incorporating studies of 
contemporary transformations in capitalism into their analyses. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THEORIZING THE GLOBAL 
 
Introduction 
The aim of the present study is to contribute toward a better understanding of 
the structures and dynamics of contemporary world order. The general issue area that 
the present study addresses is the problem of understanding how neoliberal 
globalization is shaping contemporary social and political reality. This general issue 
area has been studied by scholars in a range of disciplines, including international 
relations and international studies, international political sociology, anthropology, and 
human geography. Consequently, the approach adopted in the present study is 
multidisciplinary and draws on theoretical and empirical work in a number of 
different academic fields. The geographic focus of the study is the Americas. It is 
hoped that by exploring the dynamics of neoliberalism in the hemisphere—including 
projects that are themselves constitutive of spatial imaginaries such as the 
Americas—the present study will enhance our understanding of contemporary 
globalization. 
The study takes as its analytical starting point the social and political thought 
of Michel Foucault, a thinker whose work has become profoundly influential in the 
human and social sciences. More specifically, Foucault’s notion of “governmentality” 
will serve as an organizing conceptual framework for studying the varied and 
complex ways that neoliberalism is currently ordering social and political life today 
(Foucault 1991a). Since Foucault never produced a fully developed conceptualization 
of governmentality as a method for political inquiry, the present study will draw on a 
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large body of theoretical work that has further elaborated a governmentality approach 
(Barry, Osborne, & Rose 1996b; Burchell, Gordon, & Miller 1991; Dean 1999; Rose 
1999). At the same time, this study will offer a critical appraisal of this theoretical 
body, with the aim of contributing toward its further development. The discussion of 
a governmentality approach offered in this study will be centered on how such an 
approach can provide a better critical understanding of some of the key debates 
within international relations and international studies regarding the nature and 
implications of a range of phenomena often associated with the notion of 
globalization. These debates involve questions about the role of the state in 
contemporary world politics, how to characterize current structures of governance at 
the global level, and the functioning of political power and authority at the global or 
transnational level. Building upon work done in a number of disciplines and fields of 
study, the present study seeks to demonstrate the utility of a governmentality 
approach for addressing these questions regarding the nature of contemporary world 
politics.1 
The question of neoliberalism has also been examined from various different 
perspectives and within a number of fields of study. Within international relations and 
international studies, political economy scholars have produced the largest amount of 
research into neoliberalism—investigating among other things the origins of 
neoliberalism, its connection with the United States and the latter’s role in shaping 
contemporary world order, the political processes involved in the adoption of 
neoliberal restructuring in developing countries, and the social and political 
 
1 For a helpful survey of governmentality literature in international relations, see Merlingen (2006). 
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consequences of neoliberal restructurings of state, society, and economy (Brenner & 
Theodore 2002b; J. L. Campbell & Pedersen 2001; Ronald W. Cox 2008; Gill 1995; 
Harris & Seid 2000; Harvey 2005; Klak 1998; Roy, Denzau, & Willett 2006; 
Soederberg, Menz, & Cerny 2005). In general, political economy studies of 
neoliberalism tend to equate the latter with a set of policies, such as privatization, 
trade liberalization, and a reduced role for the state, although some critical studies of 
neoliberalism also examine the ideology that provides the justification for these 
policies. In contrast, following Foucault, the present study examines neoliberalism as 
a form of governmentality, or a complex combination of different types of 
knowledge, subjectivities, political rationalities, and techniques aimed at governing 
human subjects. In this regard the approach adopted here is in a sense complementary 
to many political economy approaches to studying neoliberalism, in that it offers a 
more expansive account of the operation of neoliberal governance. Thus, rather than 
focusing on the policies associated with neoliberalism, the present study examines 
what will be argued are the conditions of possibility for the latter. At the same time, 
the governmentality approach elaborated in the present study challenges some of the 
ways that neoliberalism is conceptualized in much of the recent research done in this 
field. It does so by examining neoliberalism in terms of what Foucault called the 
“micropolitical,” including forms of knowledge and subjectivities that are both 
produced by and productive of neoliberalism. 
Furthermore, this study examines what will be argued is a crucial element in 
various forms of neoliberal governance, namely the discursive constitution of the 
global. Discourses of the global, it will be argued—including discourses of 
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globalization, global governance, and global civil society—are transforming what the 
political philosopher Charles Taylor (2004) has called the “social imaginaries” of our 
political present.2 In order to make this argument, this study critically examines the 
different ways that discourses of the global intersect with neoliberal projects for 
governing the imagined space of the Americas, thereby producing a neoliberal 
political imaginary in which the global provides a grid of intelligibility for forms of 
social and political regulation that operate on different scales.  
Empirically, the study focuses on neoliberal discourses of the global produced 
within the academic field, although popular representations of the global will also 
figure into the analysis. Focusing on these sources has a dual function. Firstly, an 
examination of academic knowledge production can help shed light on the dynamics 
of expert knowledge and can thus provide a better understanding of the logics that 
underpin specific governance projects. Secondly, an examination of academic 
discourses of the global introduces an element of reflexivity into the analysis, which 
in turn is important for constructing a critical theoretical understanding of the 
relationship between knowledge production and forms of social and political order. 
By taking this approach, the study aims to provide critical purchase on different 
theoretical perspectives and analytical approaches to questions of globalization and 
world politics. Finally, a governmentality approach that calls attention to the 
“power/knowledge” complex that Foucault (1980c) described (however here in 
 
2  Although there are obvious differences in the intellectual projects of Taylor and Foucault (see for 
example, Taylor 1984), Taylor’s employment of the concept of the social imaginary resonates in 
certain ways with Foucault’s notion of the discursive. Much in the same way that Foucault rejected the 
view that his emphasis on the discursive foundations of the social relied on privileging ideas over 
‘material’ factors, Taylor stresses that the notion of the social imaginary “is not a set of ideas: rather, it 
is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society” (Taylor 2004: 2). 
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relation to discourses of the global) makes it possible to apprehend the ways that 
academic theories of globalization are intimately connected with specific techniques, 
mechanisms, and projects that seek to govern human subjects. 
The present chapter deals with the conceptual and theoretical issues involved 
in the study. The following section will outline the basic contours of a 
governmentality approach to the study of world politics, locating it in relation to other 
prominent theoretical perspectives and discussing how a governmentality approach 
can be applied to some of the major debates regarding the nature of contemporary 
world politics. The subsequent section provides a theoretical discussion of the global 
as a form of governmentality and the implications of this idea for understanding some 
of the ways that political power operates today. The final section discusses how the 
conceptual and theoretical issues examined in the previous sections will be 
operationalized in the rest of the study and will suggest how these issues can aid in 
our understanding of the structure and dynamics of contemporary world order. 
Foucault, Governmentality, and World Politics 
The political thought of Michel Foucault has provided the inspiration for an 
increasingly large body of work in the study of world politics and in the discipline of 
International Relations (Merlingen 2006).3 Initial Foucault-inspired work in IR drew 
primarily on the French philosopher’s archaeology of knowledge and the human sciences 
(Foucault 1970, 1972a). In these works, Foucault was deployed along with a number of 
“poststructural” political thinkers (most prominently Jacques Derrida) in order to 
3 Following conventional usage, the academic discipline International Relations will be capitalized, or 
abbreviated as IR, whereas the phenomena that is studied by the discipline will be in lower case letters—
international relations. 
challenge many of the basic assumptions that lie at the heart of mainstream realist and 
neorealist accounts of world politics (Ashley 1987, 1988; Ashley & Walker 1990; George 
& Campbell 1990). 
In recent years, a number of scholars have studied world politics from an 
explicitly Foucauldian perspective. Somewhat schematically, we can identify two 
different ways that students of world politics are drawing on Foucault. One approach 
takes its inspiration from Foucault’s development of the notions of biopower and 
biopolitics, and draws heavily on the last chapter of the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality, “Right of Death and Power over Life”, and also on Foucault’s 1976 lectures, 
“Society Must Be Defended”(Foucault 1976, 2003b). International Relations scholars 
working within what some have called a “biopolitics of security” approach4 build upon 
the idea that “biopolitics arrives with the historical transformation in waging war from 
the defense of the sovereign to securing the existence of a population…[T]his historical 
shift means that decisions to fight are made in terms of collective survival, and killing is 
justified by the necessity of preserving life” (D. Campbell 2005: 949). This reading of the 
biopolitical and biopower, often times in conjunction with a revised conceptualization of 
biopolitics provided by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, has provided a 
powerful tool for analyzing contemporary modes of war and practices of security, most 
notably those that have arisen within the context of the so-called Global War on Terror 
(M. Dillon & Neal 2008; M. Dillon & Reid 2009; Reid 2007). 
The second Foucauldian approach to world politics draws its primary inspiration 
from Foucault’s notion of governmentality developed first in his lectures at the Collège 
 
4 See the Biopolitics of Security Network website hosted by the University of Keele: 
<http://www.keele.ac.uk/research/lpj/bos/> 
 6 
 
de France in 1978 and 1979. However, it was really later in the 1980s that 
governmentality studies were first developed by some of the scholars who had 
collaborated with Foucault and/or participated in his seminars and research projects of the 
late 1970s (e.g.-Jacques Donzelot, Pascale Pasquino) as well as by a group of mainly 
British social theorists for whom Foucault’s notion of governmentality offered an 
attractive alternative to Marxist understandings of the social and political transformations 
associated with the dismantling of the Welfare State (Donzelot & Gordon 2008; Rose, 
O'Malley, & Valverde 2006). Not satisfied with attempts to apprehend those 
transformations in terms of “ideology” or “hegemony” by Marxist and Gramscian 
approaches, a number of scholars drew on Foucault to analyze the phenomena associated 
with neoliberalism and Thatcherism in terms of rationalities and technologies of 
government that were irreducible to what were argued to be static categories such as class 
or the state (Rose, et al. 2006). This approach produced two influential edited volumes—
The Foucault Effect and Foucault and Political Reason—that helped give impetus to the 
development of an “analytics of government” throughout a range of disciplines and fields 
of study (Barry, et al. 1996b; Burchell, et al. 1991). 
Initially, however, these studies were oriented to problems and forms of 
government that were located within national societies. This is perhaps not surprising 
given that the principal political problem with regards to which governmentality studies 
were formulated—the rise of neoliberalism—seemed to have developed within a limited 
number of national societies: initially Great Britain and the United States. Of course the 
social and political restructuring that took place first in Chile and later in a number of 
developing countries would seem to make this understanding of the development of 
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neoliberalism problematic. On the one hand, the formulation of “advanced liberalism” by 
Rose and others clearly, and problematically, presents the development of neoliberalism 
as necessarily emerging as challenges to the Welfare State within “post-industrial” 
societies, thus ignoring the relationship between neo-colonialism, development, and 
governmentality (Escobar 1995). On the other hand, the recent publications of Foucault’s 
1978 and 1979 lecture series should make it clear that, despite the view of some that 
Foucault focused solely on the domestic arts of governance (e.g. Selby 2007), he in fact 
understood the constitution of international relations as being inextricably related to the 
development of modern forms of governmentality (Foucault 2007a: 285-332). 
With a few early exceptions (Debrix 1999; M. Dillon 1995), it is only relatively 
recently that scholars have begun to employ a governmentality analytical framework to 
study various aspects of world politics (Larner & Walters ; Perry & Maurer 2003; 
Walters & Haahr 2005). In fact, much of the work being done from a governmentality 
perspective and dealing with issues of an international or transnational nature is taking 
place outside of the discipline of IR, for example, anthropology (Ferguson & Gupta 2005; 
Inda 2005; Murray Li 2007; Ong 2006; Ong & Collier 2005), geography (Crampton & 
Elden 2007; Margo 2008; Ó Tuathail 1996; Peck 2004; Rose-Redwood 2006; Sparke 
2006), and management and organization studies (McKinlay & Starkey 1998). At the 
same time, the multi- or trans-disciplinarity of governmentality studies is one of the chief 
strengths of this approach. So too is the fact that, from a governmentality perspective, 
many of the conceptual categories that have divided and organized social scientific 
inquiry—the state, society, the market; the local, the national, the global—are viewed less 
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as static and more as fluid categories that in themselves are complexly interconnected 
with governmental rationalities and technologies. 
Despite the broad diversity of governmentality studies and their application to a 
wide range of phenomena, both contemporary and historical, we can identify two 
intersecting axes along which most governmentality work operates. These two axes are 
related, in turn, to what Gordon has identified as two levels of meaning that can be found 
in Foucault’s own writings and lectures on governmentality (Gordon 1991). On a very 
general level, Foucault used the term “government” to refer to “the conduct of conduct”, 
or “the government of the self and of others”. Thus governmentality can refer to any 
programmatic attempt to govern subjects either directly or indirectly by structuring the 
field of possibilities for subjects and/or influencing the shape of subjectivity itself. This 
meaning of governmentality is inextricably connected with the notion of ‘technologies of 
power’ that Foucault developed. Thus any form of government can be analyzed “from the 
perspective of a genealogy of technologies of power…according to its objectives, the 
strategies that govern it, and the program of political action it proposes” (Foucault 2007a: 
36). 
There is a second, more specific level of meaning of government and 
governmentality (Foucault often used these two terms indistinguishably). Here 
government refers to a specific form of political power or technology of power, one that 
Foucault contrasts with sovereign power. Whereas sovereign power had as its end the 
strength of the state and thus of the sovereign himself or herself, government, Foucault 
says, is concerned with an object external to the sovereign: the population. Thus, 
Foucault argues, “it is thanks to the perception of the specific problems of the population, 
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and thanks to the isolation of the level of reality that we call the economy, that is was 
possible to think, reflect, and calculate the problem of government outside the juridical 
framework of sovereignty” (2007a: 104). At this level of meaning, governmentality refers 
to the historical development of a technology/rationality of government that emerges first 
with the development of Polizeiwissenschaft in the seventeenth century, and is then 
radically transformed within the liberal art of government in the eighteenth century. Here 
governmentality as a technology/rationality of government is associated with the 
“discoveries” of political economy and the population: 
The constitution of a knowledge (savoir) of government is absolutely inseparable 
from the constitution of a knowledge of all the processes revolving around 
population in the wider sense of what we now call “the economy”…the 
constitution of political economy was made possible when population emerged as 
a new subject…a new science called “political economy” and, at the same time, a 
characteristic form of governmental intervention, that is, intervention in the field 
of the economy and population, will be brought into being by reference to this 
continuous and multiple network of relationships between the population, the 
territory, and wealth. In short…the transition in the eighteenth century from a 
regime dominated by structures of sovereignty to a regime dominated by 
techniques of government revolves around population, and consequently around 
the birth of political economy. (2007a: 106) 
Like most of the concepts Foucault developed in his work, government and 
governmentality are not static categories; their meanings shifted in tandem with the kind 
of problems—political and analytical—to which they were put. In fact, for Foucault 
governmentality was above all a methodological term, a heuristic device that sought to 
provide an analytical grid for relations of power. To be more precise, the “grid of 
governmentality” is meant to open up a conceptual space within which specific aspects 
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and elements of relations of power can be analyzed. Thus, in his lecture of March 7 1979, 
Foucault proposes governmentality as a framework within which his previous analyses of 
technologies of power can be integrated. We can assume, Foucault argues, that “this 
notion of governmentality…is valid for the analysis of ways of conducting the conduct of 
mad people, patients, and children [and is equally valid] when we are dealing with 
phenomena of a completely different scale, such as an economic policy…or the 
management of a whole social body” (2008: 186).5  
Thus the concept of governmentality is bivalent, or operates on two registers. On 
the one hand, it serves as a conceptual framework for analyzing dispositifs of power 
regardless of the domain (madness, delinquency, sexuality, urban planning) or scale (the 
body, the community, the nation, the global) by focusing on the strategic and 
programmatic dimensions of power—the forms of knowledge, technologies, rationalities, 
and subjectivities that are assembled in order to shape and direct the relationships and 
activities of subjects. On the other hand, it deals with a specific form of political 
technology or art of government – liberalism or neoliberalism – which constitutes, 
broadly speaking, the overall horizon of political thought and action of “our modernity”, 
for which, Foucault argues, “the problems of governmentality and the techniques of 
government have…become the only political stake and the only real space of political 
struggle and contestation” (2007a: 109). 
In the present study the term governmentality will be used in both a 
methodological and a historical sense. From a methodological perspective, 
governmentality will refer to the strategic and calculated dimensions of practices aimed at 
 
5 Giorgio Agamben (2009) argues that the same applies to Foucault’s concept of the dispositif. 
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governing human subjects. From a historical perspective, governmentality will also refer 
to the rise of this form of political power that Foucault detailed in his analyses of 
cameralism and the development of a specifically statist political rationality. However, 
governmentality will not be viewed as synonymous with liberalism or neoliberalism, 
rather the latter will be considered as specific forms of governmentality. Although the 
focus in this study is neoliberalism, this is an important distinction because it leaves open 
the possibility of non-liberal forms of governmentality.  
Thus, governmentality functions in this study as a general conceptual framework 
for analyzing technologies and relations of power. Following Gordon (1991: 2), we can 
think of governmentality in general as “a way or system of thinking about the nature of 
the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is 
governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to 
its practitioners and to those upon whom it is practiced.” It is precisely in this sense that 
Foucault and other scholars who have built on his work understood the development of 
neoliberalism as a form of governmentality. The present study seeks to contribute to our 
understanding of neoliberalism and its relationship with the structures and dynamics of 
contemporary world order by examining the complex relationship between the 
constitution of social reality as a global reality and neoliberal forms of governmentality. 
This complex relationship is best captured by the term global governmentality. 
Globalization and Governmentality 
There are two overlapping dimensions of world politics that have been the objects 
of investigations by governmentality approaches. The first is the set of political actors 
that are understood by many IR scholars to form the elements of “global governance” 
 12 
 
(Karns & Mingst 2004). These include intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as well as 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that operate in a transnational manner. 
Merlingen, for example, articulates a governmentality framework for studying IGOs that 
takes a fundamentally different approach to the subject than the bulk of scholarship in 
this area. The latter, Merlingen (2003) argues, are concerned with understanding the role 
of IGOs in terms of international structures and relations of power, where power is 
understood along the lines originally articulated by Lasswell (1958): “who gets what, 
when, and how.” From this perspective, IGOs are understood “either as arenas in which 
states act out their power relations, as service providers enabling states to overcome 
collective action problems, or as socializing agents involved in international policy 
transfer and norm diffusion” (Merlingen 2003: 362). These approaches, Merlingen 
argues, thus fail to capture the ways that IGOs “exercise a molecular form of power that 
evades and undermines the material, juridical and diplomatic limitations on their 
influence and enables them to shape member governments, their civil societies and even 
individuals in unspectacular ways” (362).6  
The other dimension of world politics that governmentality scholars have been 
investigating is that of the specific “technologies of power” that are employed to govern 
international spaces and subjects. Although not exhaustive, a list of these technologies 
would include competitiveness indexing and country benchmarking (Fougner 2008), 
public-private partnerships and best practice schemes (Hansen & Salskov-Iversen 2005), 
accounting techniques (Neu, et. al., In press), public opinion (Jaeger 2008), regionalism 
(Donegan 2006), and risk management strategies (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, & Munster 
 
6  See also Zanotti (2005, 2008). 
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2008). In this respect, governmentality approaches to world politics can be seen as 
applying to the international domain the insights and methodologies developed 
previously to study the rationalities, arts and techniques of government of liberal and 
“advanced liberal” societies (Rose 1993). At the same time, these studies of the ‘how’ of 
political power often overlap those studies that privilege certain types of international 
actors such as IGOs and NGOs inasmuch as the latter often employ these technologies of 
power in their governmental projects. 
Here it might be helpful to clarify a point that seems to have been the subject of 
confusion in discussions regarding the role of language and the concept of discourse 
within Foucauldian IR. Like post-structuralist theoretical frameworks in general, most 
Foucauldian approaches to world politics stress the importance of language, broadly 
understood, in the operations of political power. Thus, for example, Walters and Haahr 
(2005: 6) stress that they understand “governmentality to be continuous with, and indeed 
inconceivable without post-structuralist discourse analysis…As theorists of discourse 
have emphasized, we need to understand language not as a mere reflection of an 
underlying “real” world, but as a constitutive dimension of reality. Political struggles are 
also struggles over meaning.” At the same time, they point out that  
where some strands of discourse analysis emphasize semiotic practices of 
signification, or the slippages and the indeterminacy of meaning, governmentality 
has focuses on the materiality of discourse. It draws our attention to the much 
neglected world of inscription, the eminently technical ways in which the world is 
represented by means of little things like charts, tables, graphs, numbers, 
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diagrams, and reports…materials through which the world is made visible, 
calculable, and amenable to practices of rule.7 (7)  
From a governmentality perspective, the materiality of discourse is related to the 
idea that it is impossible to separate a purely discursive realm from its material conditions 
of possibility.8 Furthermore, a governmentality approach focuses on discursive practices, 
on different ways knowing and acting (Rose 1999). Discursive practices, from this 
perspective, are inextricably tied up with “particular ‘regimes of truth’ concerning the 
conduct of conduct…[and with] the invention and assemblage of particular apparatuses 
and devices for exercising power and intervening upon particular problems” (Rose 1999: 
19). The aim of a governmentality analysis, then, is to shed light on these (discursive) 
regimes of truth, to detail the logics and rationalities that inform them, and to apprehend 
the ways that they act to govern social reality. 
The term global governmentality suggests two mutually implicated ways for 
understanding recent transformations in the exercise of power. The first implication is 
that there exists a form of governmentality—i.e. neoliberalism—that has increasingly 
‘gone global’; that is, from a governmental rationality that operated primarily on a 
domestic level, within certain societies, it has expanded to the point that it is the 
 
7 Henriques, et. al. (1998,, pp. 106-106) make a similar point: “The analysis which we propose regards 
every discourse as the result of a practice of production which is at once material, discursive and complex, 
always inscribed in relation to other practices of production of discourse. Every discourse is part of a 
discursive complex; it is locked in an intricate web of practices, bearing in mind that every practice is by 
definition both discursive and material.” See also Foucault’s 1970 inaugural lecture at the Collège de 
France, reprinted as an appendix in Foucault (1972b). 
8 Some historical materialist scholars have argued that post-structural accounts of world politics are limited 
to describing “how a particular discourse can gain dominance at a specific point in time…[and not] why a 
certain discourse and not another is successful (…)” The problem, it is argued, is that post-structuralist 
accounts overlook “[t]he underlying power structures promoting individual discourses (…)” (Bieler & 
Morton 2008: 105) From a Foucauldian perspective, the idea that there exists an a priori explanation for 
the success of certain discourses and that there exist “underlying power structures” outside and independent 
of discursive practices and formations are both problematic. 
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dominant political rationality not only in the majority of national societies but also within 
the various structures and institutions of ‘international’ or ‘global society’. The second 
implication is that the global itself represents a form of governmentality. Following 
Larner and Walters, we can apprehend the global not as a naturally existing spatiality or 
scale, but rather as an assemblage of elements or what Foucault called a dispositif. 
Foucault used this term to refer to the various institutional, physical and administrative 
mechanisms and discursive/knowledge structures that enhance and maintain the exercise 
of power within the social body.9 From this perspective, the global is produced through 
heterogeneous dispositifs or assemblages that in turn shape human conduct and social 
relations.10 In order to see the significance of these two understandings of global 
governmentality, we can contrast them with other perspectives on globalization. 
The Globalization of (Neo) Liberal Governmentality 
At first glance, the first dimension of global governmentality—the global 
extension of liberal forms of government—would seem to have much in common with a 
number of other bodies of scholarship, including critical globalization studies that frame 
 
9 Foucault defined a dispositif in the following terms: “What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, 
a thouroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this 
apparatus [dispositif] is precisely the nature of the connections that can exist between these heterogeneous 
elements. Thirdly, I understand by the term ‘apparatus’ [dispositif] a sort of—shall we say—formation 
which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need.” 
(Foucault 1980b: 194-195; original emphasis) 
10 The terms “dispositif” and “assemblage” will be used more or less synonymously. While most English 
translations of Foucault’s work use the term “apparatus” for “dispositif” in the original French, I follow 
Valverde (2007) in using the term “assemblage” to highlight the connection and deployment of 
heterogeneous elements. See also Gilles Deleuze’s (1992) discussion of Foucault’s concept of dispositif. It 
should also be pointed out that Deleuze also employed the term “assemblage” in a fashion which, while 
resonating with the Foucauldian notion of dispositif, has also been put to use in fashions quite distinct from 
the former. On this point, see also Deleuze (1988). 
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the latter in terms of neoliberal globalization (Appelbaum & Robinson 2005; Scholte 
2000) and the “Stanford” or “world society” school that focuses on the global diffusion of 
the institutional and organizational underpinnings of the liberal polity (Meyer 2007; 
Meyer, et al. 1997). However, despite the fact that they take a similar set of phenomena 
as the object of their analysis, there are important differences between a global 
governmentality framework and other critical approaches to globalization.  
To begin with, let us look at a prominent historical materialist understanding of 
neoliberal globalization. For many critical scholars of globalization who work from some 
form of Marxian theoretical framework, neoliberalism is understood as both a set of 
policies favorable to global capital and also an ideology that works to justify those 
policies. Thus, for example, Stephen Gill argues that the present world order has entered 
a stage where the expansion of capital on a global scale occurs at the same time as—and 
is in fact predicated on—“a restructuring of prevailing ideas, institutions, and material 
capacities” that Gill (1995) describes both in terms of “disciplinary neoliberalism” and 
“market civilization”.11 Neoliberalism, then, operates on two complementary levels. On 
one level, neoliberalism refers to the set of policies—privatization, deregulation, fiscal 
discipline, etc.— that are promoted by a global state-society complex, “a transnational 
historical bloc…with its nucleus largely comprising elements of the G-7 state apparatuses 
and transnational capital…and associated privileged workers and smaller firms” (1995: 
 
11 Gill uses these two terms in ways that overlap but do not appear to be synonymous—in fact, their precise 
relationship is never clearly articulated. Nevertheless, it seems that “market civilization” refers in a general 
sense to the culture of capital and market-based relations, while “disciplinary neoliberalism” refers to both 
the specific policies that are associated with neoliberalism as well as the ideology behind those policies. 
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400).12 On another level, based on the Gramscian concept of hegemony, neoliberalism is 
viewed as an ideology that produces consent for and justifies these sets of policies and 
restructurings of state-society relations. 
In general, historical materialist approaches view neoliberalism as (1) a coherent 
political program, that (2) serves the interests of a transnational capitalist and managerial 
class, (3) that is imposed on the world from above by an alliance of leading capitalist 
states and international institutions, and (4) acquires legitimacy through the dissemination 
of a kind of “false consciousness.” While this perspective captures certain aspects of 
neoliberalism, it also fails to apprehend many others.  To begin with, the historical 
materialist perspective fails to account for the complex origins of neoliberalism—both 
intellectually and practically. While entities such as the World Bank and the IMF play 
important roles in its dissemination, processes of neoliberalization are also carried out by 
complex assemblages that include a number of local or “micro” actors and organizations. 
Furthermore, rather than speak of neoliberalism in the singular, it would perhaps be better 
to speak of neoliberalisms. For, as Foucault demonstrates in his genealogy of liberalism, 
the latter is a dynamic political technology—one that has a built-in self-critiquing aspect 
and which is therefore constantly mutating into different forms. Thus, for example, the 
neoliberalism that emerged in post-world war II Germany is not only quite different from 
the classical liberalism of Adam Smith, but also from the American version of 
neoliberalism that came to prominence in the 1970s and 1980s (Foucault 2008: 79-266). 
 
12 Gramsci developed the idea of a historical bloc—basically an hegemonic alliance of different social 
groups within state and society—in a national context; the idea has been extended and applied to world 
politics by neo-Gramscian IR scholars. See Gill (1993). 
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The world society approach to globalization is, in certain respects, closer to a 
global governmentality approach. Whereas historical materialist approaches tend to 
reduce the complex political relations and processes involved with the spread of 
neoliberalism to the functional needs of a transnational capitalist class and the 
international institutions it has captured, the world society approach calls attention to the 
increasing “isomorphism of social structural and organizational forms across world 
societies” (Buttel 2000: 117) that cannot be explained either by functional necessity or by 
the logics of global capitalism. Thus, as Buttel points out, world society scholars point 
towards the global diffusion of a Western, Weberian form of rationality or political 
culture that entails “particular organizational forms, such as bureaucratic states and 
bureaucratic organization generally, constitutions and citizenship, market institutions, and 
so on” (117). Within this broad set of phenomena there are a number of social and 
political norms (environmental protection, state-promoted education, citizens’ rights), 
organizational forms (central banks, ministries of science and health) and rituals of 
statecraft (military parades, national holidays, census taking) that are said to be shaped by 
a global political culture.13 
Clearly, the notion of the diffusion of Western political culture and related 
organizational forms resonates with the idea of the spread of a liberal or neoliberal 
governmentality. Indeed, for some world society scholars, the overlap is strong enough 
that they in fact describe the way that world politics is increasingly predicated on a 
 
13 For a discussion of how a world society approach relates to other IR approaches, particularly the English 
School, see Brown (2001). For a discussion of how the world society approach relates to the historical 
sociological tradition of Marx, Weber, Elias and, more recently Bourdieu, Habermas, and Giddens, see 
Jung (2001). Similarly, it is worth noting that this problematique has been explored from a number of 
perspectives, including Anderson’s interrogation of the puzzle of the state’s enduring character as a 
“modular” form that is both “serialized and serializable” (B. Anderson 1991: 195). 
 19 
 
Weberian form of instrumental rationality in terms of the spread of different forms of 
governmentality (Drori, et al. 2003). However, a Foucauldian perspective diverges from 
the neo-institutionalism of the world society school in several important respects.14 To 
begin with, world society scholars analyze the global spread of a liberal political culture 
from a “macro-sociological, structural and long-term” perspective (Barry 2003: 566), 
thereby reproducing many of the deterministic elements of social science which 
Foucauldian scholars have rejected. One of the strengths of a governmentality approach 
is its focus on the ‘capillary’ forms of power that lie at the base of more generalized 
phenomena such as those detailed by the Stanford school.15  
This leads to what is perhaps the most fundamental difference between the neo-
institutionalism of world society approaches and a governmentality perspective, namely 
power. Whereas for world society scholars the role of power in the global diffusion of 
Western political forms is either implicit or absent altogether, it is a central focus for a 
global governmentality approach. For global governmentality scholars, rather than the 
inevitable outcome of the cultural hegemony of Western social and political norms, the 
diverse phenomena associated with the term globalization are viewed instead as the 
product not only of various forms of knowledge, technologies, and practices but also of 
disparate struggles, often between asymmetrical actors and social forces. In this regard, 
the intersection of Foucauldian perspectives and post-colonial scholarship has been quite 
productive for examining the continuities, as well as transformations, between colonial 
 
14 Curiously, there has been no engagement on the part of Foucauldian scholars with the large body of 
world society scholarship. 
15 An example of a work that effectively combines both the attentiveness to political technologies and 
micropower with the broader, indeed world-wide, spread of these technologies is Torpey’s study of the 
passport (2000).  
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forms of rule and the new mechanisms and institutions of what some term ‘global 
governance’. Thus, for example, Kalpagam (2000: 420) details how the colonial state in 
India utilized both pastoral and disciplinary forms of power in order to constitute the 
economy as a sphere of commercial exchange and also to constitute a subject that was not 
an individual bearer of rights, but “an individual who by being forced into a new sphere 
of commercial exchange would become the Homo economicus of the market economy.” 
For Barry Hindess, the occlusion of relations of power and states of domination in 
the expansion of liberal and neoliberal forms of governmentality has to do at least in part 
with the self-representation of liberalism as a political doctrine concerned primarily with 
governing populations within particular societies and with the defense of liberty and 
private property. As to the first part, Hindess argues that liberalism has always been 
concerned not only with governing domestic society, but also  
with regulating the conduct of the aggregate population encompassed within the 
system of states, and that it addresses this task by allocating responsibility for the 
government of specific populations to individual states, using treaties, trade and 
other devices to regulate the conduct of states themselves, and promoting within 
states appropriate means of governing the populations under their control. (2004: 
33) 
Thus, from this perspective, the argument by world society scholars that liberal 
government first was developed in response to domestic conditions in the societies that 
first underwent processes of modernization and only later spread to the international 
arena ignores the fact that “liberalism has always had a significant cosmopolitan and 
governmental character” (Hindess 2004: 35). 
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With regard to the second element of the common understanding of liberalism, 
namely its concern with promoting and governing through freedom, Hindess argues that 
in fact “[w]hat is required for the liberal government of populations…is a capacity to 
distinguish between what can be governed through the promotion of liberty and what 
must be governed in other ways” (2004: 28). The latter can be segments of a population 
within a liberal society, or it can be a colonial or post-colonial society either directly 
governed through imperial relations or indirectly through post-colonial modes of 
government. For Hindess, it is important to view liberalism not only or even primarily as 
a political theory or philosophy but rather as a complex assemblage of political 
rationalities and calculations that have always been involved in the mundane tasks of 
governing populations—a task which always requires the distinction between subjects 
amenable to government through freedom and those for whom “illiberal” or authoritarian 
forms of rule are more suitable. Thus, from this perspective, there is no contradiction to 
be found in liberal involvement in imperial rule; rather, historically liberalism as a form 
of governmental reason has always had as one of its preoccupations the government of 
non-liberal subjects (2004: 28). 
Furthermore, many post-colonial scholars have also challenged the idea that 
political modernity in non-Western spaces is either “the normalized telos of a 
developmental process” or “the mere historical reiteration of a single political rationality” 
(Scott 1995: 204). Rather, as David Scott argues, colonial modernity represents “a 
discontinuity in the organization of colonial rule characterized by the emergence of a 
distinctive political rationality—that is, a colonial governmentality—in which power 
comes to be directed at the destruction and reconstruction of colonial space so as to 
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produce not so much extractive-effects on colonial bodies as governing-effects on 
colonial conduct” (1995: 204).  
Finally, as many scholars of the colonial and post-colonial have demonstrated, the 
assumption of a pre-existing “Western” culture independent and outside of other “non-
Western” cultures is not only historically problematic, but the distinction itself as well as 
a whole range of discourses, identities, and apparatuses of power in fact emerged within 
the context of what Ann Laura Stoler (1995) calls “a colonial order of things.” Thus, 
rather than emerging in autonomous fashion within a neatly circumscribed “Western” 
culture and later being exported to other places, post-colonial scholars have shown how 
the colonial world was a sort of “laboratory of modernity” (Rabinow 1989), where 
disciplinary techniques and governmental practices were developed, refined, imported 
and exported (T. Mitchell 1991). At the same time, as will be discussed below, while the 
notion of a Western culture or civilization that can be clearly delineated from non-
Western cultures is problematic, this does not mean that the various forms of 
governmental rule and projects for ordering social reality that emerged within the so-
called “West” cannot be identified and their logics interrogated. In fact, as will be 
highlighted below, one of the socio-spatial logics that emerged within “Western” imperial 
projects is that of imagining the planet as a single, unitary global space.
The Global as Governmentality 
The second implication of the concept of global governmentality is that the 
global itself is a form of governmentality. While some scholars in the field of 
international studies have advanced this idea, it has not yet been fully developed. The 
strongest articulation of a Foucauldian perspective on the global as a form of 
governmentality was provided by Larner and Walters (2004a), who seek to decenter 
and defamiliarize discourses of the global and globalization. Larner and Walters build 
upon Foucault’s notion of the connection between power and knowledge, refined 
through the concept of governmentality as having to do with the way that “governing 
always involves particular representations, knowledges, and expertise regarding that 
which is to be governed” (2004a: 496). A global governmentality approach to the 
problem of globalization, therefore,  
entails a move of ‘bracketing’ the world of underlying forces and causes, and 
instead examining the different ways in which the real has been inscribed in 
thought. In this context, globalization becomes one particular political 
imagination amongst many, rather than the underlying logic of an epoch or the 
outcome of global pressures such as international competitiveness. (Larner & 
Walters 2004b: 16) 
In this sense, the global can be considered as a dispositif, or assemblage of 
elements, that contributes to the constitution of social reality. Thus, from this 
perspective, a global governmentality approach “focuses attention on the conditions 
of truth and practice” through which the global acquires its “positivity” (2004a: 499). 
Although not necessarily the primary source of elements that contribute to a global 
assemblage, the academic and expert fields of knowledge production certainly play an 
important role: “the ceaseless work of conferences, books, speeches, commissions, 
measurements, the founding of research centers, and much else plays an active, not 
merely reflective, role in fixing globalization, speaking in its name, giving it presence 
and durability” (2004a: 505). 
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The problem of the constitution of the global as part of our contemporary 
socio-spatial imaginary is also related to a number of discussions within the field of 
human geography regarding the social construction of space and scale (Jones 1998; 
Kelly 1999; Marston 2000). One perspective within human geography is that scale—
i.e. the local, the national or the global—has no ontological reality: it does not refer to 
some set of naturally existing, extra-discursive spatial properties, but is instead 
constituted through different discourses, practices, and materialities. This perspective 
clearly resonates with a global governmentality approach that views the global as 
being enacted through a complex assemblage of often times heterogeneous elements. 
In fact, Foucault serves as an important resource, for some poststructural geographers 
in their effort to conduct a “political genealogy of scale ontologies”, or “an 
historically contextualized study of the naturalizing and sedimenting production of 
scaled knowledge, in order to expose the power relationships lying behind the truth 
claims about scales and scalar hierarchies” (Kaiser & Nikiforova 2008: 538).16  
It should be noted that a global governmentality approach also suggests the 
importance of a genealogy of the global, which seeks to shed light on the historical 
conditions and the emergence of the global as a socio-spatial imaginary. Two 
common, related themes that have emerged from genealogical accounts of the global 
are the idea that the global is the product of a specifically Western mode of thought 
and that the latter is inextricably connected with the various Western projects for 
subjugating and dominating other non-Western places and peoples. In the first case, 
 
16 For a discussion regarding the ontology of scale, see Marston, Jones III, & Woodward (20005). For 
critical responses, see Collinge (2006), Escobar (2007), Hoefle (2006), Leitner & Miller (2007), Moore 
(2008), and Sayre (2009).  
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scholars in diverse fields of study have examined the connection between the history 
of Western reason and the imagination of the world as a unified, global space. Thus, 
for example, the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk expands on Heidegger’s (1977) 
claim that the conquest of the world as picture is the fundamental event of modernity, 
by arguing that “the representation of the world with the globe is the decisive deed of 
the early European enlightenment” (Sloterdijk 2009: 31).  On this account, the roots 
of globalization can be found in “the cosmological enlightenment of the Greek 
thinkers who, combining ontology with geometry” constructed the sphere as a 
representation of “the unity, totality, and roundness of existence… a logical and 
cosmological construction form of timeless validity” (31). The geographer Denis 
Cosgrove also links current visions of the global to a “Western inheritance of global 
meanings, from the Ciceronian somnium and Senecan moral reflection, through 
Christian discourse of mission and redemption, to ideals of unity and harmony” 
(2001: 257). However, unlike Sloterdijk, Cosgrove also highlights the multivalent 
nature of images and discourses of the global—how the latter can be employed by 
projects of conquest and dominion as well as liberation and revolution. 
At the same time, Sloterdijk’s genealogical study of the global is particularly 
relevant to the present study in that it calls attention to the fact that representations of 
the globe have always involved questions of power and rule: “as soon as the form of 
the sphere could be constructed in geometrical abstraction and gazed upon in 
cosmological contemplation, there arose forcefully the question of who should rule 
over the represented and produced sphere” (2009: 33). Different eras have produced 
different figures to rule over the global sphere: goddesses of victory, kings and 
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emperors, the Christ of the missionaries. Later, “scientists collected their instruments 
around themselves to trace out tropics and meridians, to draw the equator… Finally, 
in the 20th century the globe was integrated in the logos and advertisements of 
innumerable worldwide enterprises” (2009: 34-35).17 For the critical geographer John 
Agnew (2003), this particularly Western form of spatialized power/knowledge 
contains a duality. On the one hand, the visualization of the world as an ordered, 
structured whole presupposes an epistemological vantage point, a “view from 
nowhere”, from which the knowing subject can apprehend the world in its totality. On 
the other hand, Agnew argues, visions of the global have also historically been based 
on a binary geographical imagination where the Western identity is constructed on the 
basis of some foreign “other” space, characterized as primitive, backward, or 
undeveloped.18 
The other, complementary, side of a genealogy of the global examines the 
different apparatuses, technologies, subjectivities and forms of knowledge that have 
produced and also employed certain socio-spatial imaginaries in concert with colonial 
and imperial projects. For example, Edward Said’s influential theorization of Western 
“Orientalism” places the “spatial strategies” inherent in imperial practices at the 
center of his analysis (Said 2003). In tracing the shifting discursive modalities of the 
Western construction of the Orient, Said argues that there was a key transformation 
 
17 It should be noted that this last vision of the global is also central to a recent influential account of 
the world and its politics—the global as a network of postmodern Empire. See Hardt & Negri (2000). 
18 For a critical review, see (Ó Tuathail 1998) It should be noted, as Ó Tuathail (1996, p. 1) points out, 
that the struggle “over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space” is an inherent element of 
imperial systems, not only Western imperial projects but also non-Western empires such as ancient 
China and the Arab empire. However, that insight is not developed any further, and the rest of Ó 
Tuathail’s analysis focuses on the specifically Western origins of geopolitics (although the practice has 
become truly international). 
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from the Orient as an object of a “textual and contemplative” awareness, to the Orient 
as an object of “administrative, economic, and even military” control (2003: p.210)  
Said claims: 
The fundamental change was a spatial and geographical one, or rather it was a 
change in the quality of geographical and spatial apprehension….The 
centuries-old designation of geographical space to the east of Europe as 
‘Oriental’ was partly political, partly doctrinal, and partly imaginative….In 
the classical and often temporarily remote form in which it was reconstructed 
by the Orientalist, in the precisely actual form in which the modern Orient was 
lived in, studied, or imagined, the geographical space of the Orient was 
penetrated, worked over, taken hold of. (210-211, original emphasis) 
At the same time, many scholars have pointed out that the specific modality of 
colonial practices and institutions were, in turn, shaped by the particular techniques 
and understandings employed by the Western colonizers. As Benedict Anderson 
(1991) points out in talking about the effects of western classificatory techniques,  
European-style maps worked on the basis of a totalizing classification, and led 
their bureaucratic producers and consumers toward policies with revolutionary 
consequences. Ever since John Harrison’s 1761 invention of the chronometer, 
which made possible the precise calculation of longitudes, the entire planet’s 
curved surface had been subjected to a geometrical grid which squared off 
empty seas and unexplored regions in measured boxes. The task of, as it were, 
‘filling in’ the boxes was to be accomplished by explorers, surveyors, and 
military forces. (173) 
Ultimately, these critical accounts of imperial geopolitical imaginaries and 
practices emphasize that a certain modality of apprehending the world as a single, 
solitary space—a space that is essentially empty, static, quantifiable, homogeneous, 
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and passive—is present in different forms of knowledge that “encode and legitimate 
the aspirations of… expansion and empire” (Pratt 1992: 5). 
The question of spatialized forms of knowledge and practice also are at the 
heart of Foucault’s analysis of modern forms of social and political power. For 
example, in his study of the development of disciplinary forms of power, Foucault 
noted how the latter often operated through spatial arrangements, classifications and 
distributions as well as modifications in subjects’ environments. Foucault wrote that  
the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional 
and hierarchical…spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; 
they carve out individual segments and establish operational links; they mark 
places and indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals, but 
also a better economy of time and gesture. (1995: 148). 
Foucault theorized that it was the creation of classificatory schemes such as 
different kinds of “tables” (which he euphemistically refers to as “tableaux vivants”) 
that enabled the transformation of “the confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into 
ordered multiplicities” (148). Thus, whether it was the classification of living beings; 
the observation, supervision, and regularization of the circulation of commodities and 
money; the inspection and surveillance of bodies composing an armed forces; the 
classification and distribution of patients in a hospital; and so on, Foucault argues that 
it is the combination of “analysis, supervision and intelligibility” that constitute “a 
technique of power and a procedure of knowledge” (148). 
When Foucault turned his attention from the study of disciplinary power 
toward a genealogy of liberal government and rationalities of rule, the role of spatial 
logics and practices remained crucial. If the former—the “anatomo-politics” of 
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disciplinary power—focused on the management and control of the individual 
subjects of society, Foucault’s later analyses focused on the more macro or “bio-
political” forms of power that sought to manage and control populations.19 In these 
governmentality studies, the organization and politics of space are crucial for 
understanding the technologies of government associated with the modern, 
administrative state (Foucault 2007a). As Stuart Elden (2007: 30) puts it, in the 
governmentality lectures,  
Foucault’s concern is … not with discipline, as his earlier works of the mid-
1970s had looked at, but with the spaces of security, of the government of a 
polity. He is concerned with the way in which sovereignty, discipline and 
security are each connected to a particular spatial distribution [répartition]. 
The question of circulation of goods, people and wealth emerges as a 
particular concern in terms of commerce within and between states, but also 
for health and hygiene, and surveillance.  
Foucault identifies the development of a new modality of power—what he 
calls “apparatuses of security”—that do not replace but rather complement and is 
grafted upon disciplinary forms of power. Whereas the latter  
operates through the enclosure and circumscription of space, security requires 
the opening up and release of spaces, to enable circulation and passage. 
Although circulation and passage will require some regulation, this should be 
minimal. Discipline seeks to regulate everything while security seeks to 
regulate as little as possible, but in order to enable: discipline is isolating, 
working on measures of segmentation, while security seeks to incorporate, 
and distribute more widely. (Elden 2007: 30; Foucault 2007a: 9-21, 29-49) 
 
19 Foucault first distinguishes between these two “poles” of modern power in a lecture given in Brazil 
in 1976. See Foucault (2007b). He further elaborates on this distinction in Foucault (1990: 139-140).  
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Thus, the rise of the administrative state (or what Foucault (2007a: 109) calls the 
“governmentalization of the state”) was accompanied by a shift in the operations of 
power in general but also with the way that spatial technologies were deployed within 
overall apparatuses of power. As John Pickles (2004: 131) observes, “mapping, social 
statistics, public health, moral education, and the institutions of urban planning and 
administration were from the beginning thoroughly spatialized practices of identity 
construction and social engineering.” 
However, as with much of the early governmentality literature, most of the 
research into the spatial elements of governmentality has focused on governmental 
rationalities and programs within national spaces. In general this is also true of 
Foucault's analysis in the governmentality lectures, with one important exception. 
The exception is Foucault’s analysis of what he terms a set of  “new diplomatic-
military techniques” that emerged some time in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries and was one of the cornerstones of the governmentalization of the state 
(2007a: 296). Foucault’s argument is that, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
there occurred two fundamental transformations to the way the state was understood. 
First, with the emergence of a new raison d’état, the state—its stability, preservation, 
and power—is considered the ultimate finality of politics (2007a: 286-290). 
Secondly, there is what Foucault describes as the decline of “the old forms of 
universality” offered by visions of Empire and a unified Christian ecumene (291). 
Taken together, these two transformations in political reason, along with a number of 
other historical developments such as the conquest of the Americas and the Protestant 
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revolution, provide the basis for what has since been conceptualized as the 
Westphalian state-based order: 
We are now dealing with absolute units, as it were, with no subordination or 
dependence between them, at least for the major states, and…these units 
assert themselves, in a space of increased, extended, and intensified economic 
exchange. They seek to assert themselves in a space of commercial 
competition and domination, in a space of monetary circulation, colonial 
conquest, and control of the seas, and all this gives each state’s self-assertion 
not just the form of each being its own end…but also this form of 
competition.20 (291-292)  
Foucault argues that the new diplomatic-military techniques associated with 
the modern state form one of two poles of the modern political order. The other pole 
is a science of police, or Polizeiwissenschaft, that seeks to ensure the wealth and 
happiness of the inhabitants of a state in order to maintain or increase the state’s 
power. Taken together, these two poles constitute a new form of governmentality 
whose common aim is the preservation of a dynamic set of forces. 
On the one hand, the diplomatic-military apparatus seeks to stabilize the set of 
forces external to the state, which is to say, the relations between European states in 
terms of territorial frontiers, commercial trading, military power, etc. The objective 
here, as Foucault tells us, is “the balance of Europe.” On the other hand, the apparatus 
 
20 While Foucault’s description here of the Westphalian political order resembles in some senses both 
realist and neo-realist descriptions of the international order, there are of course crucial differences. 
Most obviously, whereas realist and neo-realist accounts of the international system construe the latter 
as timeless, Foucault historicizes its emergence. Secondly, Foucault also historicizes the emergence of 
the modern state itself, arguing that this development is inextricably connected with the constitution of 
an inter-state system. Finally, Foucault’s historical analysis calls attention to the role of a major 
transformation in political thought and political strategy in the construction of both the modern state 
and the modern state system. Thus, it might be said that anarchy is not “what states make of it” (Wendt 
1992), but rather is made possible by shifting discursive practices and diagrams of power. I will take 
up this idea again in Chapter Four. 
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of police seeks to stabilize the set of forces internal to the state, which is to say, the 
maintenance of “good order” within a state in terms of the productivity, health and 
growth of its population (Foucault: 296-306; 323-326). 
However, Foucault claims that the unity of these two forms of governmental 
power is displaced by the eighteenth century with the development of apparatuses of 
security, which have as their primary target a new object of political reason—the 
population, or “society.” The key development, Foucault argues, is the rise of a new 
form of political reason that understands the population, or society, as a natural 
phenomenon with its own internal logics and processes which must be allowed a 
certain degree of autonomy and the exercise of a different type of political power—
more management and less direct, coercive control (2007a: 348-354). The result is 
that 
the unitary project of police in the classical seventeenth and eighteenth 
century sense of the term—increasing the state’s power while respecting the 
general order—will now be dismantled, or rather it will be embodied in 
different institutions or mechanisms. On one side will be the great 
mechanisms of incentive-regulation: the economy, management of the 
population, etcetera. Then, with simply negative functions, there will be the 
institution of police in the modern sense of the term, which will simply be the 
instrument by which one prevents the occurrence of certain disorders. (2007a: 
353-354) 
So far, Foucault’s insights into the connection between the changing nature of 
the exercise of political power and the different ways that governmental projects and 
practices work through and actively produce different spatialities have been employed 
primarily in the analysis of phenomena within national spaces. Important exceptions 
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include Larner and Walters’ (2004a) outline of a governmentality approach to 
globalization and Hindess’ (2001, 2004, 2005, 2008) analysis of the connection 
between liberal governmentality and the constitution of an international space made 
up of self-governing polities, both discussed above.21  
Furthermore, in addition to applying a governmentality analytics to the 
international or global “level” of analysis, a few studies have also examined how 
other supra- or trans-national spaces have been constructed as part of governmental 
projects. The main focus in this literature has been on the construction of geographic 
regions as part of neoliberal governmental projects (Donegan 2006; Larner & Walters 
2002; Newstead 2009; Sparke 2002; Sparke, et al. 2004; Walters & Haahr 2005). 
Regional spaces can vary from cross-border zones that include parts of the territory of 
two adjacent countries, to small multi-country regions such as the Indonesia–
Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle, and to larger geographic zones such as those 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union 
(EU). Of course the phenomena of transnational regions is not new; what is new is the 
language of ‘regionalism’ and how it has been inscribed within a specifically 
neoliberal rationality. For the most part, then, governmentality scholars have focused 
on regions that have a primarily economic logic, although most studies are careful to 
follow a Foucauldian methodology and take the economic as an element of an overall 
 
21 While Neumann and Sending (2007) argue for analyzing the international as a form of 
governmentality, their paper does not offer much in the way of a substantive discussion of how to 
actually carry out such research—not surprising since much of the paper is devoted to comparing and 
contrasting Foucault with Weber and Hans Morgenthau. See also Leira (2009) for a discussion of how 
a governmentality approach can provide a more thorough account of the development of the inter-state 
system in early modernity. In Neumann and Sending (forthcoming 2010) the authors aim to provide an 
in-depth analysis of both the historical developments and contemporary forms of governmentality at 
work in constituting the international system. 
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political reason and not a description of the “true” nature of these projects. Thus, for 
example, Matthew Sparke and Victoria Lawson (2003) speak of “geoeconomics” as a 
new form of political rationality for representing and remapping political 
communities. 
One important implication of the study of these “geoeconomic” regions is the 
way they complicate discourses of globalization that rely on a local-global binary and 
that describe the contemporary world in terms of processes of de-territorialization. 
Neoliberal regionalism offers, instead, a concrete example of how much of the 
phenomena associated with globalization involves processes of re-territorialization 
and the construction of new spaces of governance (Sparke 2005: chapter 2).22 This 
lack of foundation for territoriality and the dynamic of de- and reterritorialization 
connected with contemporary capitalism has an important implication, namely that 
the different phenomena associated with globalization contribute to the production 
not only of the global but also a range of “scales”—from the continental to the sub-
individual (or dividual).  
A possible way to better understand some of the broader dynamics and 
structures associated with “globalization” is to examine them in their actualities—in 
the ways that complex assemblages of governmentality emerge, function and 
collide—some times producing resonance (Connolly 2005), other times friction 
(Tsing 2005). Importantly, this also means attending to the ways these governmental 
assemblages attempt to (re)inscribe certain spatialities—not only the global, but also a 
 
22 Although working from a different theoretical register, Deleuze and Guattari’s examination of the 
connection between capitalism and processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization still 
provides a powerful theoretical vocabulary and framework. See (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 222-262, 
1987: 453-456)  
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whole host of spatialities including the individual, the national, and the hemispheric. 
However, a governmentality perspective also looks at the possible transformation of 
the various logics and rationalities that are productive of and produced by specific 
spatial imaginaries. Thus, for example, the production of national space or scale, 
while it reproduces and reinforces a certain spatial imaginary, similar in many ways 
to what Foucault describes in terms of juridico-sovereign and  “racial” logics (2003b), 
is also a form of governmentality, or a way of ordering social reality (2007a). While 
the production of a national socio-spaital governmental logic may have been one of 
“territory, authority, and rights” (Sassen 2006), the present study will show that today 
it is also governed according to a logic of entrepreneurialism, where competition is to 
be managed through technologies such as country branding and the marketing of the 
national space.  
These transformations of contemporary social imaginaries and rationalities of 
government also raise the question of how the meaning and aims of political action 
are being redefined and re-imagined. In the present study, the focus is on a loose 
assemblage of different political rationalities and technologies, subjectivities, 
knowledges and practices that operates on the basis of a global, neoliberal logic, but 
that have the Americas as their object. The history of the Americas as a socio-spatial 
imaginary is complex, and in fact there exist and have existed multiple imaginings of 
the Americas—either as unitary or as divided between different, even opposed, 
Americas (Mignolo 2005). The empirical focus of the present study is on various 
discourses and projects that imagine the Americas as a liberal space of commerce and 
economic competition, composed of entrepreneurial actors along a variety of scales—
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the individual, the local, the national, the regional, the hemispheric—but all of which 
exist in relation to and must operate on the basis of a global reality. Thus, rather than 
spatial “scales,” I will refer in the present study to various “sites” of neoliberal 
assemblage (Schatzki 2002, 2005). 
Within this global imaginary, the present study examines three 
complementary and overlapping modalities, or “sites” of the global social and 
political imaginary: globalization, global governance, and global civil society. A 
central premise of the study is that these represent three core elements of a neoliberal 
political imaginary: the market, the state, and civil society. A related premise is that 
the social processes and phenomena associated with the term globalization are 
producing “new geographies of governmentality” (Appadurai 2002: 24) Thus the 
present study examines some of the specific elements of a project that aims to 
construct a global polity on the basis a liberal political imaginary—as well as the 
difficulties inherent in such an endeavor when the principal categories of the liberal 
political imaginary are applied outside of what has traditionally been their locus in the 
nation-state. At the same time, the empirical focus of the study is on the constitution 
of the Americas as a multilayered neoliberal political space. Thus the analysis will 
attend to the different ways that three basic sites of the global liberal political 
imaginary—globalization, global governance, and global civil society—are connected 
with specific projects for constructing neoliberal subjects and spaces in the Americas. 
CHAPTER TWO: GLOBALIZATION 
 
The public and leaders of most countries continue to live in a mental universe that no 
longer exists—a world of separate nations—and have great difficulties thinking in 
terms of global perspectives and interdependence. 
The liberal premise of a separation between the political and economic realm is 
obsolete: issues related to economics are at the heart of modern politics. 
—Toward a Renovated International System 
(Trilateral Task Force Report: 1977)  
Introduction 
Globalization has become a central element in the contemporary social 
imaginary, both enacted by as well as framing the different ways in which social 
space and contemporary politico-cultural dynamics are understood. Within the 
academic field it has been installed as an increasingly formalized object for study and 
investigation. Originally a term used within the field of business management to 
describe the increasing homogenization and integration of markets throughout the 
world, by the 1990s globalization had become a major object of study and theoretical 
elaboration within the social sciences. Thus, for example, in the introductory chapter 
of an edited volume on Global Modernities, Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (1995: 
1) wrote that “‘Globalization’ has become an increasingly influential paradigm in the 
human sciences since the beginning of the 1990s [and has emerged] as the central 
thematic for social theory.” Similarly, social theorist Anthony Giddens has argued 
that gobalization “is a term which must have a key position in the lexicon of the 
social sciences” (1990: 52). The proliferation of texts written on the subject of 
globalization led Douglas Kellner (1997) to observe that “the ubiquity of the term 
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‘globalization’ suggests that it is part of a reconfiguring and rethinking of 
contemporary social theory and politics that is caught up in some of the central 
debates and conflicts of the present age.” 
Within the discipline of International Relations (IR), globalization has also 
become a major object of study as well as a paradigm for understanding recent 
transformations in world politics. IR scholar Robert Keohane has been extremely 
influential in articulating concepts that describe, within a liberal institutionalist 
framework, the changing nature of world politics. The latter has been described in 
terms of “transnationalism” (Keohane & Nye 1971), “complex interdependence” 
(Keohane & Nye 1977), and “international regimes” (Keohane 1984). More recently, 
Keohane has turned to the concept of globalization to describe contemporary world 
politics. He explains the shift in terminology in the introduction to a volume of his 
collected essays: 
When globalization became the buzzword of the 1990s, my first reaction was 
to regard it as journalistic hype: interdependence in flashier but less revealing 
garb…But it is frustrating to try to row against a strong tide or sail directly 
into the wind. To be heard, the scholar has to speak to the concerns of his era 
in the language of his era. Doing so gets people hooked; then one can proceed 
to the analysis that may increase their understanding or at least raise questions 
about their preconceptions. 
At one level, then, “interdependence” was simply overtaken by 
“globalization” as the fashionable language to describe increases in economic 
openness and integration. But at a deeper level, changes in terminology reflect 
changes in reality…Globalization moves beyond linkages between separate 
societies to the reorganization of life on a transnational basis…globalization is 
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to interdependence as Federal Express is to the exchange of letters between 
national post offices.23 (2002: 14-15)  
We can see here a strong ambivalence on the part of Keohane regarding the 
reasons for adopting the language of the global: on the one hand, it is merely a matter 
of following current convention; on the other hand, the term points to a fundamental 
change in social reality, a deepening and intensifying of what liberal theorists had 
studied in terms of complex interdependence and the increased importance of 
international institutions and regimes to world politics. In fact, Keohane (2002) 
argues that the changes referred to by the concepts of globalization (the process) and 
globalism (the result) have produced a qualitative shift in that we can now genuinely 
speak of the existence of a global social, economic, and political system. 
At the same time that the idea of globalization has become paradigmatic 
within the academic and intellectual fields, it has also become a powerful concept 
within popular discourses and the languages of everyday life. Consider, for example, 
U.S. President Bill Clinton’s comment in the 2000 State of the Union address that 
globalization is “the central reality of our time” (Clinton 2000). Similarly, we can 
point to the recurrent deployment of the idea that we live in an increasingly 
globalized world in a recent encyclical by Pope Benedict XVI (2009) as further 
evidence that not only for secular but also spiritual authorities, globalization has 
become foundational for shared understandings of our social and political present.  
 
23 It is worth noting that Fed Ex is not only an example of the role of global transportation networks in 
promoting globalization. The company is also a major supporter of the World Economic Forum and 
the latter’s Global Competitiveness Report. In touting their contribution to this work, Fed Ex states that 
“[it] is committed to advancing free trade and driving global commerce and economic development. 
We support the World Economic Forum’s dedication to improving the state of the world by engaging 
leaders in regulatory, industry, and economic cooperation” (World Economic Forum 2009: 479).  
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The central premise of the present study is that one of the central features of 
contemporary world politics is the production of a global liberal imaginary. This 
global liberal imaginary takes up and reworks the liberal notion of three separate sites 
of human existence – the state, society, and the market – and transposes them onto an 
imagined global space. However, projecting these sites onto a global space also 
entails a reconceptualization of the sites and their relation to each other. Furthermore, 
the re-imagination of the state, society, and the market as global is also intimately 
connected with novel formulations of governmental rationalities and technologies. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, the notion of governmentality posits a domain of 
analysis that focuses on the strategic and programmatic dimensions of power—the 
forms of knowledge, technologies, rationalities, and subjectivities that are assembled 
in order to shape and direct the relationships and activities of subjects. In this chapter, 
the concern is to better understand how discourses of globalization and the global 
market/economy function as a form of governmentality.  
Drawing on Foucault’s lectures on liberalism and neoliberalism, this chapter 
examines how discourses of globalization and of the global economy are related to a 
transformation from a liberal to a neoliberal governmentality. Far from being a static 
category, the idea of the market has undergone profound transformations within 
liberal rationalities of government. From a naturally existing space of free circulation 
and exchange in eighteenth century liberal thought, the market has become in 
contemporary neoliberal governmentality a site of inequality and competition that 
needs to be developed and fostered. This chapter explores some of the implications 
that this shift in governmental rationalities has for contemporary world politics by 
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examining projects for regional economic integration in the Western hemisphere. 
Free trade, it will be suggested, has undergone a change in signification from liberal 
to neoliberal governmentality. 
Globalization as the Global Market 
The idea of globalization—as contained in expert, academic, and popular 
discourse—is decidedly multivalent. It can refer to a variety of phenomena: the 
spread of American popular culture, increasing social interconnectedness produced by 
new information and communication technologies, and the global expansion of a 
capitalist economic system. The focus of the present analysis will be on discourses of 
globalization that understand the latter in primarily economic terms, although the 
analysis will also be attentive to the various ways that social, cultural, and political 
elements often slip into economic understandings of globalization.  
Jagdish Bhagwati provides an example of this understanding of globalization 
in his book In Defense of Globalization. Bhagwati notes that the term globalization 
has multiple meanings, but states that his work will focus on economic globalization, 
which he will simply call “globalization.” This, in turn, is defined as the “economic 
integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct 
foreign investment (by corporations and multinationals), short-term capital flows, 
international flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology” 
(Bhagwati 2004: 3). Similarly, author and New York Times columnist Thomas 
Friedman, in his best-selling description of globalization, defines the latter as “the 
inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never 
witnessed before—in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-
states to reach around the world faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before” (1999: 
9). 
This economistic understanding of globalization is not limited to globalization 
boosters such as Bhagwati and Friedman. Marxist geographer David Harvey (1995), 
for example, identifies globalization with the spatial and geographical dynamics of 
capitalist development and class struggle. Susan Strange offered one of the strongest 
articulations of the idea that the global economy was increasingly achieving a degree 
of autonomy and power that exceeded the ability of states to regulate or control: 
The impersonal forces of world markets, integrated over the postwar period 
more by private enterprise in finance, industry and trade than by the 
cooperative decisions of governments, are now more powerful than the states 
to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to 
belong. Where states were once masters of markets, now it is the markets 
which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states. 
(1996: 4) 
Strange’s “retreat of the state” thesis has been challenged on the left by 
thinkers such as Leo Panitch (Panitch 2000; Panitch & Konings 2009) who argue that 
the current international economic order is the product of deliberate decisions made 
by states and their political leaders, particularly in the core G-8 countries and 
especially the US.24  However, even though Panitch argues that “states, and above all 
the world’s most powerful state, have played an active and often crucial role in 
making globalization happen,” the latter is still understood in terms of “untrammeled 
financial speculation, export competition and capital accumulation” (Panitch 2000: 5) 
 
24 A similar point regarding the role of states in promoting globalization is made by Robert W. Cox 
(1996) and Saskia Sassen (1996).  
 43 
 
In other words, whether considered a force for good or ill, and whether 
possessing a power above and beyond the capacity for control by nation-states or the 
product of the latter, the existence of a global economy is a fundamental, taken-for-
granted premise of most articulations of the idea of globalization. Following 
Foucault, however, the approach taken here is to not take for granted the existence of 
something like a global economy, but rather to interrogate how this the “reality” of a 
global economy has been produced and, crucially, how that reality has been put to use 
in governing subjects and spaces. This theoretical point is connected to what some 
commentators have called Foucault’s “historical nominalism” (Balibar 1992; Flynn 
1997: Ch. 2; Lemke 2002; Veyne 1997) and which I call a “critical nominalism.” 
Foucault himself described this in terms of a specific methodology, one that does not 
take 
as a primary, original, and already given object, notions such as the sovereign, 
sovereignty, the people, subjects, the state, and civil society, that is to say, all 
those universals employed by sociological analysis, historical analysis, and 
political philosophy in order to account for real governmental practice. For my 
part, I would like to do exactly the opposite and, starting from this practice as 
it is given, but at the same time as it reflects on itself and is rationalized, show 
how certain things—state and society, sovereign and subjects, etcetera—were 
actually able to be formed, and the status of which should obviously be 
questioned. In other words, instead of deducing concrete phenomena from 
universals, or instead of starting with universals as an obligatory grid of 
intelligibility for certain concrete practices, I would like to start with these 
concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of 
these practices. (2008: 2-3) 
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In describing this methodological or critical nominalism, Foucault also developed the 
concept of “problematization” (Foucault 1991b). This form of analysis, Foucault 
observes, consists of analyzing  
the way institutions, practices, habits, and behavior become a problem for 
people who behave in certain sorts of ways, who have certain types of habits, 
who engage in certain kinds of practices, and who put to work specific kinds 
of institutions…[It] is the analysis of the way an unproblematic field of 
experience or a set of practices, which were accepted without question, which 
were familiar and “silent,” out of discussion, becomes a problem, raises 
discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the 
previously silent behavior, habits, practices and institutions. (Foucault & 
Pearson 2001: 74) 
Thus, for example, madness, crime, sexuality can all be analyzed not in terms 
of whether they actually exist or not, nor in terms of their origin and development, but 
instead in terms of how they are constituted as objects of knowledge and, crucially, 
how this enables certain practices and disables others (2008: 115).25  In other words, 
Foucault analyzes ideas not in order to determine their origins and thus better 
understand the historical context in which they emerged, but instead to better grasp 
how they are put to work—to what ends they are applied. Nor is Foucault interested 
 
25 In the same lecture series, Foucault later comments:  
When I say that I am studying the “problematization” of madness, crime, or sexuality, it is not a way of 
denying the reality of such phenomena. On the contrary, I have tried to show that it was precisely some 
real existent in the world which was the target of social regulation at a given moment. The question I 
raise is this one: How and why were very different things in the world gathered together, characterized, 
analyzed, and treated as, for example, “mental illness”? What are the elements which are relevant for a 
given “problematization”? And even if I won’t say that what is characterized as “schizophrenia” 
corresponds to something real in the world, this has nothing to do with idealism. For I think there is a 
relation between the thing which is problematized and the process of problematization. The 
problematization is an “answer” to a concrete situation which is real (2008: 115). 
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in any forms of knowledge; his analysis focuses on those that seem crucial for 
understanding particular modes of social regulation and of social power. 
Furthermore, this analytical perspective examines how transformations in 
forms of knowledge and associated ‘regimes of truth’ produce reconfigurations in 
other, oftentimes unrelated, domains. For example, in his lectures on biopolitics and 
the birth of liberalism, Foucault shows how the government of populations (i.e. 
biopolitics) “produces specific dilemmas for liberalism as a principle for the 
rationalization and exercise of government based on a conception of autonomous 
legal subjects endowed with rights and free enterprise of individuals” (Rabinow & 
Rose 2003: xi). Reframed in the context of biopolitics, the manner of presenting and 
dealing with specific issues—for example, “the management of racial difference in 
the colonies, the management of public health, the design of hospitals and sewage 
systems, concerns about the falling birth rate, female fecundity or the location of 
cemeteries” (xi)—are transformed. “New relations, dangers, promises, apparatuses, 
stakes, and quandaries come into view and we can see how our present took shape 
through successive attempts to resolve them” (xii). The job of the “historian of the 
present,” then, is to map out “the complex circuits and relations between our 
knowledges of ourselves as living beings and the practices that made these 
knowledges possible and which they have engendered” (xii). 
 
The Introduction of Political Economy in the Art of Governing 
The implications of this analytical perspective can be seen when we consider 
the problem of the constitution of the market. Most theoretical perspectives take the 
existence of the market for granted—not only liberal theories of world politics, but 
also those inspired by Marxist critical theory. While the market is a source of 
opportunities and challenges for states and institutions for the former, for the latter it 
is a domain that needs to be submitted to the democratic and egalitarian control of 
society. Even those critical perspectives that draw on Karl Polanyi’s insights 
regarding the artificial nature of the market still conceive of the latter in terms of the 
interests of certain sectors of society, whether national or transnational (Robinson & 
Harris 2000). 
From a Foucauldian governmentality perspective, however, there is no trans-
historical social category that is the market. Indeed, what we call the market has 
referred to phenomena that are historically quite different. For example, Foucault 
points out that from at least the Middle Ages until some time in the eighteenth 
century, the market was viewed as “a site of justice” (2008: 30). What Foucault 
means is that for various historical reasons, the market was constituted as a social 
space that was strictly regulated and that ultimately these regulations had as a primary 
concern ensuring that, as far as it was possible, the market operated “fairly”— i.e. 
fraud, crime, and other abuses were curtailed (30-31).  
However, some time in the eighteenth century, due to a number of historical 
factors, the “reality” of the market became inscribed with a different logic.26  
 
26 Foucault is at pains to make clear that he does not offer a causal explanation for “this absolutely 
fundamental phenomenon in the history of Western governmentality, this irruption of the market as a 
principle of veridiction…” While he notes a number of factors that contributed to this phenomenon—
“the particular monetary situation of the eighteenth century, with a new influx of gold on the one hand, 
and a relative consistency of currencies on the other; a continuous economic and demographic growth 
in the same period; an intensification of agricultural production; the access to governmental practice of 
a number of technicians who brought with them both methods and instruments of reflection; and 
finally a number of economic problems being given a theoretical form”— Foucault argues that 
genealogical analysis consists only in establishing “the intelligibility of this process” (2008: 33) 
Foucault further elaborates on this notion of making intelligible different ‘regimes of veridiction’ by 
comparing previous studies on madness, crime, and sexuality (2008: 34-36) See also the editors’ note 
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Beginning with the Physiocrats, the market came to be viewed as a “naturally” 
occurring phenomenon that obeyed its own “natural” logic (2008: 30-35). In this 
context, the market becomes integral to a new ‘regime of truth’, one in which prices 
are no longer linked to fairness, but instead obey a natural logic that must be 
respected and allowed to operate without interference (i.e. one must laisser faire). 
Foucault argues that what takes place is a profound transformation in the constitution 
of the market, from a site of jurisdiction to a “principle of veridiction” (2008: 140). 
That is, the “natural” operation of the market, of the price mechanism determined by 
the interaction between supply and demand, reveals a truth that can be employed to 
“define the limit of governmental competence and the sphere of individual autonomy 
in terms of utility” (Senellart 2008: 328) 
It is there that we can see the application of Foucault’s notion of 
problematization. For the idea of the market as a site of truth for discerning the limits 
of governmentality emerges not as an ideology masking the interests of a social class, 
nor as an “objective” discovery or truth, but as a result of efforts to respond to 
specific problems, including a crucial one: the problem of the periodic scarcity of 
grain, and thus food shortages and hunger. (2008: 32-56). And whereas mercantilist 
government  
had worked for the protection of the wealth of the state by preventing scarcity 
from occurring by various disciplinary restrictions on the cultivation, pricing, 
storage and export of grain, the Physiocrats advocated for an opposite strategy 
that was based on the free circulation of grain, both within and between 
                                                                                                                                           
(8), p. 49 and passages in the 1978 lectures where Foucault elaborates the same theme (2007: 116-117; 
238-239; 244).  
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nations. Instead of working to prevent the one singular event of scarcity, this 
new approach allowed for spontaneous fluctuations in a free circulation, being 
composed of various series of plural events—of pricing, supply, demand, and 
production; of the behavior of producers, consumers, buyers, importers, and 
exporters; of weather conditions; and of the world market—which were now 
all being analyzed as processes not to bring under control but to grant their 
natural course. (Gudmand-Høyer & Hjorth 2009: 107) 
With the Physiocrats, an old concept (the economy) is transformed, applied to 
a pre-existing “problem space” (the population) producing a new form of knowledge 
(political economy) and ultimately operating on the basis of what Foucault calls a 
dispositif de sécurité (2007a: 21). For Foucault, this “security assemblage” represents 
a new technology of government.27 The Physiocrats propose a different way of 
conceiving of problems such as the supply of food, locating these problems within a 
logic of government that views the commerce that occurs within and between 
populations as obeying a specific, natural logic that escapes, and poses a boundary 
for, sovereign control. At the same time, while the Physiocrats pose the market and 
the processes internal to the population as operating on the basis of natural laws, and 
thus requiring an absence of direct control by the sovereign, they still operate within a 
logic of government that seeks to strengthen of the overall power of the sovereign. 
This was because the different components of the territory were in a sense the 
property or at least subjects of the sovereign (2008: 284-285).  
Thus, while the Physiocrats formed a critique of an already existing 
governmental reason—cameralism and raison d’état—that had sought for the 
 
27 See Chapter One, footnote 9, of this study regarding the translation of dispositif as “assemblage,” 
and also Valverde (2007). 
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sovereign to have direct control over the smallest detail of the population, the form of 
governmentality they constructed would itself be the object of a critique by liberal 
political economists who would completely reject “a political reason indexed to the 
state and its sovereignty” (2008: 284). The crucial development in the technology of 
liberal political economy is the transformation of the site of the economy into a limit 
to sovereign knowledge and control, and the transformation of the population from a 
source of power for the sovereign to the object, justification, and ultimately subject of 
government. This new site, according to Foucault, is civil society, society, or the 
nation (296, 295-311, and passim). 
Neoliberalism and the Market 
A crucial point, then, is that these categories do not refer to some pre-existing 
reality that they merely identify and call attention to. Nor are they static; the market 
that forms part of the governmentality is different in important ways to the market of 
liberal political economists such as Adam Smith. And, crucially, the mechanisms and 
assemblages of government, the political techniques and technologies, and the 
domains of knowledge and objects of government also change in relation both in their 
relation to each other and within more general regimes of truth. This also means that 
something such as a “free trade” treaty between nations does not exist as a natural, 
transhistorical phenomenon, since the basic categories of which it is composed—free 
trade and the nation, for example—have themselves undergone significant 
transformations and occupy different positions within shifting regimes of truth and 
political rationalities. 
In fact, an important dimension of Foucault’s genealogy of liberal 
governmentality has to do with the mutations in political reason represented by more 
recent neo-liberal modes of governmentality. Just as liberal governmentality emerged 
as a series of problematizations of already existing forms of government, so too 
neoliberalism emerges in the twentieth century in the midst of what Foucault calls a 
“crisis of governmentality” (2008: 76). A common theme, then, in Foucault’s analysis 
is that novel forms of governmentality find their ‘conditions of possibility’ amid 
instability and upheaval, when already existing truth regimes lose their coherence and 
their legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the technologies of power associated with different forms of 
governmentality involve taking up elements of previous governmental technologies, 
reshaping and recombining them in addition to novel elements, ultimately producing 
something that did not exist before. It is thus important, following Foucault, to not 
view specific governmental rationalities and technologies as embodying the essence 
of some more general regime of power. Thus, as Stephen Collier (2009) points out, 
Foucault does not present the Physiocrats as representative of an emerging 
biopolitics. Instead he calls attention to the ways they “maneuver between a persistent 
sovereignty and a technology of power based on a figure of population that cannot be 
subject to sovereign law. They are actively engaged in recombining elements of 
sovereign power and security, and adapting them to the problems of population 
growth, expanded trade and urbanization in the 18th century” (95). 
Similarly, the German neoliberals, or “Ordoliberals”28 draw on elements of 
classical liberalism, including the idea of the free market as a site of veridiction for 
 
28 The German neoliberals are also referred to as “Ordoliberals” due to their role in directing and 
publishing important texts in the journal Ordo (Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft, usually translated as The Ordo Yearbook of Economic and Social Order). 
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governmental power. However, they are dealing with different ‘problems’ than their 
liberal predecessors, and thus construct new spaces of problematization as part of 
their critique of government.29 Specifically, there emerges a powerful critique of 
governmental reason that is framed in anti-statist terms, representing a kind of “state 
phobia” (2008: 76-78, 187-191). For Foucault, it is this reaction to the governmental 
crises of the first half of the twentieth century—the disasters of two world wars and 
great depression, the rise of different forms of totalitarianism (fascist and state 
socialist)—that marks the neoliberalism that emerges from the 1930s to 1950s both a 
novel and important form of governmentality. 
This “state phobia” or anti-statist discourse is, Foucault argues, the glue that 
binds together the many heterogeneous elements of post-war neoliberalism. The role 
that anti-statist discourse plays within neoliberal forms of governmentality can be 
better understood by referring again to Foucault’s notion of problematization. 
Foucault argues that “for a domain of action, a behavior, to enter the field of thought 
it is necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made 
it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around it. 
These elements result from social, economic, or political processes. But here, their 
only role is that of integration” (2003a: 23). Thus the neoliberalism that emerges in 
the first half of the twentieth century is able to bring together what might seem like 
disparate phenomena—Soviet totalitarianism, German fascism, and English post-war 
state planning—and integrate them within a form of problematization that posits an 
 
29 The German neoliberals are also referred to as “ordoliberals” due to their role in directing and 
publishing important texts in the journal Ordo (or “order”).  
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intrinsic tendency of the state to expand its powers at the expense of society and 
individual freedom (2008: 76).  
For Foucault, this integration function within the neoliberal problematization 
of the state is crucial, for as soon as the “genetic continuity” is established between 
different forms of state (administrative, bureaucratic, welfare, fascist, and totalitarian) 
and there is attributed to the state an intrinsic expansionary drive, “it then becomes 
possible not only to use different analyses to support each other, but also to refer them 
back to each other and so deprive them of their specificity” (2008: 187). Thus, for 
example, European neoliberals argued that state planning in wartime and post-war 
England would produce similar conditions to those that gave rise to Nazism in 
Germany (190).30  
Again, an important point is that the different historical actualizations of a 
liberal form of governmentality are not dealing with the same ‘reality’. As Nils 
Goldschmidt and Hermann Rauchenschwandtner comment, “The considerable 
differences that are to be found within the liberal discourse, from the modern 
founding fathers of economics (David Hume, Adam Smith) to the ordoliberal, 
American, and Austrian versions of liberalism, affect the relation between nature and 
… order, between the market and competition, as well as the structure of the 
economic subject” (2007: 7). 
 
30 Friedrich von Hayek (1944) makes this argument. It is tempting to view the current political 
discourse in the United States, in which President Obama is simultaneously accused of being a socialist 
and a fascist as an example of this form of anti-statist discourse that conflates state socialism and 
fascism. See, for example, Reynolds (2009), where he argues that we are experiencing a “drift toward a 
socialist/fascist state.”  
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Thus, out of the space of problematization posed by the German ordoliberals, 
there emerges a different understanding of the market from the classical liberal 
conceptualization. If for the latter, the market and competition were naturally 
occurring phenomena, for the German ordoliberals these were not natural phenomena 
but instead needed to be produced. Again, the specific, historical problems faced by 
the ordoliberals, as well as the different “material” at their disposal (intellectual, 
institutional, cultural) helped shape the direction that their problematization took. In 
the wake of the National Socialist regime and all its consequences, a crucial question 
was “whether the societal foundations for the existence of capitalism remain[ed] the 
same” (Goldschmitt & Rauchenschwandtner 2007: 8). 
The response to this question was that Nazism had severely impaired the 
social basis necessary for the functioning of a market economy. The solution that the 
German ordoliberals proposed was a “social market economy” (Peacock & 
Willgerodt 1989). This formulation involved a unique manner of conceiving of the 
relationship between state, society and market. Rather than locating the market within 
society and posing these two overlapping domains as the limit for the state, as with 
the classical liberals, the German ordoliberals saw the need for strengthening both the 
institutions of civil society—particularly the Church and small-sized civic 
associations—and the institutions of the state in order to make possible the 
functioning of the market. The crucial idea is that the competitive market is not, as 
classical liberals thought, a naturally occurring phenomenon but instead requires 
certain conditions to exist—most importantly a strong ethical basis (which the 
ordoliberals anchored in the Christian church), strong social bonds (the existence of a 
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Volksgemeinschaft), and a strong state, that is, one that provides the Rule of Law, or 
Rechsstaat (Streit & Wohlgemuth 2000). 
It is in this last element, the role of the state and its relationship to the market 
that we can see the novelty of German neoliberalism as a form of liberal 
governmentality. If for the classical liberals the role of the state was to help maintain 
social order and to guarantee private property and the enforcement of contracts, the 
German neoliberals see the state as crucial in constituting the market as a competitive 
order (Streit & Wohlgemuth 2000: 230). The central concern of the ordoliberals “was 
to establish ‘order’ as a set of legal rules for a society of essentially self-reliant 
decision makers whose actions are controlled and coordinated by market 
competition” (230). 
Thus, the “strong state” that the ordoliberals propose is not an end in itself, but 
rather a narrowly limited means used to achieving a functioning economic order, one 
based on the principle of competition. (Goldschmitt & Rauchenschwandtner 2007). 
Furthermore, Foucault argues that it is in this concept of a “competitive order” that a 
whole new terrain of governmentality is composed: 
Government must not form a counterpoint or a screen, as it were, between 
society and economic processes. It has to intervene on society as such, in its 
fabric and depth. Basically, it has to intervene on society so that competitive 
mechanisms can play a regulatory role at every moment and every point in 
society and by intervening in this way its objective will become possible, that 
is to say, a general regulation of society by the market.31 (2008: 145) 
 
31 Foucault goes on to say, “So this will not be the kind of economic government imagined by the 
physiocrats, that is to say, a government which only has to recognize and observe economic laws; it is 
not an economic government, it is a government of society” (145-146). 
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Note that this represents a fundamental transformation in liberal thought: 
competition is not a naturally occurring fact of socio-economic reality; it needs to be 
produced. Thus, not only does it make little sense to present neoliberalism as a return 
to the laissez faire, free market philosophy of classical liberalism, since neoliberalism 
proposes a great deal of governmental action in order to produce the conditions that 
make market competition possible; but also because, as mentioned above, there is no 
trans-historical reality that is the market to which both eighteenth century liberalism 
and twentieth century liberalism could refer. The market of the German neoliberals is 
not the same as the market of Adam Smith; the latter is a naturally occurring site of 
exchange, the former is a realm of competition that must be produced. 
Clearly there are many factors that made possible this understanding of the 
market and competition, including those associated with the rise of industrial 
capitalist society, mass social and political movements, and the expansion of the state 
in Western societies (Goldschmidt n.d.). However, none of these factors, or their 
interconnection, pre-determines the kind of problematization offered by the German 
neoliberals. Rather, the latter take up different elements of liberal thought and diverse 
institutional and political ideas that had already existed in Germany and other 
countries, recombine and rework these elements, and assemble a new form of 
governmental reason. And, as Foucault argues, the results have a profound 
importance for the forms of government and social regulation that exist today. 
The most important legacy of this formulation of neoliberal governmentality 
is that, in posing the market and competition as a principle of social regulation, it 
makes possible a governmental technology that is both “lighter” and more extensive 
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and intensive. It is “lighter” in the sense that it relies increasingly less on sovereign as 
well as disciplinary modes of power—that is, less on the law and the norm—and 
operates more through the mobilization of certain types of subjectivity. At the same 
time, this new form of power—neoliberal governmentality—is more extensive and 
intensive in that it seeks to “have the greatest possible surface and depth and…also 
the greatest possible volume in society” (Foucault 2008: 147). As already mentioned, 
this is made possible by a shift in the understanding of the market, from a site of 
production and exchange to an all-pervasive reality of competition. By extending the 
principle of competition throughout society, the goal is that “individuals should not 
only realize their desires on the market, but also actually desire a competitive market” 
(Goldschmitt & Rauchenschwandtner 2007: 23). Thus, at the level of society, the aim 
is to produce “an enterprise society”; at the level of the subject, the aim is to produce 
what Foucault calls homo oeconomicus (2008: 147, 173, 225-226, 276-278, 291-294). 
It is this logic of competition, of an “ethic of enterprise” (2008: 175) that, for 
Foucault, is the most important element of neoliberal forms of governmentality. This 
insight also opens up a perspective on neoliberalism that is quite different from the 
understanding of the latter as entailing a reduction in government in favor of the 
market. The idea of the “retreat of the state” (Strange 1996) associated with 
neoliberalism is in a certain sense misleading. For, as Foucault demonstrates, 
neoliberalism actually entails an extension of government, that is, a partial 
replacement of the direct government of society by the state with a form of 
government at a distance conducted by myriad social actors, organizations, and 
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institutions (including the state). As Jacques Donzelot (2008: 54) argues, what takes 
place is  
a destatification of government which goes in hand with the appearance of 
social technologies which delegate responsibility for individuals to other 
autonomous entities: enterprises, communities, professional organizations, 
individuals themselves. The use of contractual agreements, defined of 
objectives, measures of performance, combined with local autonomy, allows 
this shift of responsibility to governmental action at a distance.  
Of course, the ethos of competition and responsibility that is part of neoliberal 
forms of governmentality does not only operate at the individual level—it is also 
applied to organizations and institutions, including state agencies, the state, countries, 
as well as international organizations and institutions. It is here that we can see how 
Foucault’s analysis of governmentality provides a powerful conceptual framework for 
studying “global” forms of governmentality. In the following section, I examine how 
the constitution of the global market as a site of competition operates as part of a 
more general, neoliberal technology of government. The example of the project for a 
Free Trade of the Americas is used to illustrate some of the different elements 
associated with this neoliberal governmental assemblage. 
Neoliberalism and Globalization 
The problem of free trade was a central one within the process of constructing 
an international economic order undertaken by the victors of the Second World War 
and their allies, an order that came to be called the Bretton Woods system (Hoekman 
& Kostecki 1995). However, as John Ruggie (1982) has pointed out, the Bretton 
Woods economic order represented a different kind of liberalism than the liberalism 
of the 19th century international economic order under British hegemony. The post-
World War II order, Ruggie famously argued, was characterized instead by a kind of 
“embedded liberalism.” The latter was based on Keynesian principles rather than the 
“laissez-faire” principles of classical liberalism, as capitalist countries attempted to 
“reconcile the efficiency of markets with the values of social community that markets 
themselves require in order to survive and thrive” (Ruggie 2008: 231). As Ruggie 
explains, “the underlying idea was…a grand social bargain whereby all sectors of 
society agreed to open markets, which in some sectors had become heavily 
administered if not autarchic in the 1930s, but also to contain and share the social 
adjustment costs that open markets inevitably produce” (2008: 231). 
The last two decades, however, have witnessed a dramatic change in the 
international economic order which, if we stay within the neo-Polanyian framework 
employed by Ruggie, is characterized by a “disembedding” of the market from 
society.32 Ruggie follows many other scholars and commentators in attributing this 
transformation to the forces associated with economic globalization. He argues that 
the   
grand social bargain [contained within] … embedded liberalism presupposed 
an international world. It presupposed the existence of national economies, 
engaged in external transactions, conducted at arm’s length, which 
governments could mediate at the border by tariffs and exchange rates, among 
other tools. The globalization of financial markets and production chains, 
however, challenges each of these premises and threatens to leave behind 
merely national social bargains. (232, original emphasis) 
 
32 The notion of the “embeddedness” or “disembeddedness” of the market from society was formulated 
by Karl Polanyi (1944).  
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The transformation from the embedded liberalism of the Bretton Woods era to 
the current international, or rather global, economic order has been analyzed and 
discussed across a range of disciplines and from a variety of theoretical perspectives. 
The idea that this transformation is being driven by changes within the nature of 
capitalist production and capitalist society and related technological developments is 
not new, emerging first in the 1970s, for example in Ernest Mandel’s (1975) 
conceptualization of “late capitalism,” and Daniel Bell’s (1976)  theorization of 
“post-industrial society.”33 This, in turn, has provided a major conceptual basis for 
those who have theorized the ways that state sovereignty in general and, more 
specifically, the social compromise represented by the welfare state, have been 
challenged by the forces of globalization. Ultimately, it is argued, the emergence of a 
fully global market economy and the related need for global competitiveness have 
limited the options available to states and policymakers at the national level, forcing 
them to open up their economies and more fully integrate into the global economy 
(Mishra 1999). 
This understanding of the impact of globalization on states and national 
societies is shared alike by those who see this as a positive change and those who are 
critical of it. For the former, globalization is seen as “a welcome loosening of political 
constraints on economic production and exchange and as a force leading to greater 
political and economic integration worldwide” (Yeates 2002: 71). For the latter, the 
 
33 More recent variations on this theme include Manuel Castells’s “network society.” In fact, Castells 
represents an interesting figure within this line of thought, since he has explicitly drawn on and further 
developed earlier notions of a shift from an industrial to an information-based economy and society, 
while also theorizing the connection between these developments, globalization, and the impact on 
domestic institutional structures, particularly the demise of the welfare state. Cf. Castells (1996, 2005).  
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results are viewed in generally negative terms. However, the general understanding of 
the impact of economic globalization on national societies is similar. Thus, for 
example, Yeats argues: 
Buffeted by the winds of global competition, states are expected to pursue 
social and economic policies which are most attractive to transnational capital 
and foreign investment. Governments will increasingly stay clear of programs 
of redistribution, renationalization or other forms of intervention of which 
capital and markets do not “approve.” Those which stray too far outside these 
parameters will be punished electorally and economically, rendering 
themselves vulnerable to lower credit ratings, higher interest rates and 
currency speculation. (2002: 72) 
As another example, Robert W. Cox, one of the more prominent critics of the 
contemporary global economic order in IR, argues that the global organization of 
production and the globalization of financial markets “together constitute a global 
economy”, and that “states must become the instruments for adjusting national 
economic activities to the exigencies of the global economy” (1993: 259-260, 262, 
original emphasis). Similarly, if a bit more dramatically, Ulrich Beck claims that “the 
premises of the welfare state and pension system, of income support, local 
government and infrastructural policies, the power of organized labour, industry-wide 
free collective bargaining, state expenditure, the fiscal system and ‘fair’ taxation: all 
this melts under the withering sun of globalization and becomes susceptible to 
(demands for) political molding” (2000: 1). 
 However, for most critics of globalization, the latter is not the result of 
material factors alone but is also related to a complex of beliefs, ideas or even an 
ideology. This set of beliefs or ideology is most commonly associated with 
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neoliberalism. In some versions, neoliberalism is seen as primarily an ideology that 
seeks to both justify and make seem necessary, unavoidable and inevitable the 
various social, economic, and political transformations associated with the decline of 
the welfare state, the liberalization of finance and trade, deeper integration into the 
world economy, etc. In most accounts of neoliberalism, however, the latter is seen in 
terms of both an ideology as well as a set of policy preferences. Human geographers 
James McCarthy and Scott Prudham argue that “neoliberalism is the most powerful 
ideological and political project in global governance to arise in the wake of 
Keynesianism, a status conveyed by triumphalist phrases such as ‘the Washington 
consensus’ and the ‘end of history’” (2004: 275). Similarly, Kim Moody describes 
neoliberalism as “a mixture of neoclassical economic fundamentalism, market 
regulation in place of state guidance, economic redistribution in favor of capital 
(known as supply-side economics), moral authoritarianism with an idealized family at 
its center, international free trade principles (sometimes inconsistently applied), and a 
thorough intolerance of trade unionism” (1997: 119-120). 
It is worth highlighting Moody’s comment that, while neoliberalism favors 
free trade in principle, this is often not the case in practice. This raises the question of 
the relationship between neoliberalism as ideology and what some scholars call the 
specific policies and programs of “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner & 
Theodore 2002a). For some scholars, it is important to differentiate between a general 
neoliberal ideology, and the specific programs and policies put in place as responses 
to different contexts and situations. The result, Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore argue, 
is  
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a blatant disjuncture between the ideology of neoliberalism and its everyday 
political operations and societal effects. On the one hand, while neoliberalism 
aspires to create a ‘utopia’ of free markets liberated from all forms of state 
interference, it has in practice entailed a dramatic intensification of coercive, 
disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose market rule upon all 
aspects of social life…On the other hand, whereas neoliberal ideology implies 
that self-regulating markets will generate an optimal allocation of investments 
and resources, neoliberal political practice has generated pervasive market 
failures, new forms of social polarization, and a dramatic intensification of 
uneven development at all spatial scales. (2002: 5) 
According to this view, the hypocrisy inherent in the gap between neoliberal 
utopian ideology and the reality of neoliberal governmental policies can be seen in 
the fact that the latter “has tended to subject the majority to the power of market 
forces while preserving social protection for the strong” (Gill 1995: 407). 
Furthermore, this understanding of neoliberalism, prevalent among scholars whose 
work is informed by Marxian political thought, presents a straightforward and 
unidirectional relationship between neoliberalism. Neoliberalism represents both an 
ideology that justifies the expansion and intensification of a global capitalist system, 
and also set of policies that seek to bring about the latter. In other words, from this 
perspective neoliberalism is “the dominant political and ideological form of capitalist 
globalization” (Brenner & Theodore 2002a: 3).  
However, the argument advanced here is that neoliberalism cannot be 
adequately understood if posed as epiphenomenal to the interests of a global capitalist 
class (as argued, for example by Leslie Sklair (2001) and William I. Robinson 
(Robinson 2007). In order for this to be true, neoliberalism could only achieve its 
effects through pure coercion, by “duping” the majority of people, or some 
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combination of both. Foucault’s point about the centrality of the anti-state discourse 
to neoliberalism, however, is to show that this discourse was not unique among the 
political right. The left too, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, denounced the 
totalitarian nature of the state (Foucault 2008: 117). Thus, while the state was 
problematized by both the left and the right, it has been the latter which, on the basis 
of this problematization, has proposed making the market the basis for social and 
political organization. And while this objective may be advanced by specific actors 
and sectors of society with an interest in curtailing the activities of the state and 
expanding the reach of market relations, there are a number of phenomena which are 
often subsumed under the general category of neoliberalism which cannot be 
explained as mere tools for the advancement of the interests of a certain social group 
or class. In the following section, I examine Free Trade Agreements and, particularly, 
Regional Free Trade Agreements, to illustrate how such phenomena are best 
explained by a framework that views neoliberalism as an assemblage of governmental 
rationalities and technologies, rather than the legitimizing discourse of a global 
capitalist class.
Free Trade and Regional Trade Agreements 
The 1990s saw a massive growth in international trade agreements. In 1994, 
the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
concluded, creating the World Trade Organization (WTO)—the first comprehensive, 
formal organization governing international trade (Karns & Mingst 2004: 381). With 
153 current members, the WTO presides over a broad spectrum of rules on trade in 
goods and services, and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs). It also 
promotes trade liberalization throughout the world (World Trade Organization, n.d.). 
In addition to the WTO, there has been a major proliferation of bilateral and regional 
trade agreements since the 1990s. According to the WTO, over 400 regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) have been notified to that organization34—the majority of these 
agreements hve been finalized within the last fifteen years.35  
The question of the proliferation of trade agreements in the last two decades 
has been addressed from a number of theoretical perspectives. For most liberal 
instuitionalist scholars, these agreements represent attempts by countries to deal with 
the exigencies of globalization, particularly the demand of attracting foreign capital 
and investment. Thus, free trade agreements are supposed to be a way for states to 
become more competitive within the context of a global economy (Cerny 1997; 
Prakash & Hart 2000). Some liberal scholars also study the interaction of variables at 
the domestic and international levels of analysis, or what Robert Putnam (1988) has 
called “two-level games.” However, even this approach, which focuses on “both the 
strategic interaction between politicians and interest groups at the domestic arena and 
strategic interaction between governments in the international arena” (Grossman & 
Helpman 1995: 676), still treats economic globalization as an exogenous factor.36  
Furthermore, it is very much state-centric in that its principal focus is on the 
 
34 World Trade Organization, “Regional Trade Agreements”, available at <http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm>, accessed January 2, 2010. 
35 World Trade Organization, “Regional trade agreements notified to the GATT/WTO and in force: By 
date of entry into force”, available at <http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicPreDefRepByEIF.aspx>, accessed 
January 2, 2010. 
36 One perspective does center on the impact of globalization, particularly on developing countries. For 
example, Haggard (1995) argues that the economic transformations of the 1980s, mainly undertaken in 
response to economic crises in developing countries, altered the domestic political-economic balance 
of power away from firms benefiting from protectionism and in favor of firms benefiting from 
liberalization of foreign trade. 
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processes by which state action is determined—domestically through the strategic 
interaction of different actors, and internationally through the strategic interaction of 
states. 
For many scholars who are critical of neoliberal globalization, the creation of 
the WTO and the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements represent a 
far-reaching attempt to reorganize world trade along neoliberal lines and to constitute 
a single global economy (McCarthy 2004). While these accounts offer important 
insights on the attendant social inequalities and forms of domination involved in the 
liberalization of trade on a global level, there is all too often an assumption that there 
exists a monolithic ideological formation that is neoliberalism. Essentially, many 
critical Marxian-inspired studies of neoliberal globalization begin by identifying 
neoliberalism as a distinctive ideology and set of policy proposals, then subsume 
specific instances of neoliberalism within that general framework. In the process, 
disparate phenomena such as international trade agreements are treated as mere 
examples of the more general category of neoliberalism (Plehwe, Walpen, & 
Neunhöffer 2005). 
A governmentality perspective, on the other hand, begins with specific 
governmental practices and their related rationalities, forms of knowledge, and 
subjectivity. Rather than assuming a priori that they all share some essence of 
neoliberal forms of governance, it also interrogates the ways that these practices seek 
to govern subjects and spaces by making the latter knowable and calculable. In fact, 
as will be discussed in further detail below, the problem of free trade agreements and 
regionalism, far from representing unproblematic characteristics of neoliberalism, 
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have instead been the object of a great deal of problematization within governmental 
rationalities and technologies. Attending to the different ways that putatively 
neoliberal forms of governance such as free trade agreements have been 
problematized thus helps us to understand not only the complex ways that concrete 
forms of governance are assembled, but also brings into view their dynamic 
properties and the possibility for the emergence of novel modes of governmentality. 
The Problem-Space of Regionalism 
While both apologists and critics of free trade focus on recent international 
agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it is often 
forgotten that, for most of modern history, commercial agreements between different 
societies were organized within colonial and imperial structures (Acemoglu, Johnson, 
& Robinson 2005; Mitchener & Weidenmier 2008; P. O'Brien 1999). In fact, it was in 
large part a reaction to the competitive logic of international trade that was at the 
heart of colonialism and imperialism that liberal thinkers argued for a different 
understanding of commerce between nations, one that emphasized its cooperative and 
pacifying qualities (Hont 2005; Silberner 1946). This problem was also central to the 
post-World War II plans for constructing an international order that would promote 
international cooperation and minimize conflict. Reducing the overall barriers to trade 
between countries, in addition to enhancing economic growth, was seen as one means 
for promoting a logic of cooperation in international trade instead of one of 
competition (Irwin 1993). 
For most of the post-war period, due to a number of factors including an 
extended period of international economic growth, international institutions, and the 
role of American hegemony, the international economic system was characterized by 
an absence of trade wars and major forms of protectionism among the advanced 
industrial countries (Keohane 1990). The Bretton Woods system and the GATT 
promoted the open markets and non-discriminatory trade. In principle, the GATT was 
meant to function on a multilateral basis, meaning that the lowering of barriers to 
international trade would be negotiated by and applicable to all its member states. At 
the same time, the GATT also recognized the reality of already existing customs 
unions and free trade agreements among its members, and the likelihood that more 
would come into existence (Trakman 2008: 369-370). 
In the late 1980s, however, as negotiations of the Uruguay round of the GATT 
stalled and popular political discourses in the United States regarding that country’s 
declining position in the world economy, particularly vis-à-vis Japan, became 
common, many observers feared a return to protectionism and a retreat from previous 
commitments to further liberalize the international trading system (Dhar 1992). 
Liberal scholars and commentators feared that, as Jagdish N. Bhagwati put it, the 
entire world trading system was “at risk” (Bhagwati 1991), while others predicted the 
outbreak of a US – Japan trade war (G. Friedman & LeBard 1991). The status of the 
international economic order that had dominated since the establishment of the 
Bretton Woods system was uncertain. Commenting on this uncertainty, economic 
geographers John O’Loughlin and Luc Anselin wrote: 
The post-World War II geopolitical order was shattered with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991…The geoeconomic order, built on a foundation of 
United States hegemony, a liberal international trade regime, and a Fordist 
mode of production, is also challenged, not with the finality of a military coup 
but through the actions of multinational corporations and the policies of 
governments. The GATT, promoted and dominated by the United States as a 
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way of linking the capitalist economies and promoting international growth, is 
no longer unquestioned by America’s partners or even within the United 
States itself. (1996: 131) 
It was in this context that the relationship between the formation of regional 
trading blocs and regional trade agreements, and the status of the world trading 
system came to be problematized. Regions and regionalism became the object of 
expert knowledge and were submitted to the scrutiny of governmental rationalities. 
O’Loughlin and Anselin were among many who interrogated the nature of the “new 
world order” that was emerging after the fall of the Soviet bloc, wondering if “the 
GATT world of global commerce is being gradually replaced by a tripartite division 
into trade blocs, each dominated by the respective superpowers” (1996: 132). As 
economic geographer Detlef Lorenz put it: “one of the important questions of the 
1990s is the juxtaposition of a universal GATT and the centers of gravity of naturally 
regionalized world economy: will these trilateral regions of East Asia, Europe, and 
North America become substitutes or complements to the GATT?” (1992: 84) Thus, a 
major concern for many experts, policymakers, and politicians was that “the world 
would return to the problems of the 1930s: open multilateralism would give way to 
rival geo-economic regions…Markets would become more political, trade conflict 
would rise, and the three major regions [North America, Europe, and East Asia] 
would compete for supremacy” (Ikenberry 2002: 23). 
Of course the notion of a tripartite or trilateral division of global 
economic/political power was not a new one; it was reflected in the formation of the 
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Trilateral Commission in 1973.37 However, in reality, the geographic imaginary of 
the Trilateral  Commission was, as the epigraph at the beginning of this chap
illustrates, a global one that was not significantly different from the vision of 
cooperation among the leading capitalist countries that was at the heart of the post-
World War II international order. Regional economic agreements and organizations 
such as those which were created in Western Europe and which eventually led to the 
creation of the European Union (EU) had been viewed as exceptions to the rule of 
open multilateralism, and had been rationalized in terms of the anti-communist logic 
of the Cold War (Irwin 1993). With the end of the Cold War, the logic and rationale 
for the existence of “geo-economic regions” were problematized within governmental 
thought. While fears of the resurgence of geopolitical reason were mobilized, 
combined with other discourses (for example, the fear of social and economic decline 
in the US and concerns about the vitality of the Anglo-Saxon economic model 
compared with, for example, the Japanese model (Freeman 1987; Vogel 1979)), and 
put to different cultural and political uses, more technocratic governmental 
technologies were taken up and developed in response to the problem of the growth 
of regional trade agreements.  
37 The Trilateral Commission, “About the Organization”, available at < http://www.trilateral.org/ 
about. htm>, accessed on January 3, 2010. 
Econometric Models and Governmental Technologies 
One governmental technology for assessing regional trade had actually been 
around for some time. This is the model developed by the economist Jacob Viner 
(1950), which proposed to evaluate customs unions in terms of the “trade-creating” or 
“trade-diverting” effects they produced.38 “Trade creation occurs when new trade 
arises between member countries because of the reduction in internal trade barriers. 
Trade diversion exists when imports from a low-cost outside country are replaced by 
imports from a higher-cost partner country because the partner has preferential access 
to the market and does not have to pay tariffs” (Kendall & Gaisford 2007: 120).  
The trade-creation vs. trade-diversion model provided a tool for evaluating 
free trade areas and customs unions within an overall framework that poses the flows 
and volumes of trade as the overall goal. In this regard, the Viner model more closely 
resembles the classical political economy approach in its emphasis on exchange and 
 
38 The economist R. G. Lipsey explained the theory as follows: 
Viner's analysis leads to the following classification of the possibilities that arise from a customs union 
between two countries, A and B: 
1. Neither A nor B may be producing a given commodity. In this case they will both be importing this 
commodity from some third country, and the removal of tariffs on trade between A and B can cause no 
change in the pattern of trade in this commodity; both countries will continue to import it from the 
cheapest possible source outside of the union. 
2. One of the two countries may be producing the commodity inefficiently under tariff protection while 
the second country is a non-producer. If country A is producing commodity X under tariff protection 
this means that her tariff is sufficient to eliminate competition from the cheapest possible source. Thus 
if A's tariff on X is adopted by the union the tariff will be high enough to secure B's market for A's 
inefficient industry. 
3. Both countries may be producing the commodity inefficiently under tariff protection. In this case the 
customs union removes tariffs between country A and B and ensures that the least inefficient of the 
two will capture the union market. 
In case 2 above any change must be a trade-diverting one, while in case 3 any change must be a trade-
creating one. If one wishes to predict the welfare effects of a customs union it is necessary to predict 
the relative strengths of the forces causing trade creation and trade diversion. This analysis leads to the 
conclusion that customs unions are likely to cause losses when the countries involved are 
complementary in the range of commodities that are protected by tariffs (Lipsey 1960: 498, original 
emphasis).  
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circulation (2008: 31-32). Viner’s notion of trade-creation and trade-diversion, 
however, has provided the conceptual basis for a number of econometric models that 
have attempted to incorporate various other factors that could affect ultimate 
outcomes of trade arrangements. Finally, the question of trade creation or diversion 
has been incorporated into the concept of “general world welfare,” thereby making it 
possible to extend the original concept to a wide number of phenomena and to 
provide what seems like a technical solution to the problem. 
At the same time, there is no consensus among the various experts39 regarding 
regional trade agreements.  On the one hand, the complexity of determining the 
effects of such agreements with regard to trade creation or diversion, including the 
wide diversity of such trade arrangements, has meant that different economic studies 
have arrived at different conclusions (Ghosh & Yamarik 2004; Koo, Kennedy, & 
Skripnitchenko 2006; Magee 2008). One response to this has been to seek to further 
develop the formal econometric models used to measure the trade effects of RTAs. 
The most commonly used model is the “gravity model.” In general, gravity models 
are mathematical models based on an analogy with Newton’s gravitational law and 
used to account for aggregate human behaviors related to spatial interaction such as 
migration and traffic flows (Deardorff 1998). In regards to trade, the gravity model 
states that the volume of trade can be estimated as an increasing function of the 
national incomes of trading partners, and a decreasing function of the distance 
between them (Bergstrand 1985). The application of a gravity model to international 
 
39 The term “expert” is used here to mean any producer of a mode of knowledge that is considered to 
be expert in the sense that it is grounded in a rationalistic epistemology and part of a wider discursive 
structure associated with modern, Western forms of knowledge production. Cf. Mitchell (2002).  
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trade first occurred in the context of the problematization of the effects of planned 
European economic integration (Linneman 1966; Pöyhönen 1963; Pulliainen 1963; 
Tinbergen 1962). Since then, the model has been refined and the variables which it 
includes have been modified and expanded in the attempt to provide an objective, 
technical tool for measuring the impact of a wide range of trade agreements (J. E. 
Anderson & Wincoop 2003; Bergstrand 1985; Carrère 2006; Deardorff 1998; 
Feenstra, Markusen, & Rose 2001; Helpman & Krugman 1985; Matyas 1997).  
For proponents of the gravity model, one of its purported benefits is that it 
incorporates the ‘geographic dimension’ into the analysis of regional trade. Indeed, as 
Harvard economist Jeffrey Frankel explains, without incorporating geographical 
elements into the analysis, “one can hardly claim to be studying regionalism” (1998: 
1). However, despite Frankel’s claim, incorporating ‘geography’ into the analysis has 
not produced consensus among economists regarding the ability of the gravity model 
to provide an unequivocal tool for evaluating the trade effects of RTAs.  
Part of the problem with gravity models is that a number of factors—such as 
common language, culture, or colonial ties—that are not readily amenable to 
quantification are often important variables included (usually post hoc) in the 
analysis. A perhaps more important problem is that gravity models really only 
calculate one result of trade agreements—their impact on the overall levels of trade. 
Granted, this can be a powerful tool within governmental technologies that seek to 
submit international trade arrangements to a calculus that is indexed to overall net 
volumes of trade. With this governmental technology, it is possible to evaluate 
specific trading agreements with regard to the amount of trade that will be created 
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within the trade zone, as well as possible reductions outside that zone. This, indeed, 
has been one of the most important uses to which gravity models and similar 
econometric tools for analyzing international trade have been put to use. 
However, as mentioned above, the logic of a quantum of trade flows largely 
hews to a classical liberal governmentality, in which free flows and circulations of 
trade are equated with a general utility. The assumption is that increased trade is 
positively related to economic growth, which in turn is a major—indeed, perhaps the 
most important (from a liberal governmental perspective)—contributor to the overall 
welfare of a population. And yet, econometric models such as the gravity model do 
not by themselves demonstrate the correlations between increased trade, free trade, 
and the ultimate goal of increased welfare.40 In order to calculate the latter, different 
models are required, the most commonly utilized being applied general equilibrium 
(AGE) models (Ginsburgh & Keyzer 1997; Shoven & Whalley 1984).   
The AGE models of international trade make it possible to calculate the 
impact of trade agreements on a number of macroeconomic indices, including 
production, wages, and employment by industrial sector and nationally. The AGE 
models, in fact, played an important role in providing policymakers deliberating the 
proposed North American Free Trade Agreement with calculations regarding the 
positive economic effects of NAFTA (Francois & Shiells 1994). As Joseph F. 
Francois and Clinton R. Shiells (at the time, GATT and IMF officials respectively) 
observe, “Mexican Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development Jaime Serra-
 
40 To be clear, I do not take a position regarding the accuracy or desirability of calculations that link 
economic growth to the welfare of a population, but rather, following Foucault (2007a, 2009), view 
this calculation as a crucial and integral element within liberal governmentality. 
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Puche wrote his Ph.D. dissertation in economics at Yale University on an AGE model 
of Mexico and made a big push at the outset of negotiations for development of AGE 
models of NAFTA, based on his academic connections” (1994: 4).41  
Likewise, the authors note that the role that  this form of expert knowledge 
played in US debates over NAFTA marked the emergence of “the AGE trade policy-
modeling community”—“a truly novel phenomenon” (7).  
From a governmentality perspective, what is striking about these kinds of 
econometric models is not the degree of formalization they have achieved, the 
amount of complexity they are able to incorporate, or the degree to which they are 
able to capture certain features of social reality. In fact, from a brief examination of 
the record of projections of the impacts of trade agreements on different aspects of 
national welfare and macroeconomic indicators, their record is mixed. The field of 
economics, however, is founded on the assumption that it is possible to model 
complexity and that any flaws in actually existing models only provide opportunities 
for improvement. 
This leads to a second, important aspect of economic models and economics 
more generally—what some scholars call their “performativity” (Callon 1998b; 
MacKenzie, Muniesa, & Siu 2007). Timothy Mitchell, for example, has argued that  
the idea of ‘‘the economy’’ is a surprisingly recent product of socio-technical 
practice, emerging only in the mid-twentieth century. Before then, economists 
did not use the word ‘‘economy’’ in its modern sense. From around the 1930s, 
new forms of consumption, marketing, business management, government 
 
41 For an excellent analysis of the important role played by the diffusion of specific, neoliberal forms 
of expertise—particularly in the fields of economics and law—in the transformation of state fields in 
Latin America, see Dezalay & Garth (2002).  
 75 
 
planning, financial flows, colonial administration, and statistical work brought 
into being a world that for the first time could be measured and calculated as 
though it were a free-standing object, the economy. Economics claimed only 
to describe this object, but in fact it participated in producing it. Its 
contribution was to help devise the forms of calculation in terms of which 
socio-technical practice was increasingly organized. (2005: 298) 
An important implication of this view of the performativity of economics—
indeed, of forms of expertise and knowledge in general—is that one of the ways that 
economics has an impact in the world is through “[the organization of] agents, goods, 
information, and other things into economic projects and experiments (…) [drawing] 
others into their calculative arrangements, setting them in play as producers, 
consumers, owners, or investors” (298). In other words, economics and economic 
knowledge often take the form of governmental technologies—technical methods of 
governing spaces and subjects. In fact, the connection between economy and 
government goes at least as far back to the emergence of the concept of political 
economy, which Foucault points out really meant two things. First, a political 
rationality based on the idea of an “economic” form of government: government 
whose potential actions and interventions are pegged to the latter’s social, political, 
and especially economic costs (2008: 94-95).42 Second, a governmental reason whose 
aim “is not the State anymore, or its wealth…but the society, its economic progress” 
(Donzelot 2009: 29). 
 
42 “Quesnay speaks of good government as economic government (…) which is basically tautological 
since the art of government is precisely to exercise power in the form, and according to the model, of 
economy. But if Quesnay says ‘economic government,’ the reason is that the word ‘economy’ (…) is 
already beginning to acquire its modern meaning, and it is becoming apparent at this moment that the 
essence of this government, that is to say, o f the art of exercising power in the form of economy, will 
have what we now call the economy as its principal object” (Foucault 2008: 95).  
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The economic models employed to analyze trade agreements function as 
governmental technologies in a number of ways. First, as already indicated, they 
provide “technical” criteria to evaluate the effects of trade agreements, despite the 
fact that both models discussed (AGE and gravity models) have a built-in bias for 
assuming that the minimum constraints on international trade will produce the 
greatest overall benefits. Second, and related to the former, these models are at least 
partially constitutive of objects of knowledge, such as “barriers of trade” (Traub-
Werner 2007), that are essential to a number of concrete forms of governance. 
Essentially, economic analyses take up terms and concepts that are part of the reality 
which they study—in the case of international trade, concepts such as “rules of 
origin” and “investment regimes”—and are able to insert them into a complex model 
that forms part of a general calculus of “free trade.” Finally, these technologies 
operate as forms of representation and intervention (Hacking 1999) that help 
constitute and reconfigure major aspects of social reality—including political spaces 
such as sub- and supra-national regions, as well as the “space” of a global economy 
(Larner & Walters 2002). Indeed, it is worth noting that other such technologies in 
other domains and sites also often end up taking on the shape and appearance of 
economic modeling and econometric forms of calculation (Larner & Le Heron 2004) 
These functions of governmental technologies are crucial to understanding the 
relationship between neoliberal governmentality, discourses of globalization, and 
phenomena associated with both, including free trade agreements. Markets, including 
the global market, are shaped by calculative rationalities and techniques (Callon 
1998a). Typologies, classificatory devices, and other forms of calculation make 
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possible and sustain specific forms of governmental ordering. In the final section, I 
examine the roles played by some of these political technologies in projects that have 
sought to create a free trade zone in the Western hemisphere. 
Governmentality and Free Trade in the Americas 
The vision of a hemisphere-wide free trade area of the Americas received its 
first significant articulation in the idea of an “Enterprise for the Americas Initiative” 
(EAI) promoted by US President George H.W. Bush at the end of his term.  The goal 
was to create “a free trade zone stretching from the port of Anchorage to the Tierra 
del Fuego” (Bush 1990: 49). The project rested on a dual geographical imaginary: the 
Americas as a single space, and the Americas as divided between the United States, 
on the one hand, and Latin America and the Caribbean, on the other.43  
With regard to the Americas as a single space, this was seen as being united 
by a common heritage of European colonization, Western culture, and the post-Cold 
War embrace of democracy and market-based economies. President Bush made clear 
in his comments that the proposed EAI was only conceivable against a backdrop of “a 
rising tide of democracy never before witnessed in the history of this beloved 
hemisphere” accompanied by a “turning away from the statist economic policies that 
stifle growth” and a renewed embrace of “the power of the free market to help this 
hemisphere realize its untapped potential for progress” (1990: 48). The vision of the 
Americas as divided between an “advanced” North America and a “developing” Latin 
America and the Caribbean is articulated in terms of a “partnership” between the two, 
43 Within this imaginary, Canada implicitly forms, with the US, North America, which is distinct from 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite the creation of a “North American” free trade area, Mexico 
nevertheless is located within the imagined space of “Latin America”. 
in which the US would take a lead role in “[creating] incentives to reinforce Latin 
America’s growing recognition that free market reform is the key to sustained 
economic growth and political stability” (49). This “growing recognition,” Bush 
argued, is exemplified by “Colombia’s courageous leader,” President Virgilio Barco, 
who argued that “‘The long-running match between Karl Marx and Adam Smith is 
finally coming to an end’ with the ‘recognition that open economies with access to 
markets can lead to social progress’” (1990: 48). 
The geospatial imaginaries productive of and produced by the EAI are of 
course not sui generis—they draw upon and rework already existing spatialized 
discourses that have been produced by numerous governing rationalities in the history 
of the Americas. While a thorough discussion of the history of spatial imaginaries in 
the Americas is beyond the scope of the present study, it is worth mentioning a few 
important theses related to the subject. To begin with, a number of scholars, mainly 
working from some form of postcolonial theory, have called attention to the 
relationship between the “discovery” or “invention” of the Americas and the 
emergence and consolidation of capitalism and colonialism or, as Enrique Dussel 
(1995, 1996) has it, “modernity.”44 Thus images of America and the Americas have 
 
44 For Dussel, the “invention of the Americas” represents “a constitutive moment of modernity.” 
Modernity, Dussel argues, came to birth in Europe’s confrontation with the Other: by controlling, 
conquering, and violating the Other, Europe defined itself as discoverer, conquistador, and colonizer of 
an alterity that was likewise constitutive of modernity” (1995: 26).  Dussel argues that although most 
empires in the past considered themselves as centers of a certain geographical context, the situation is 
changed in modernity because of the latter’s global reach: “Only modern European culture, from 1492 
onwards, became the center of a world system, of a global or universal history that confronts (with 
various forms of subsumption and exteriority) all the other cultures of the world—cultures that now 
will be militarily dominated as its periphery” (1996: 51-52).  
In a similar vein, Aníbal Quijano (2000: 533) argues that “America was constituted as the first 
time/space of a new model of power of global vocation”, namely “colonial/modern Eurocentered 
capitalism.”  
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been intimately connected with imperial projects and related forms of knowledge, as 
well as with diverse forms of resistance to the latter—in short, with colonial relations 
of power, or the “coloniality of power” (Mignolo 2001).  
Racialized discourses have also been at the heart of the idea of a difference 
between “Anglo-American” (or, later, simply “American”) and “Latin American” 
cultures in the Americas. The idea of Latin America has been commonly attributed to 
“pan-Latinist intellectuals close to Napoleon III, including Michel Chevalier, who 
sought to justify French intervention in Mexico in 1860s by asserting solidarity 
between France and Mexico based on shared belonging to the ‘Latin race’” 
(McGuinness 2003: 88).45 However, historian Aims McGuinness has found 
“numerous instances of the geopolitical designations ‘América Latina’ and 
‘latinomericano’ in the writings of important intellectuals from the Americas…in the 
decade before the French intervened in Mexico” (2203: 88). McGuinness attributes 
the increasing importance of the concepts of “América Latina” and a “Latin race” for 
Spanish speaking intellectuals to “the intensely violent struggles over the forging of 
international trade routes, the expansion of U.S. capital, and conflicting racial 
practices…in the late 1840s and 1850s” (88-89).  
Certainly, by the time the US emerged as a “great power” internationally with 
its defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War (Laó-Montes 2008), the 
transformation of the geopolitical imaginary of the Monroe Doctrine and the idea of 
the Americas as a sphere of US influence acquired new meanings within the context 
of US imperial practices and relations with the rest of the region. In fact, it is only 
 
45 McGuinness attributes this thesis to US historian John L. Phelan. Cf. Phelan (1968).  
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two years after the Spanish-American war that the Uruguayan writer José Enrique 
Rodó (1988) would publish his essay Ariel, in which he writes: 
As fast as the utilitarian genius of that nation [the United States] takes on a 
more defined character, franker, narrower yet, with intoxication of material 
prosperity, so increases the impatience of its sons to spread it abroad by 
propaganda, and thinks it predestined for all humanity. Today they openly 
aspire to the primacy of the world’s civilization, the direction of its ideas, and 
think themselves the forerunners of all culture that is to prevail.  
It is also around the time of the rise of American imperialism that pan-
Americanism emerges—in part out of the “softer” side of US hegemonic aspirations, 
in part as a reaction by other countries to the latter. In fact, we can identify many 
vectors of this relationship between pan-Americanism and the idea of the difference 
between Anglo-America and Latin America, from the existence of inter-American 
institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the influence of 
Latin America in the creation of the United Nations, to discourses and practices of 
development that attempt to submit Latin America to mainly US expert knowledge 
and governmental reason (Escobar 1995).  
The proposal for an Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which would 
become the Free Trade Area of the Americas under President Clinton, drew on 
different elements of a geopolitical imaginary that was shaped by the Cold War (e.g., 
the Alliance for Progress) and also by the end of the Cold War and visions of the “end 
of history” (Fukuyama 1992) or the triumph of the “American model” of liberal, 
capitalist democracy. However, while the developmentalist geopolitical imaginary of 
the Cold War was shaped by a logic of national security and fears of the global spread 
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of communism (G. M. Joseph & Spenser 2008; T. F. O'Brien 2007: Ch. 6; Westad 
2007), the post-Cold War geopolitical imaginary of Latin America locates the latter 
within a broader global perspective. Thus, for example, whereas statist developmental 
policies were to be opposed during the Cold War since they might lead to state 
socialism, by the 1990s statism came to be represented as an anachronism that was 
increasingly recognized as being an impediment to development and progress.  
In other words, the idea of a transformation of Latin America involving the 
embrace of liberal democracy and free markets saw this transformation as 
confirmation of the “truth” that was being experienced all across the world. Thus the 
vision of the political and economic liberalization of Latin America is connected with 
the emergence of a new “regime of truth” (2008: 18-20, 29, 33, 37), which was being 
revealed on a global scale. As Roger B. Porter, Assistant to the President for 
Economic and Domestic Policy, put it, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative was 
being proposed at a historical conjuncture marked by “a fresh, dynamic attitude 
around the world that views change optimistically, not fearfully” (1990: 1). He adds: 
The global transformation of the last decade symbolizes the triumph of two 
ideals the United States has championed during the 20th century. In country 
after country, the verdict is clear: a preference for governments based on 
democratic political institutions and market-oriented economic arrangements. 
The intellectual debates of the 1960s and 1970s centered on whether 
capitalism or socialism provided the more efficient means for producing 
prosperity. While the “end of history” may not have arrived yet, the terms of 
international debate over politics and economics have certainly changed. (2) 
Porter’s comments on the EAI also bring to light the shift in the regime of 
truth connected with discourses of development. Porter compares the EAI to the 
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Alliance for Progress program initiated under President Kennedy, noting that the 
latter, “reflecting the spirit of the times,” has as its underlying premise “the 
importance of governments” (5). “By contrast, the Enterprise for the Americas 
Initiative focuses on markets. It is built on the premise that no amount of official 
resources can offset inappropriate economic policies” (6). Consistent with the “truth-
telling” nature of his discourse, Porter makes clear exactly what kind of economic 
policies would be “appropriate”: “exchange rate maintenance, stabilized inflation 
rates, open trade policies, and sound fiscal policies,” all of which “should create a 
favorable climate for both domestic and foreign investors” (6). Finally, the foundation 
of this particular regime of truth is clearly stated: “to remove obstacles to efficiently 
functioning markets, and to create a climate for entrepreneurship” (8). In a similar 
fashion, US Trade Representative under President Clinton, Charlene Barshefsky, 
located the FTAA within the context of a paradigm shift that emerged at the end of 
the Cold War.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the permanent factors of interest and 
geography which make the FTAA logical have been joined by a third which 
makes it possible—a consensus of the citizen rather than the state as the 
source of law and policy…Most governments in the hemisphere now agree in 
principle that economic development is best achieved through freedom, open 
markets and entrepreneurialism rather than detailed guidance by a state in 
favor of one group or another. (1999: 3) 
The formal declaration of a plan for a Free Trade Area of the Americas was 
made at the December 1994 meeting of Western Hemisphere Presidents in Miami—
the First Summit of the Americas. In the “Declaration of Principles” at the Miami 
Summit, it was stated that 
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Our continued economic progress depends on sound economic policies, 
sustainable development, and dynamic private sectors. A key to prosperity is 
trade without barriers, without subsidies, without unfair practices, and with an 
increasing stream of productive investments. Eliminating impediments to 
market access for goods and services among our countries will foster our 
economic growth… Free trade and increased economic integration are key 
factors for raising standards of living, improving the working conditions of 
people in the Americas and better protecting the environment. (FTAA 1994). 
The participating heads of state thereby resolved “to begin immediately to construct 
the ‘Free Trade Area of the Americas’ (FTAA), in which barriers to trade and 
investment will be progressively eliminated” (Kennedy 2004b: 121). The ultimate 
goal was to finalize negotiations by 2005.   
After a number of ministerial-level meetings, negotiations for the FTAA were 
officially launched at the Second Summit of the Americas held in Santiago, Chile in 
April 1998. The principle guiding the negotiations was that the FTAA would 
“comprehensive, WTO-consistent, and a single undertaking, i.e. an all-or-nothing, 
package deal” (Kennedy 2004b: 127).46 This vision of the FTAA, however, fell apart 
by the time of the Eighth Ministerial Meeting in Miami in November 2003. At that 
 
46 “We reaffirm the principles and objectives that have guided our work since Miami, including inter 
alia that the agreement will be balanced, comprehensive, WTO-consistent, and will constitute a single 
undertaking.”(FTAA 1999); 
 “We reaffirm the principles and objectives that have guided our work since the First Summit of the 
Americas, in particular, the basic principle of consensus in decision making within the FTAA process 
and the achievement of a balanced, comprehensive agreement that is consistent with the rules and 
disciplines of the World Trade Organization. We reaffirm that the result of the FTAA negotiations 
shall constitute a comprehensive single undertaking, that incorporates the rights and obligations that 
are mutually agreed for all member countries.” (FTA 2001);  
“We reaffirm the principles and objectives that have guided our work since the First Summit of the 
Americas, in particular, the basic principle of consensus in decision making within the FTAA process 
and the achievement of a balanced and comprehensive agreement that is also consistent with the rules 
and disciplines of the World Trade Organization (WTO). We reaffirm that the result of the FTAA 
negotiations shall constitute a comprehensive single undertaking that incorporates the rights and 
obligations that are mutually agreed for all member countries” (FTA 2002). 
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meeting, opposition by Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela to the goal of a “WTO-plus” 
comprehensive agreement became manifest. Since then, despite subsequent meetings, 
FTAA negotiations have largely been stalled. Partially as a result of the impasse in 
FTAA negotiations, the US has aggressively pursued numerous trade agreements 
mainly with developing countries individually or in sub-regional groupings. In the 
Americas, the US has concluded trade agreements with Chile, Colombia, Panama, 
and Peru, as well as the  Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) which includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic (USTR"Free Trade Agreements"). 
The pursuit of multiple trade agreements in the hemisphere and beyond has 
been termed “competitive liberalization” (Bergsten 1996). The concept refers to a 
strategy of using preferential trade agreements (PTAs) as “building blocks” for 
multilateral agreements. The idea is that free trade agreements would have a sort of  
“domino effect” (Baldwin 1992), creating momentum not only for more PTAs but, 
crucially, to advance in the areas under negotiation in the latest Doha Round of the 
WTO. Whether PTAs lead to greater global trade and increased liberalization is the 
subject of much debate.47 What is striking, though, from the perspective of the 
present study is the way that the various aspects of trade agreements have been 
subjected to different forms of governmental reason and technologies. As already 
mentioned, a number of econometric tools have been developed that attempt to 
discover the “truth” about trade agreements. Furthermore, international organizations 
 
47 The literature is too large to include all the different studies done on this issue. For work that sees 
PTAs as “stumbling blocks” to increased liberalization of trade, see Bhagwati (1991), Bhagwati & 
Kreuger (1995), Wonnacott (1990). Works that view PTAs as “building blocks” to a more liberal 
global trading order include Bergsten (1996) and Hufbauer (2008). 
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such as the WTO and academic institutions like Purdue University’s Center for 
Global Trade Analysis have developed extensive databases to provide the data, which 
can be analyzed by the various economic models. The Center for Global Trade 
Analysis coordinates the Global Trade Analysis Project, which is described as “a 
global network of researchers and policy makers conducting quantitative analysis o
international policy issues” (Global Trade Analysis Project). The Center states that it 
aims to provide a “common language” for scholars, analysts, and officials conducting
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trade agreements. In their report, the Business Roundtable claims: 
economic analysis. 
For some scholars, the trend of competitive liberalization and PTAs b
the US and developing countries reflects the preferences and influence of a 
“transnational interest bloc” led by transnational firms based in the US, EU, and 
Japan (Ronald W. Cox 2008). Interestingly, many analysts who favor increased 
liberalization of international trade come to a similar conclusion. For the latter, the 
proliferation of PTAs represents the capitulation 
al (2009: 1-2), for instance, argues that  
the U.S. strategy of competitive liberalization—by which it has pursued
piecemeal liberalization through open sectoral agreements such as the 
Information Technology Agreement (ITA), bilateral PTAs, and calls f
transregional accords such as the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific 
(FTAAP)—has fractured the domestic coalition for free trade. By giving 
specific industries what they wanted, this policy has left protectionists in 
agriculture, steel, textiles, and others in control of the trade policy agen
As an example of the former, Aggarwal points to arguments made by the US 
Business Roundtable in favor of the US pursuing increased bilatera
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From the end of World War II until a few years ago, there was an unwritten 
rule of trade negotiations: the U.S. is the indispensable country--the one 
country that has to be involved in a trade negotiation for that negotiation to 
succeed...But today, the rules have changed profoundly, and irrevocably. The 
U.S. still is a major player, but it is no longer indispensable. Our trading 
partners are cutting deals without us, gradually surrounding the U.S. with a 
network of preferential trade agreements.48 
Written in 2001, before the US had successfully negotiated a number of PTAs, the 
exhortation of the Business Council follows a logic that is feared by many liberals—
that trade agreements would be the source of international competition. Ironically, it 
is the same competitive logic that has been advocated by those who seek to deepen 
the liberalization of the international trade regime.  However, the latter have 
envisioned the competition being generated by the desire to complete a trade 
agreement with the US. Thus, the logic of competition can point in multiple 
directions. 
Conclusion 
The move to liberalize international trade took a dramatic turn in the 1990s, 
with the establishment of the WTO, the completion of EU integration, and the signing 
of numerous bilateral and regional trade agreements. In order to situate these various 
projects and policies within a broader governmental logic, it is useful to return to 
Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism. In this regard, Porter’s description of the 
imperative of what would become the FTAA is illustrative: “remove obstacles to 
efficiently functioning markets, and create a climate for entrepreneurship.” Or, in 
 
48 Business Roundtable, "The Case for U.S. Trade Leadership: The U.S. is Falling Behind”: 2. 
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Ambassador Barshefsky’s words “open markets and entrepreneurialism.” The 
analysis presented here suggests that it is difficult to take phenomena such as the 
proliferation of free trade agreements and explain them in terms of the interests of 
transnational capital or the hegemonic intentions of a world power, although these 
may certainly play a role. Neither is there a univocal neoliberal ideology which 
political phenomena such as trade agreements automatically follow. Instead, the latter 
emerge not only out of the interaction of various actors (government leaders and 
officials, business interests, various interest groups), but also from a process of 
problematization in which questions regarding the appropriate way of governing 
subjects and spaces are always present. 
What we have seen is that the transformation of the international trading 
system and the policies pursued by different states with regard to international trade 
agreements have been the result of different governmental rationalities and 
technologies—for example, econometric models, trading regimes, and logics of 
competition—that have at times overlapped and resonated, while other times 
diverging and causing friction. What has been consistent is the attempt by various 
experts to submit the various policies and projects to a technical form of calculation 
that could produce an objective measure of their utility. Additionally, the spatial 
imaginary of the global market has provided what Foucault terms a “grid of 
intelligibility” for the various governmental rationalities and technologies. Thus, it is 
the discourse of globalization and the demands of a global market that provide a 
conceptual horizon for envisioning a global order of competitive, entrepreneurial 
subjects—whether individuals, governmental agencies, or nation-states. 
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In fact, the global political imaginary contained in visions of global free trade 
depends and builds on, while at the same time reconfiguring, the imagined space of 
the nation-state. In this global political imaginary, national states are analogous to 
individuals in the liberal political imaginary; the global market and global political 
institutions are justified and legitimated largely in terms of a kind of social contract in 
which nation-states are ‘member-states’ who seek global cooperation in order to 
advance the welfare of their own societies. Indeed, global institutions are quite clear 
that their ultimate objective is the increased well-being of the various societies of the 
world, and that the nation-state is the ultimate authority vis-à-vis each and every 
society. Thus, the various global organizations and institutions see their role as 
helping each and every state adapt to the challenges and demands of a global 
reality.
 
 
 
govern
 
49  
Finally, the imperatives to be competitive and adopt an entrepreneurial 
subjectivity find their support in a complex and diffuse assemblage of forms of expert 
and common knowledge, techniques and technologies, and institutional practices and 
arrangements. The proliferation of trade agreements is accompanied by a proliferation
of tools, such as econometric models, for evaluating their usefulness. Likewise, there 
is a continual process of identification of elements of social reality that are classified
as “obstacles to efficiently functioning markets,” and a constant effort to formulate
mental strategies to foster and encourage competitive entrepreneurialism.  
Discourses of globalization and the global market help provide a language for 
fostering competition between various subjects. At the national level, globalization is 
49 It is this each and every that suggests a “pastoral” form of care and power, something Foucault 
detailed in his later research and writings. See especially Foucault (1981).  
 89 
 
portrayed by neoliberal governmentality as a disciplining force that compels states t
improve their governance. As the World Bank argues, “Globalization is a thre
weak or capriciously governed states. But it also opens the way for effective, 
disciplined states to foster development and economic well-being, and it sharpens 
need for effective international cooperation in pursuit of global collective action” 
(World Bank 1997: 11). In other words, competition is salutary in that it encourages 
improvement and, at the state level, “good governance”: “involvement in the global
economy tightens constraints on arbitrary state action, reduces the state’s ability to 
tax capital, and brings much closer financial market scrutiny of monetary and fiscal 
polic
o 
at to 
the 
 
ies.” States are thus urged to “embrace external competition” (World Bank 1997: 
12). 
lities 
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ite.” 
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In light of the recent global financial crisis and economic downturn, it is 
tempting to forecast the end of a neoliberal governmentality that must have contained 
within it the seeds of its demise. However, as Foucault reminds us, governmenta
are produced through problematization, and crisis is, in a sense, the crucible o
governmentality. Indeed, Foucault argues that taken together, all the various 
technologies, rationalities and programs associated with liberalism—free trade 
regimes, econometric models, and programs for increasing competition—are “devices
intended to produce freedom which potentially risk producing exactly the oppos
Thus Foucault speaks of a “consciousness of crisis” that grounds the project of 
neoliberal global governmentality, arguing that neoliberalism “has a consciousne
itself as a theory which seeks to incite entrepreneurialism to the point of crisis” 
(Kiersey 2009: 363) Speaking in 1979, Foucault said, “This is precisely th
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visions of the global market will continue to 
shape the neoliberal political imaginary.
crisis of liberalism” (2008: 69). The same could be said thirty years later. 
Nevertheless, however the present crisis comes to be problematized within neoliberal 
governmental reason, it is likely that the 
CHAPTER THREE: GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
Introduction 
The idea that there exists a “global civil society” has become common in the 
international public policy domain as well as in the academic field (Batliwala & 
Brown 2006; Braman & Sreberny 1996; Eberly 2008; Florini 2000; Frost 2002; 
Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003; Lipschutz & Mayer 1996; Richter, Berking, & Müller-
Schmid 2006; Salamon, Sokolowski, & List 2003; R. Taylor 2004; J. W. S. G. 
Walker & Thompson 2008; Walzer 1995b; Warkentin 2001). In most regards, global 
civil society is understood in similar terms as domestic civil society, namely as “the 
broad range of institutions that occupy the social space between the market and the 
state” (Salamon, et al. 2003: 1). In other words, civil society exists as part of the 
tridimensional liberal political imaginary, and is defined in part by its relation to, and 
difference from, the state and the market. Thus, despite the diversity of organizations 
and institutions that make up civil society, grouping them together under one category 
is justified in that collectively they exist outside both state and market, while 
providing important points of articulation between the two. In a fairly typical account, 
civil society organizations and institutions are seen as 
private in character and not part of the governmental apparatus. But unlike 
other private institutions, these entities are expected to serve some public or 
community purpose and not simply to generate profits for those involved in 
them. They therefore embody two seemingly contradictory impulses: first, a 
commitment to freedom and personal initiative, to the idea that people have 
the right to act on their own authority to improve the quality of their own lives 
or the lives of persons they care about; and second, an emphasis on solidarity, 
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on the idea that people have responsibilities not only to themselves but also to 
the communities of which they are a part. Uniquely among social institutions, 
the institutions of the nonprofit or civil society sector merge these two 
impulses, producing a set of private institutions serving essentially public 
purposes. (Salamon, et al. 2003: 1) 
The liberal idea/ideal of civil society as a blend of the public and private, 
existing in a relationship of both interiority and exteriority vis-à-vis the domains of 
the state and the market, is retained when it is applied to a global framework. Here 
global civil society is seen as both product and agent of globalization. And yet 
constituting civil society on a global scale entails many problems. An obvious 
problem is that historically the collective identity and sense of belonging associated 
with civil society has been inextricably linked to a relationship between governed and 
government, as articulated through the mechanisms of citizenship and rights (Sassen 
2006). In the absence of clearly visible authoritative institutions and structures of 
government at the transnational or global level, it is unclear on what basis the 
relationship between governed and government can be articulated.  
And yet, the argument to be developed in this chapter is that it is precisely this 
problem that the various efforts to construct transnational or even global domains of 
civil society seek to overcome. In other words, the central claim advanced here is that 
at the heart of various projects for transnational or global forms of civil society there 
can be found an attempt to solve the problem of integrating subjects within 
institutions and structures of transnational or global governance. Here Foucault’s 
insights regarding the relationship between the development of civil society and 
modern forms of governance offer a number of productive insights for apprehending 
 93 
 
 94 
 
the shifting governmental logics and technologies at work in contemporary projects 
for constructing transnational or global civil society. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section offers a critical examination 
of some of the more influential scholarly accounts of civil society that were produced 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These accounts are important for the development 
of a discourse of global civil society, in that they provided much of the conceptual 
and normative foundations for the latter. The second section presents a Foucauldian 
perspective on civil society, based primarily on Foucault’s 1978 and 1979 
governmentality lectures. In this section the critical understanding of both the idea 
and practice of civil society, and how these are connected with concrete forms of 
governance, will be elaborated. In the third section, specific discourses of global civil 
society will be critically examined, with special emphasis on the implications for the 
liberal political imaginary and related forms of governance for this transposition of 
civil society from the national to the global sphere. In the fourth section, I examine 
some specific projects, and their associated rationalities, for constructing civil society 
within the Americas. Finally, the concluding section will analyze the implications that 
these projects have for understanding the shifting nature of contemporary forms of 
governance. A crucial question that will be addressed is whether the ‘going global’ of 
the discourse of civil society represents a significant transformation in (neo) liberal 
technologies of government, and how this development can aid us in “understanding 
some of the contingencies of the systems of power that we inhabit – and which 
inhabit us – today” (Barry, Osborne, & Rose 1996a: 4). 
The Discourse of Global Civil Society 
Beginning in the late 1980s, an increasing number of social and political 
theorists began addressing the issue of civil society. Following Robert Fine (1997), 
we can refer to this body of literature as civil society theory. There are four, 
interrelated, elements of civil society theory which are of interest for the present 
analysis: (1) the explanation for a renewed interest in civil society, (2) the treatment 
of civil society as a trans-historical universal, (3) the normative justifications for civil 
society, and (4) the vision of civil society as a sphere of peaceful interaction free from 
relations of domination and structures of violence. These elements are important not 
only to understand contemporary discourses of civil society but, as I will argue in the 
final section, to apprehend their connection with projects that seek to regulate and 
govern subjects and spaces. 
To begin with, most theories of civil society make a strong connection 
between the renewal of interest in the concept and the historical context. In general, 
theorists of civil society tend to explain the increased attention to the concept in terms 
of a resurgence of the object of analysis—that is, of civil society itself. For example, 
for Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato (1992: 29), the “revival” of the idea of civil 
society that took place in the 1980s was in fact the result of “citizen initiatives, 
associations, and movements” trying to reclaim the autonomy of a public, social 
realm against different forms of statism—either the welfare state of liberal 
democracies, the militarized state of right-wing authoritarian governments, or the 
socialist state of the (now mostly formerly) communist countries. Thus, in their 
account, political action by social groups and movements that in many cases view 
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themselves in terms of an autonomous social sphere is the underlying reason why the 
notion of civil society has re-entered the political (and scholarly) discourse. 
The explanation of the rise in interest in the concept of civil society in terms 
of an increase in civil society activity itself also takes on an added, slightly modified 
meaning when located within the discourse of democracy and democratization.50 In 
this account, the resurgence of the idea of civil society is connected with what Samuel 
Huntington famously labeled the “third wave of democratization” (Huntington 1991). 
As Marc Plattner and Larry Diamond write, 
Since the inception of the third wave of global democratization in the mid-
1970s, one of the most dramatic developments in both intellectual and policy 
circles has been the vast increase in attention to “civil society.” The 
rediscovery of civil society can be traced back to the late 1970s in Poland, 
when the intellectual fathers of Solidarity applied the term to their efforts to 
organize people independently of the totalitarian state. The subsequent 
popularity of the term has been fueled by the pivotal contributions that 
autonomous organizations and movements have made to democratic 
transitions not only in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but also in 
Latin America, Asia, and Africa. (1994: 3) 
Next, civil society theory often treats the object of analysis as if it were a 
trans-historical universal—that is, as a category of human existence that has existed 
in some form since the earliest time (Inayatullah & Blaney 1997) and to which 
humankind allegedly wishes to return. More specifically, most scholarly treatments of 
civil society view both the concept and the phenomenon as having originated in 
 
50 In fact, the way that it has become a key theme in major issue areas related to democracy and 
democratization, such as the issue of development, is perhaps revealing of the central place that the 
idea of civil society has come to occupy in the contemporary political imaginary. Cf. Howell & Pearce 
(2001).  
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Ancient Greek political thought and practice, having then undergone a number of 
transformations, ultimately producing the modern idea and reality of civil society. 
Thus, for example, Cohen and Arato argue that “[t]he first version of the concept of 
civil society appears in Aristotle under the heading of politike koinonia…” which 
would later be translated in Latin as societas civilis (1992: 84). From politike 
koinonia in Ancient Greece to societas civilis in Ancient Rome, Cohen and Arato 
claim, the concept eventually is taken up by political thinkers to describe the system 
of city states then emerging in medieval Europe (84). In a similar fashion, political 
theorist Adam B. Seligman locates the origins of the idea of civil society in the 
political thought of Aristotle and traces its development from  “the idea of a universal 
law of nature” that emerged first with the Stoics, to its incorporation into and 
transformation of Christian thought, and its transformation into the natural law 
tradition exemplified by Hugo Grotius (1992: 17; 18-21). 
In a slightly different register, Charles Taylor (1990) emphasizes a number of 
historical transformations that the idea of political community has undergone. The 
first was the idea that emerged in the Middle Ages “that society is not identical with 
its political organization”— a development which, Taylor argues, represents a break 
from the classical Greek and Roman understanding that “the identity of society was 
defined by its politeia, its political constitution” (102). Furthering this trend, in 
Taylor’s account, was “the development of an idea of the Church as an independent 
society” and the corresponding idea that there were two sources of authority—“one 
temporal, one spiritual…” (102). Furthermore, Taylor points to “the development of a 
legal notion of subjective rights” that emerged out of “the peculiar nature of feudal 
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relations of authority” together with the complex political structure of medieval 
polities (e.g. “the existence of relatively independent, self-governing cities; and the 
semi-dependent relationship between monarch, on the one hand, and feudal lords and 
the body of Estates, on the other”) as providing the basis for the development of the 
notion of a civil society that exists alongside but separately from the State (102-103). 
In accounts of the origins and development of civil society—both as idea and 
practice—the period of time in Europe from the late seventeenth to the early 
nineteenth centuries is seen as crucial. For it is at this time that many of the main 
elements that, it is argued, provide the basis for the idea of civil society today, 
become prominent. These include the distinction between civil society and the state, 
the idea of a public sphere and the somewhat related distinction between the public 
and the private, and the idea of a nascent commercial society that is related to the 
development of civil society (Keane 1988; Seligman 1992; Taylor 1990). For Taylor 
(1990) the two thinkers who provide the conceptual basis for the modern idea of civil 
society are John Locke and Charles Montesquieu. In most theories of civil society, 
Adam Ferguson, Alexis de Tocqueville, and G.W.F. Hegel are also seen as providing 
foundational accounts of the idea of civil society (C. Calhoun 1993; Cohen & Arato 
1992; Fine 1997; Kaldor 2003; Seligman 1992). 
Despite recognizing differences in the accounts of civil society provided by 
these different thinkers, many civil society theorists nonetheless assume that these 
accounts share some common foundation or refer to some universally describable 
human phenomenon. In other words, something like civil society has always existed, 
and although historical developments and intellectual changes have caused both the 
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idea and practice of civil society to undergo important transformations, the essential 
components of civil society came into place by the time of the early nineteenth 
century and have endured up until the present time. As will be argued at greater 
length in the third section of this chapter, it is this kind of non-genealogical form of 
thought to which, among other things, a Foucauldian analytical perspective offers a 
productive alternative. 
The third element of civil society theories which is relevant to the present 
analysis has to do with the strong normative arguments offered to justify a renewed 
focus on the importance of civil society for contemporary political life. As Fine 
argues, “civil society theory is not just a theory of civil society, but a theory which 
privileges civil society” (Fine 1997: 9; emphasis added). The principal normative 
justification for civil society is the argument that a strong democracy requires a robust 
civil society and civic participation in the political domain. In fact, there are two, very 
much related, strands of this argument. The first was already mentioned above—
namely that the revival of an autonomous sphere of civic activity and associations is 
crucial for transitions to and consolidations of democracy (Plattner & Diamond 
1994). In this account, “emergent civil societies in Latin America and Eastern Europe 
are credited with effective resistance to authoritarian regimes, democratizing society 
from below” while pressuring authoritarian states for change above (Foley & 
Edwards 1996: 38). 
The second, related strand of normative justification for a renewed emphasis 
on civil society is the need for strengthening already established democratic societies. 
For some, it is in part the fear that norms of civility and civic association are in 
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decline in their own Western societies that prompts the “return” to the language of 
civil society. Thus, for example, Michael Walzer justifies his attempt to re-theorize 
civil society by noting that “increasingly, associational life in the ‘advanced’ 
capitalist and social democratic societies seems at risk” (1995a: 8). Similarly, it is this 
fear of the disintegration of civil society that has prompted scholars such as Robert 
Putnam (1995, 2000) to examine related concepts such as social capital, in order to 
find why, for example, Americans are increasingly “bowling alone.” 
However, the performance of these normative tasks to which civil society has 
been assigned requires a certain understanding of what civil society is (or is meant to 
be) and how it operates. While there is no agreed upon definition of civil society 
among civil society theorists, a crucial element in its conceptualization is that it is 
imagined as a domain of freedom; it is free of relations of power, of coercion, of 
structures of domination and violence. In large part, this understanding of civil 
society is made possible by locating civil society outside both the state and the 
economy.  
For liberal theorists, the state is seen as the, at least potential, site of coercion 
and domination. For many critical theorists, most notably Jürgen Habermas and 
others who have taken up his work, both the state and the economy are potential sites 
of coercion and domination.51 However, despite this understanding of the dangers the 
economy as well as, (but not only, as for the liberals) the state present for an 
autonomous civil sphere, critical theorists of civil society still see the latter as a space 
 
51 The now classic work by the German philosopher is Habermas (1989). Cohen and Arato (1992) seek 
to provide an updated vision of civil society within the framework Habermas constructed. See also the 
discussions in Calhoun (1992). 
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for social groups to formulate, express, and promote their interests and identities in a 
manner that is free from coercion, domination, and violence. Whether the emphasis is 
placed on a “pragmatics of communication” (Habermas 1998) or shared cultural 
norms (Alexander 2006), civil society is still seen as a sphere of human life and 
activity with the potential to penetrate and civilize “the economy, the state and the 
other subsystems of society” (Vandenberghe 2008: 423). 
In this sense, most theories of civil society, while providing a fuller account of 
the history of ideas that contributed to different articulations of the notion of civil 
society, tend to remain locked within a liberal political imaginary which posits civil 
society as site of (at least potential) freedom. Even those critical accounts of civil 
society that draw upon the Marxist political tradition (particularly those influenced by 
the political thought of Antonio Gramcsi), while rejecting the close linking of the 
market and society (and the dependence of the latter on the former) in liberal thought, 
still tend to pose civil society or the sphere of the social as a potential domain of 
freedom (Cox 1999; Gill 2000). 
Civil Society as a Technology of Government 
In his 1978-1979 lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault identifies a novel 
rationality and technology of government that emerges in the eighteenth century. This 
new form of governmentality, Foucault argues, can best be understood as a liberal 
technology and rationality of government (2007a, 2009). In other words, what 
Foucault is analyzing is the emergence of liberalism—but not as a political theory or 
philosophy. Rather he analyzes liberalism “as a practice, that is to say, a ‘way of 
doing things’ directed towards objectives and regulating itself by continuous 
reflection” (2008: 318).  
One of the principal characteristics that Foucault identifies in a liberal art of 
government is that it contains a logic of internal limitation. Other modes of 
government, of course, confronted the problem of limitations on governmental power. 
However, Foucault argues, these limitations were ultimately exterior to the 
underlying logic and rationalities of government itself. For the centralized states that 
operated on the basis of raison d’État, the problem of the limitation of political power 
revolved around the problem of sovereignty, of the constitution, and of the 
relationship between political subjects and political authority. Ultimately, Foucault 
suggests, this problematic was framed within the parameters of the law and the 
juridical field (2008: 9).  
On the other hand, liberal government, Foucault suggests, is based on a 
principle of internal limitation that is to be found within the underlying rationality, or 
finality, of government itself. And this governmental reason, Foucault argues, is 
based on: (1) the “discovery” of the population and the economy as relatively 
autonomous spheres, distinct from the state, and containing their own internal logics 
and characteristics; and (2) the “discovery” of political economy as a principle or 
form of knowledge that can provide governmental reason with a relatively coherent 
framework for gauging the rationality of government. This is why Foucault at one 
point describes liberal governmentality in terms of  
the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit 
very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as 
its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential 
technical instrument. (2008: 108) 
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The development of political economy, as Lemke suggests, means that the 
“art of government” need not be “limited to the field of politics as separated from the 
economy; instead the constitution of a conceptually and practically distinguished 
space, governed by autonomous laws and a proper rationality is itself an element of 
‘economic government’” (2000: 10). At the same time, it is the discovery of the 
population that, Foucault argues, allows political economy to function as a 
technology of liberal government. So these two developments are interconnected: 
“the transition in the eighteenth century from a regime dominated by structures of 
sovereignty to a regime dominated by techniques of government revolves around 
population, and consequently the birth of political economy” (2008: 106).  
However, Foucault argues that while political economy and the new economic 
sciences of the eighteenth century provide a form of knowledge which can inform 
governmental reason, principally by providing the principle that good government 
must be economic government, economic science cannot itself provide the foundation 
for governmental rationality. Political economy, Foucault suggests, is both a specific 
type of knowledge (savoir) and a general modality of knowledge (connaissance), and 
indeed in a liberal art of government,  
one must govern with economics, one must govern alongside economists, one 
must govern by listening to economists, but economics must not be and there 
is no question that it can be the governmental rationality itself…So, a problem 
arises: what will government be concerned with if the economic process…is 
not in principle its object? I think it is the theory of civil society (2008, p. 
286). 
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Foucault’s provocative claim—that it is the theory of civil society that 
provides the basis for a liberal governmental rationality—relies on another theoretical 
argument he makes about the political subject typical of liberal government. Under a 
regime dominated by the logic of sovereignty, the relationship between the subject 
and the sovereign is regulated by the juridical sphere—by the law. The political 
subject is therefore the subject of right and rights, and it is the law that provides the 
basis for the limitation of sovereign power (2008: 37-39). Some time around the 
eighteenth century, with the Physiocrats, not only is the economy “discovered,” with 
its own natural laws and dynamics, providing a new form of limitation to sovereign 
power.52 There also emerges a new political subject that is located within “the 
economy”: homo oeconomicus (2008: 296-297). 
The emergence of the economy as an autonomous field and of homo 
oeconomicus as political subject however, presents a problem to the sovereign and the 
exercise of power. While the subject of rights is integrated into the political system 
through a regime of rights—renouncing certain rights or transferring them to the 
sovereign—homo oeconomicus is integrated into the economic system as an 
autonomous agent seeking to maximize his own utility. Furthermore, the proper 
functioning of the economic sphere—a sphere with which, since the rise of political 
economy, a sovereign must be concerned—requires that this economic agent be free 
to pursue his personal interest. To make things more difficult, political economy as a 
governmental knowledge tells the sovereign that he must not, and indeed cannot, have 
complete knowledge of the economy. The economy, and the multiplicity of subjects 
 
52 See Chapter Two, pp. 49-52. 
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that make up the economy, exist at the limit of sovereign power. Thus, Foucault 
argues,  
the economic subject and the subject of right have an essentially different 
relationship with political power. Or, if you like, with regard to the question of 
the foundation and exercise of power, the question posed by the problematic 
of economic man is completely different from that which could be posed by 
the figure and element of juridical man, the legal subject. (2008: 276) 
Furthermore, Foucault points out that the discovery of the economy as an 
autonomous realm inhabited by economic agents with their own, private logic does 
not mean that the logic of sovereignty and the problem of sovereign authority 
disappear. For the economic subject still has a juridical relationship to sovereign 
authority. So the crucial problem posed is how, on the basis of what logic or 
rationality, can “these individuals, who inhabit the space of sovereignty as subject of 
right and, at the same time, as economic men” be governed? (2008: 294-295) 
Foucault suggests that the basis for the government of the subject who is both a 
subject or right and an economic subject can only be assured “by the emergence of a 
new object, a new domain or field which is…the correlate of the art of government 
being constructed at this time in terms of the problem of the relation between the 
subject of right and the economic subject” (295). 
It is in relation to this problem, Foucault claims, that “a new plane of 
reference” emerges, a “new ensemble” which will integrate both the subject of right 
and the economic subject, thereby “preserving the unity and generality of the art of 
governing over the whole sphere of sovereignty” (295). The answer, Foucault 
suggests, is civil society. Civil society, according to Foucault, provides a rational 
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principle for limiting government, without relying exclusively on either the principle 
of right or the total autonomy of the market. Thus, Foucault argues, civil society is 
not best understood as a philosophical idea. Instead, it is best understood as “a 
concept of governmental technology, or rather, it is the correlate of a technology of 
government the rational measure of which must be juridically pegged to an economy 
understood as a process of production and exchange” (296).  
The construction of civil society makes possible the exercise of governmental 
power, one that simultaneously respects the principles of right as well as the laws of 
the economy. As Foucault observes, “an omnipresent government, a government 
which nothing escapes, a government which conforms to the rules of right, and a 
government which nevertheless respects the specificity of the economy, will be a 
government that manages civil society, the nation, society, the social” (296). Civil 
society, then, presents a solution to the problem that the autonomy of the economy 
and the economic subject posed to government. Foucault writes,  
Homo oeconomicus is…the abstract, ideal, purely economic point that 
inhabits the dense, full, and complex reality of civil society. Or alternatively, 
civil society is the concrete ensemble within which these ideal points, 
economic men, must be placed so that they can be properly managed. (2008: 
296) 
Finally, Foucault suggests that civil society carries out another crucial 
function within a liberal art of government; it offers a domain for not only the 
integration of the subject of rights and the economic subject of interest, but also for 
the incorporation of logics and assemblages of security.53 Under the previous 
 
53 See Chapter 2, pp. 51-52. 
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governmental regimes such as raison d’état, security was preoccupied with 
defeating—through violence, coercion, or domination—enemies that existed in a 
relation of exteriority to the sovereign power; whether they were foreign enemies, or 
rebellious or seditious subjects. Ultimately, the objective was to secure the sovereign 
power of the state itself (2008: 318-319). With the introduction of civil society, and 
within the framework of a liberal art of government, the object of government is the 
security not of the sovereign but civil society. Because civil society is understood as a 
domain “constituted by quasi-natural but relatively opaque processes of the economy, 
of population and of society itself”, it is these natural processes that needed to be 
protected, managed, and taken care of (Dean 2007: 26). As Foucault points out, 
“these processes, in turn, depended on the ‘natural liberty’ of individuals to pursue 
their own interests and better their own condition” (Dean 2007: 27).  
An important corollary to the integration of apparatuses of security within a 
liberal art of government is the potential that always exists for what Dean calls 
“authoritarian liberalism”: the eruption of sovereign and biopolitical forms of power 
within a liberal art of government (2007a: 108-129). Ostensibly, liberalism is 
concerned with managing the freedom of the population and the subjects that make 
up the latter. However as Foucault reminds us, freedom is not a natural quality of a 
universal subject—it must be defined and produced.  
The new art of government [i.e. liberalism] therefore appears as the 
management of freedom, not in the sense of the imperative: “be free,” with the 
immediate contradiction that this imperative may contain…Liberalism 
formulates simply the following: I am going to produce what you need to be 
free. I am going to see to it that you are free to be free. (2008: 63). 
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However, it is here in the need to produce freedom that Foucault identifies one of the 
central paradoxes of liberalism:  
at the heart of this liberal practice is an always different and mobile 
problematic between the production of freedom and that which in the 
production of freedom risks limiting and destroying it…Liberalism must 
produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, 
controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats, etc. (2008: 64) 
Dean further develops this idea in relation to the new understanding of 
government that results from a liberal political technology with society as its object 
and rationale. He argues that  
authoritarian measures follow not simply from the liberal government of free 
persons, but also from the liberal understanding of the sphere of government 
itself, and the implications of that understanding. That is to say, that the liberal 
reliance on authoritarian techniques is a consequence of the understanding of 
government as a limited sphere that must operate through the forms of 
regulation that exist outside itself, i.e. through those forms of regulation that 
obtain within…“civil society.” (2007: 110). 
Moreover, since the domain that must be governed becomes coextensive with all of 
social (and natural) life itself, an art of government that is ostensibly limited becomes 
both more extensive and intensive. That is, as governmental logic is tied to the well-
being of the population, every aspect of the “social body” is potentially of concern to 
an expanding governmentality. Population, civil society, society, the nation—these 
are sites which become the principal concern of governmental reason.54  
 
54 For many scholars, (neo) liberal governmentality is ultimately biopolitical—the latter understood as 
the government of life itself (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero 2009; Dillon & Reid 2001; Reid 2007). 
 108 
 
 109 
 
At this point, the significant analytical innovations present in Foucault’s 
treatment of civil society, as well as the serious differences between his account and 
the theories of civil society discussed in the first section, should be clear. While most 
civil society theories deal with the idea of civil society, they also refer to the reality 
of civil society. For Foucault, on the other hand, there is no fundamental difference 
between ideas and practices of civil society—and there is certainly no such thing as 
civil society independent of the discursive practices that constitute it. I referred to this 
in chapter two as Foucault’s “critical nominalism.” This method of analysis in turn 
makes possible a different way of interrogating civil society. For Foucault, since civil 
society is a historical, discursive construction, it is possible—indeed, necessary—to 
inquire into the conditions of possibility for its emergence. The framework of 
governmentality also highlights how civil society operates as a technology of 
government—one that transforms the field of governmental power and produces not 
only the freedom with which it is ostensibly concerned, but also significant degrees of 
unfreedom. Finally, a governmentality approach provides a powerful critical 
perspective for apprehending the political processes and implications in the shift from 
a national to a transnational or global civil society within the liberal political 
imaginary. It asks how transnational or global civil society functions as a 
governmental technology, to what kinds of problematizations it responds or produces, 
and what kinds of political subjectivities it invokes. In other words, what happens 
when the liberal political imaginary “goes global”?  
Global Civil Society as Governmentality 
Since the 1990s there has been a growing discourse regarding the existence of 
a global civil society (GCS). The concept has been invoked by scholars and policy 
practitioners, and it has become integral to discourses of global governance (which 
will be explored in Chapter 4). Very schematically, we can say that there are two 
general positions that students of global civil society have taken. The first position, 
which I call the “advocate” position, promotes the existence of a global civil society, 
highlighting its potential for making global politics more democratic, representative, 
and accountable. The second, or what I call the “progressive,” position is skeptical of 
the use of the term global civil society by the main institutions of global governance, 
yet believes in the possibility of global social movements to offer an “alternative 
globalization” or “globalization from below.” However, employing a Foucauldian 
governmentality framework, we can see that both positions share a number of crucial 
elements that form the discourse of civil society as a technology of government. 
One of the earliest, and most prominent, articulations of the notion of a global 
civil society came not from the academic field, but rather from within the United 
Nations system. In 1995 Report of the Commission on Global Governance (1995) 
argued that “To be an effective instrument of global governance in the modern world, 
the United Nations must…take greater account of the emergence of global civil 
society.” During the second half of the 1990s, the idea that there existed a global civil 
society became more prevalent both in policy and academic fields, and by 2001 the 
Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics 
(LSE), with funding from the MacArthur and Rockefeller Foundations, began 
producing a series of Global Civil Society yearbooks (Anheier, Glasius, & Kaldor 
2001b, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007). The yearbooks are part of an overall objective for 
the Centre to research globalization and global governance and “to increase 
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understanding and knowledge of global issues, to encourage interaction between 
academics, policy makers, journalists and activists, and to propose solutions [to 
global problems].”55 
One theme that is commonly found in the growing literature on global civil 
society is the connection between the latter and the idea of global governance. Indeed, 
global civil society is presented, both by scholars and policymakers, as having a 
crucial role in the overall structures and processes of global governance. While the 
issue of global governance will be discussed in the following chapter, an important 
element of the discourse of global civil society has to do with what is argued to be 
both the decreasing capacity of national states to deal with and, therefore, the 
increasing necessity for transnational non-state actors to respond to, what are viewed 
as fundamentally transnational or global problems.  Thus, for example, GCS scholar 
Ann Florini describes a number of transnational, or global, problems (transnational 
crime and terrorism, environmental problems, global trade and economic issues, etc.) 
and then calls attention to the “increasing disjunction between [these problems] and 
the (mostly national) systems and procedures available to solve them” (2003: 3-10). It 
is this disjunction between existing forms of largely national state-based institutions 
and global problems that requires, as the subtitle of Florini’s book (2003) calls for, 
“new rules for running a new world.” Within these new forms of global governance, a 
global civil society is crucial. 
Similarly, many commentators have been impressed by the massive growth in 
the transnational non-state sector. As Lester M. Salamon puts it, 
 
55 The Centre for the Study of Global Governance, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/>, last accessed 
January 6, 2010.  
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A striking upsurge is under way around the globe in organized voluntary 
activity and the creation of private, nonprofit or non- governmental 
organizations. . . . The scope and scale of this phenomenon are immense. 
Indeed, we are in the midst of a global ‘associational revolution’ that may 
prove to be as significant to the later twentieth century as the rise of the 
nation-state was to the later nineteenth. (1994: 109) 
Like Florini, Salamon also argues that this “associational revolution” fills a necessary 
governance gap produced by the increasing inability of national states to solve global 
problems. Indeed, Salamon argues that in addition to “[reflecting] a distinct set of 
social and technological changes”, the rise of GCS also reflects  
a long-simmering crisis of confidence in the capability of the state. Broad 
historical changes have thus opened the way for alternative institutions that 
can respond more effectively to human needs. With their small scale, 
flexibility and capacity to engage grass-roots energies, private nonprofit 
organizations have been ideally suited to fill the resulting gap. (110)  
From this perspective, GCS can fill two important, complementary, roles in 
terms of global governance: it can provide mechanisms of governance and rule 
outside of official state organs and institutions (including intergovernmental 
organizations), and it can also provide input into and hold accountable the latter, 
ultimately, it is hoped, making the more formalized structures of global governance 
more legitimate and democratic. Thus an overall list of the functions of civil society 
actors in global governance includes: “agenda setting, developing usable knowledge, 
monitoring, rule-making (through principled standards), policy verification, 
enforcement and capacity building” (Haas, Kanie, & Murphy 2004, cited in Green 
2007: 75).  
 112 
 
Furthermore and importantly, it is not only international governmental 
institutions that, it is argued, are increasingly being held more accountable by 
transnational non-state actors; states themselves are also seen as being subject to the 
“civilizing effect” of global civil society—“civilizing” in the sense that states 
supposedly hew more closely to a Western norm/ideal of the liberal, democratic state 
(Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Price 1998; Risse & Sikkink 
1999; Warkentin & Mingst 2000). In much of the GCS literature, the emphasis is on 
the role of transnational NGOs and networks that promote desirable ends such as the 
banning of land-mines; environmental protection; and the promotion and protection 
of the rights of minorities, women, children and human rights more generally (Clark 
2003, 2008; Evans 1997; Grigorescu 2007; Imber 1997; McGrew 1997; Payne & 
Samhat 2004). In most cases, the targets of this political action are governments of 
societies considered underdeveloped or in the process of development. Thus, GCS is 
seen as a means to “civilize” non-liberal states by forming transnational links between 
private actors within lesser developed societies and NGO networks based in more 
“advanced” societies in order to help the former transform their national governments 
along more “developed” and, ultimately, liberal lines (Hopgood 2000; Tvedt 2002).  
This civilizing, or disciplining, role of GCS is typically not subjected to 
critical analysis by liberal scholars of global civil society. Indeed, the central 
assumptions contained within liberal analyses of GCS regarding the proper role and 
function of political authority are, as has been presented above, fundamental elements 
in the overall discourse of global civil society and its role in helping produce a more 
civilized—that is, democratic and accountable—form of world politics. For their part, 
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more critical, Marxian-inspired, analyses of global civil society, call attention to the 
fact that the attempt to produce a global civil society has been largely an attempt to 
reproduce a liberal political culture on a global scale, and that such a project 
necessarily entails uneven relationships of power (Gill 2003) . However, many of 
these scholars still see the emergence of a global civil society as a development with 
potentially liberating results. From a Gramscian perspective, for example, global civil 
society can be seen as a terrain within which the contest between oppressive and 
emancipatory forces is being played out—in other words, as a battlefield over 
hegemony (Cox 1999; Gill 2000). 
It is here that a Foucauldian governmentality approach offers an alternative 
and potentially productive conceptualization of global civil society. As pioneering 
scholars in the field of Foucauldian IR have argued, critically apprehending the 
functioning of power in world politics entails not only challenging mainstream 
perspectives which ignore and/or are complicit with the dominant structures of power, 
but also paying attention to the ways that power operates in and through the very 
categories of knowledge that in turn constitute political subjects and objects of 
intervention (Debrix 1999; M. Dillon 1995). Consequently, a Foucauldian 
governmentality perspective on global civil society highlights the specific logics, 
rationalities, and technologies employed in producing the subject of global civil 
society and in involving this subject in mechanisms of governance (an issue to which 
I return in Chapter Four). Thus it is useful to briefly look at some elements of this 
“political repertoire” (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald 1996) of global civil society that 
have been developed over the past few decades. Here a number of interconnected 
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aspects of the relationship between the sites of global governance and civil society 
actors are particularly relevant for understanding how the overall governmental logics 
and relationships of power operate. 
To begin with, it is important to apprehend the process of constituting 
transnational or global civil society actors as political subjects. While most analyses 
of GCS take for granted the existence of these political subjects, from a Foucauldian 
perspective it is the mechanisms, discourses, and relations of power involved in their 
constitution that are of critical importance. For example, the very definition of global 
civil society and its actors and legitimate functions is a crucial factor in understanding 
its deployment within different forms of governmentality. Within the scholarly 
literature, there is no consensus on how to define transnational or global civil society. 
However, the authors of the Global Civil Society Yearbook offer a definition which is 
also consistent with the majority of discourses of civil society produced by the 
official sites of global governance: GCS is a combination of “transnational, national 
and local non-governmental actors who are engaged in negotiations and discussion 
about civil matters with governmental, intergovernmental, and other transnational 
actors at various levels and the business sphere” (Anheier, Glasius, & Kaldor 2001a: 
4). Similarly, international legal scholar Anna-Karin Lindblom (2005: 46-52) defines 
civil society organizations as non- governmental, not-for-profit organizations that do 
not use or promote violence and that have some form of formal existence and 
representative structures and processes. 
Needless to say, the act of defining who counts as civil society actors, and is 
thus endowed with the legitimacy to represent others by engaging with transnational 
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political authority, is a powerfully political act. Indeed, it is here where one of the 
major fault lines between liberal and critical theories (particularly those in the 
Marxian intellectual/political tradition) can be seen: for the former, GCS is comprised 
almost exclusively of NGOs making claims on political authority (E. J. Friedman, 
Hochstetler, & Clark 2005); for the latter it is broader social movements such as the 
World Social Forum which are privileged for their potential to produce counter-
hegemonic resistance to neoliberal hegemony (e.g. Gill 2000). When global 
governance actors define GCS along largely liberal lines, they attempt to legitimize 
some political subjects while delegitimizing others; at the same time they also attempt 
to circumscribe the field of political action to conform to a liberal vision of the 
political as being based on a “process of competition and aggregation of private 
preferences” (Baynes 2001: 162; Sunstein 1991). 
Second, in addition to how GCS is defined, it also matters who provides the 
definition. In this regard, the role played by the institutions of international or global 
governance in the constitution of a transnational or global civil society subject is 
significant. In fact the term “non-governmental organization” seems to have been 
coined by the United Nations, stipulating in Article 71 of its Charter that these 
organizations “could be accredited to the UN for consulting purposes” (Martens 
2002: 271). More recently, the United Nations system has also played a key role in 
identifying a global civil society that mainly consists of a “NGO community” whose 
identity emerges primarily in their interaction with the various sites of political 
authority.56 Similarly, other global governance actors have contributed to the 
 
56 Cf. Commission on Global Governance (1995). See also Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on 
United Nations-Civil Society Relations, We the People, Civil Society, the United Nations and Global 
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invocation and definition of transnational or global civil society actors. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, defines global civil society in terms 
of civil society organizations (CSOs), which in turn are defined as: 
the wide range of citizens' associations that exists in virtually all member 
countries to provide benefits, services, or political influence to specific groups 
within society. CSOs include: business forums, faith-based associations, labor 
unions, local community groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
philanthropic foundations, and think tanks.57 
Likewise, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has followed the precedent of UN 
Charter Article 71 by recognizing NGO involvement in the WTO in the Marrakech 
Agreement establishing the WTO. Article V § 2 provides that “the General Council 
may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-
governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO”.58 
In fact, a brief survey of the websites of all the major intergovernmental organizations 
shows that all have identified the existence of transnational civil society actors, 
provided working definitions for the latter, and established mechanisms for 
interacting and working with those groups. Here again we can see the 
“governmentalization” of global civil society at work by examining the various 
                                                                                                                                           
Governance (Cardoso Report), A/58/817, dated 11 June 2004, para 13, http://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/376/41/ pdf/N0437641.pdf?OpenElement (accessed January 6, 
2010); “UN and Civil Society”, http://www.un.org/en/civilsociety/index.shtml (accessed December 2, 
2009). 
57 International Monetary Fund, “The IMF and Civil Society Organizations,” available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/civ.htm, accessed on January 6, 2010. 
58 World Trade Organization, “Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization — Article V 
(extract),” available at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/estwto_e.htm#ngo, accessed on 
January 31, 2010. 
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mechanisms—Foucault’s  “political technologies” (2003c)—used to involve civil 
society actors in the structures and sites of global governance. 
One such political technology, mentioned above, is the use of juridical tools to 
establish a formal, legalized basis for civil society organizations’ involvement in the 
activities of international organizations (Ripinsky & Bossche 2007).59 Another 
political technology is the use of tools such as metrics, benchmarks, best practices 
and other techniques for normalizing the participation of civil society actors in global 
governance. More generally, these political technologies make civil society the object 
of expert knowledge, thereby inscribing the role of the constituted civil society within 
normalized frameworks for political action. 
Finally, the development of transnational forms of civil society are connected 
with projects for governing transnational spaces by constituting political subjects that 
can perform a number of functions in relation to transnational sites of governance. 
This role of transnational civil society can perhaps be seen most clearly in projects 
that aim at regional integration. Here, transnational non-governmental actors are 
viewed as potential “key contributors to a convergence of social and cultural norms 
able to support processes of regional and international integration” (Keck & Sikkink 
1999: 89). Transnational civil society, in this regard, is seen as “both a process and a 
goal: it is through the development of civil society that [regional] political and 
economic frameworks…can be made more democratic, and it is the presence of a 
 
59 The group of academics that run the annual Washington Model Organization of American States, 
have spent years trying to get accredited as a non-governmental organization by the OAS. This year 
they finally had their status as a non-profit certified, so their NGO status may finally be approved. 
However, this anecdote provides a telling example of the ways that international organizations make it 
difficult for potential “civil society” interlocutors to engage with them. 
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strong and effervescent civil society which will, in the end, be proof of the success of 
that enterprise” (Lizee 2000: 550). Regional integration, supported by national and 
regional civil society organizations, could then form an integral part of a “‘good’ 
global governance” that is produced through the “partnerships” formed between state 
and non-state actors at the national, regional, and global levels (Thakur & Van 
Langenhove 2006: 234). In this regard, civil society organizations (CSOs) could “act 
as a conduit for linking the local to the global” (239). 
However, lurking in the background of this view of transnational civil society 
is a significant problem, one that constantly surfaces when civil society is asked to 
function as a support for transnational governance—the problem of the relationship 
between political subjectivity and political authority. This problem has perhaps been 
most visible in the attempts to deepen the level of political integration within the 
European Union, wherein numerous (and for the most part unsuccessful) attempts 
have been made to constitute a European political identity and European civil society 
(Armstrong 2002; Curtin 2003; Eriksen & Fossum 2005). In the case of the EU, one 
strategy for dealing with this problem is to try to take advantage of the apparent 
connection between citizenship rights and collective identity and belonging, by 
constructing various mechanisms and institutional arrangements that produce EU 
community-wide citizenship rights (Painter 2002; Prentoulis 2001; Rumford 2003). 
This strategy, however, raises questions regarding the basis for the connection 
between rights and collective identity, since the former are also connected with 
political institutional structures and authority. That is, citizenship and rights are 
seemingly inextricably connected with the relationship between governed and 
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governors, including the ability of the former to make claims on the latter (Bellamy & 
Warleigh 2001). And yet, despite the emerging and evolving complex of governance 
structures in the EU, authority at the EU level is restricted and fractured, and 
mechanisms for citizens to make claims on political authority are quite limited 
(Wiener & Sala 1997). 
The problem of constructing a regional civil society to provide legitimacy for 
regional structures of governance and integration and to act as an interlocutor for 
regional sites of power and authority is certainly not restricted to the EU zone; it is 
present in some form or other in all projects for regional, transnational governance. 
Indeed, all of these elements of what was analyzed above and which I refer to as the 
“governmentalization” of civil society can be found in attempts to construct, 
mobilize, and deploy civil society as a political subject of transnational governance. 
In the final section, I take a look at how this problem has been posed in the context of 
projects to integrate the Americas. I argue that what Foucault discussed in terms of a 
‘crisis of government’ can be seen in the ways that the problem of the relationship 
between political subjectivity, on the one hand, and political power and authority, on 
the other, has been problematized in the space of the Americas. 
Civil Society of the Americas 
The idea of civil society has been invoked in the context of various projects 
that seek to construct some form of supranational geopolitical imaginary in the 
Americas. In this section, the focus is on the various forms of political practice that 
have coalesced around the project to construct a hemispheric space of economic 
exchange and enterprise in the Americas. This project has been promoted through a 
variety of institutional structures, most importantly the process of multilateral 
negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, discussed in the 
final section of chapter two), and the related series of hemispheric Summits of the 
Americas. 
Under President Bill Clinton, the EAI was renamed the FTAA, and a Summit 
of the Americas was convened in Miami in 1994. A second Summit of the Americas 
was held in Santiago, Chile in 1998 to formally launch FTAA negotiations and to 
ultimately serve as the political framework for hemispheric integration (Kennedy 
2004a). At both the Miami and Santiago Summits, the US vision of hemispheric 
integration, as consisting primarily in economic integration based on the liberalization 
of markets in the Americas, was generally supported by the majority of governments 
participating in the process (Kennedy 2004a).  
However, by the time of the 1998 Santiago Summit, popular opposition and 
resistance to neoliberal transformations in Latin America in general, and to the FTAA 
project specifically, were becoming more widespread throughout the region (Harris 
2003; Seoane & Taddei 2002). In part to address these concerns about public 
opposition to the proposed project, the nascent institutional structures of the FTAA 
made civil society participation in the negotiation process a priority. In promoting 
civil society participation, the various political actors both drew on and further 
developed the political rationalities and technologies involved with the construction 
of a transnational civil society subject and its insertion into mechanisms of 
governance that were discussed in the previous section. In the Joint Declaration 
produced at the Fourth Trade Ministerial of the Summit of the Americas, held in San 
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José, Costa Rica in March 1998, the importance of civil society participation was 
affirmed. The declaration stated:  
We recognize and welcome the interests and concerns that different sectors of 
society have expressed in relation to the FTAA. Business and other sectors of 
production, labor, environmental and academic groups have been particularly 
active in this matter. We encourage these and other sectors of civil societies to 
present their views on trade matters in a constructive manner. (FTAA 1998) 
Furthermore, at the San José ministerial meeting, a Committee of Government 
Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society (with the acronym SOC) was 
established, with a mandate to “receive inputs, analyze them and present the range of 
views for consideration by Ministers” (FTAA 1999). The SOC established 
mechanisms for soliciting and receiving “input” from civil society organizations, 
including classifying the latter based on sector: “Business Associations and Other 
Sectors of Production (including professional associations),” “Labor Organizations,” 
“Environmental Organizations,” “Academics (including students);” and “other 
organizations and individuals” (FTAA 1999). However, initially the mechanism for 
input was limited to written submissions by recognized civil society organizations. 
Subsequent meetings of the SOC produced minor changes designed to 
increase civil society participation without altering the fundamentally restrictive 
nature of the FTAA process. At the same time, the SOC recognized that civil society 
input into the FTAA negotiations and meetings was very limited. However, rather 
than changing the basis for civil society participation, new political technologies were 
adopted that had the governance of participating states as their principal objective. 
That is, within the context of the problematization of insufficient civil society 
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participation, the focus came to be on the role of individual states and their 
responsibility for producing civil society participation. Thus techniques such as best 
practices and benchmarks were established in order to provide standards for 
individual states to take the necessary actions to enable participation by civil society 
groups and to measure how successful the different states were in achieving the goal 
of civil society participation.  
From this perspective, the ability of individual states to produce civil society 
participation in the process of hemispheric integration is seen as an important 
indicator of the ‘good governance’ of those states. Indeed, the role of civil society has 
been prominent within discourses of good governance in a number of sites and 
contexts, especially in relation to developing and post-colonial polities. Beginning in 
the 1990s, “civil society [has] emerged as the prime political force in the policy 
agenda of the major lenders and development agencies. An active civil society, it was 
believed, would enable choice, scrutinize errant governments, and ultimately lead to 
regularized, plural democracy (Mohan 2002: 125)”60 Various global governance 
actors such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have used the 
quantity of civil society organizations as an “objective indicator of governance” 
within individual countries. Indeed, the UNDP actually measures this indicator of 
good governance on the basis of the quantity of NGOs within a country (UNDP 2002; 
Willis 2005). Likewise, the European Commission locates the existence of civil 
society as one of the factors in the overall political development of a country: “As the 
concepts of human rights, democratisation and democracy, the rule of law, civil 
 
60 See also Fisher (1998) and McIlwaine (1998).  
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society, decentralised power sharing, and sound public administration, gain 
importance and relevance as a society develops into a more sophisticated political 
system, governance evolves into good governance” (European Commission 2003). 
The FTAA process sought to deploy some of these political technologies of 
civil society by instructing the SOC to “strengthen and deepen their consultations 
with civil society at the national level,” and “identify and foster the use of best 
practices for outreach and consultation with civil society” (FTAA 2002). 
Furthermore, countries participating in the FTAA process were instructed to create 
“Governmental Points of Contact,” located within a governmental agency (usually 
ministries of trade or the exterior) for each of a defined list of issue areas that can be 
contacted by societal groups or individuals.61 The result can probably be seen as 
mixed, given that some countries did not provide any “Points of Contact,” many 
countries provided only a single contact for all issue areas, and only a few countries 
have a special FTAA/Hemispheric/North American division with a number of 
different individual contacts within the particular state agency.62  
In addition to action on individual states in the region from the FTAA 
organizations, a network of non-state organizations has also been formed to promote 
civil society participation in the Summits of the Americas. More specifically, this 
network of organizations has taken on the task of “supporting and promoting 
democratic governance throughout the Americas,” primarily by evaluating “the level 
 
61 The issue areas are: Market Access, Agriculture, Government Procurement, Investment, Competition 
Policy, Intellectual Property Rights, Services, Dispute Settlements, Subsidies, Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duties, Smaller Economies, Civil Society, E-Commerce, Trade Negotiations 
Committee, Business Facilitation Measures, and Technical Committee on Institutional Issues. 
62 In this latter category, both Canada and Chile stand out. 
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of Government compliance with the mandates issued during the Summits of the 
Americas” in four areas: “access to public information; freedom of expression; local 
government and decentralization; and support for civil society participation in 
governance” (Active Democracy 2007). 
The Active Democracy Network consists of twenty-one organizations, each 
one located in a different participating state in the Summit of the Americas process 
(although obviously not all thirty four countries have organizations in the network). 
The three principal organizations that coordinate the Citizen Network for the 
Implementation of Summit Mandates are PARTICIPA in Chile, which acts as 
General Administrator of the project; the Canadian Foundation for the Americas 
(FOCAL) in Canada; and Instituto Venezolano de Estudios Sociales y Políticos 
(INVESP) of Venezuela. According to the FOCAL website, “These organizations 
compose the Hemispheric Coordination Team sharing the responsibility of 
coordinating the work of, and administering support to, the CSO’s implementing the 
project locally, designated National Coordinators” (FOCAL 2010). 
This Active Democracy Network also employs a number of techniques to help 
ensure that participating countries comply with the Summit mandates for 
strengthening democratic governance in the hemisphere. To begin with, it has 
identified five areas for governmental action: 
1. Access to Public Information 
2. Freedom of Expression 
3. Access to Justice and the Independence of the Judiciary 
4. Local Governments and Decentralization  
5. Strengthening of Civil Society Participation 
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Furthermore, between May 2002 and October 2005, civil society organizations in the 
twenty-one countries in the region  
received training in how to apply the follow-up instruments comprised of 
questionnaires and indicators used to collect information on each of the five 
themes. In each of the 21 countries, a baseline of progress was generated for 
each of the themes being monitored. The results were elaborated in national 
reports and were the basis of a series of proposals to address the deficiencies 
in implementation uncovered by the monitoring exercise. (FOCAL 2010) 
 The image presented by this network of organizations is that its membership 
consists only of non-state organizations that are also largely representative of the 
countries in which they are located. However, all of the organizations receive 
significant financial support from both governments and private companies and 
foundations, most of which are located in the US, Canada, or the EU. In fact, a closer 
look at the different affiliated organizations and sponsors of the different groups 
involved in the Active Democracy Network, reveals a network of US foundations, US 
government agencies, US corporations, international corporations, and international 
organizations that seek, among other things, to strengthen (or constitute) civil society 
in a number of sites and at different scales—from the “local” to the “hemispheric”—
in the Americas.63  
Furthermore, while the various groups associated with this network are active 
in Canada and the United States, the bulk of their activities are directed at countries in 
 
63 As has been mentioned above (and in previous chapters), and will be further explicated below, the 
perspective adopted here is a nominalist one regarding the existence of geographical/spatial scale. That 
is to say, it is not assumed that different scales exist independent of their discursive constitution; at the 
same time, the discursive constitution of scale is itself both a significant “social fact” and also has 
important implications for relationships of power. 
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Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus, there is a marked geographical unevenness to 
the project for promoting the idea/ideal of civil society in the Americas, where it is 
largely the “underdeveloped” societies of Latin America and the Caribbean which are 
the principal targets for governmental intervention. Similarly, the neoliberal logic that 
informs the project for civil society development in the Americas is closely related to, 
and draws on elements of, earlier discourses of modernization and development. 
Indeed, projects for developing civil society as part of an overall strategy of good 
governance and regional integration, such as those promoted by the Active 
Democracy Network, operate on the basis of what Sheppard and Leitner call a 
“developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary” (Sheppard & Leitner 2010).  
Sheppard and Leitner’s focus is on the shifting logics and rationalities 
contained within discourses of development, especially in the recent transformation 
from the “Washington Consensus” of the 1980s and 1990s to some kind of “Post-
Washington Consensus” (2010). What these authors highlight is the way that, despite 
shifts regarding the specific policies that are promoted, there exist a number of deep 
continuities within the developmentalist projects. One underlying element that is 
particularly relevant to the present study is the way that, despite changes in preferred 
policies, developmentalist projects (re)produce a spatiality of difference based on a 
developed/underdeveloped binary and, especially, the legitimacy of knowledge and 
expertise produced within the “first world.” It is here that the importance of civil 
society for neoliberal governmentality becomes central, for it both serves as an 
indicator of a particular country’s level of development, while at the same time it 
offers the promise of increased development if it can be effectively mobilized. 
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The importance of civil society for develomentalist discourses and projects 
finds its expression in a number of different ways. One example is the way that the 
discourse and project of participatory development (PD) that became prominent in the 
1990s has increasingly emphasized the importance of civil society in developing 
countries (Nelson & Wright 1995). However, when international organizations such 
as the World Bank have promoted the role of civil society as part of an overall project 
of participatory development, civil society is understood largely in neoliberal terms—
as a collection of “stakeholders” in developmental projects whose role is limited to 
providing increased transparency and accountability, rather than being able to decide 
on the more fundamental meaning and shape of “development” in general. From a 
Foucauldian perspective, participatory development can be seen as a political 
technology, one which seeks to incite and mobilize political subjects such as ‘civil 
society’ in order to shape the conduct of other subjects, including countries which are 
the object of governmental intervention in the form of development. Thus, for 
example, PD is connected with the idea of country “ownership” of development 
programs, where the state and/or international development agency seeks civil society 
involvement for policy development and agenda setting (Kapoor 2005). 
This raises another important point about civil society and the role it is called 
upon to play within the neoliberal political imaginary—namely that while civil 
society is seen as distinct from the state and formal political institutions, it is at the 
same time envisioned as helping produce governance. This can be seen clearly within 
the discourse of participatory development, in which development organizations 
construct what I call a “development-participation-governance” assemblage. Indeed, 
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this linkage between development, participation and governance is made quite 
explicit. Thus, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) lists the following as one of its 
general conclusions regarding participatory development: 
The development-participation-governance linkages can only be strengthened 
if civil society…and the private sector are able to advocate for needed reforms 
in the political and economic systems. Technocratic approaches to 
institutional change and legal reform fail without effective local demand for 
change, expressed through local constituencies and locally-based skills for 
building grassroots and national participation. Through policy dialogue and 
capacity building, donors can effectively support the strategic role of civil 
society. (OECD 1997) 
Notice that, far from rejecting “technocratic approaches,” the OECD instead 
envisions civil society as producing demand for and supporting technocratic 
approaches that include “institutional change and legal reform.” One of those 
“reforms” involves the privatization of public services, described by development 
agencies in terms of creating “public-private-civil society partnerships in public 
service provision” (Hanna 2000). Again, within this political imaginary, civil society 
is viewed as acting not only as a buffer between the state and the market, but also as a 
site where demand for an increased marketization of social existence can be generated 
and put to work. In other words, civil society is envisioned as a site where “good 
governance” can be demanded; however the latter is defined in strictly neoliberal 
terms of making the state more efficient, productive, and competitive—that is, more 
entrepreneurial.  
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Furthermore, within various neoliberal forms of governmentality, civil society 
is seen as not only as a relay within a generalized governmental network, but also as 
an asset that can be employed for diverse governmental objectives—from the 
provision of public services to the provision of security against terrorism. With regard 
to the latter, civil society is often portrayed as a critical resource—indeed, as one of 
the overall “elements of national power”—that can be mobilized within a public-
private partnership to counter terrorism, for example (OSCE 2009).64 In fact, the 
potential fungibility of civil society as a governmental resource is implicit in the 
concept of “social capital” which is increasingly employed as a governmental 
technology for measuring social capacity. 
However, the effort to make civil society both a benchmark for measuring, 
and resource for increasing, a given country’s governance and overall level of 
development reveals a profound contradiction within liberal forms of 
governmentality, namely that this mode of civil society is hard to find in developing 
countries (at least as envisioned by the international actors promoting a liberal version 
of civil society). The contradiction is that civil society is meant to be a naturally 
occurring phenomenon, yet liberal discourses and projects of civil society clearly 
have in mind a particular form of social organization that they wish to promote—or 
produce. Thus, within the framework of development, the need to construct civil 
society, to increase, harness, and put to work a country’s social capital, becomes an 
important governmental aim. 
 
64 See also “United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” Resolution adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly, 20 September 2006, which encourages states to develop public-private 
partnerships to combat terrorism.  
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The perceived problems and potentials of the project of mobilizing civil 
society were a source of discussion at the seminar “Good Practices on Social 
Inclusion: A Dialogue between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean” 
sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank in 2003. In one paper presented 
at the seminar, Alicia Forhmann, an official from Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
shared her country’s experience in generating civil society participation with regard 
to negotiations for the FTAA (2003). She noted that ,in Chile, “the  citizens know 
that, for better or for worse, globalization is here to stay. In the future, the economy 
and society will develop within this context” (2003: 2). In fact, Frohmann claims that 
this acceptance of the reality of globalization is one of the reasons why “public 
opinion in Chile has generally favored trade negotiations” (2003: 3). However, she 
goes on to comment that an engagement with civil society is crucial in order to 
maintain that high level of support for Chile’s negotiation of free trade agreements. 
Frohmann’s comments present civil society as both an opportunity and a challenge—
an opportunity to provide legitimacy for the government’s strategy of increased 
economic liberalization, and a challenge in that this political subject that is civil 
society does not automatically appear but rather needs to be produced. 
Indeed, much of Frohmann’s paper details the various mechanisms and 
techniques employed in Chile in order to produce the object of a complex 
governmental intervention—a political actor named civil society whose role would be 
to legitimate the deepening of the country’s neoliberal transformation. This role 
would be carried out by providing the consent of the governed, and also by providing 
the justification in terms of the well-being of the governed that would be secured 
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through increased neoliberalization. The problem of producing civil society also 
involves providing it with a certain amount of savoir necessary to carry out its role. 
Here Frohmann speaks of how various mechanisms were designed in order to 
produce “trained, informed civil society dialogue participants who provide input for 
international trade negotiations” (2003: 10). Despite the difficulties, Frohmann 
reports that Chile was able to successfully establish a competent interlocutor. 
However, she notes that in general this is not the case with the rest of Latin America: 
“Many Latin American countries have yet to train many sectors of civil society to be 
informed participants in dialogue on matters related to trade negotiations, and we 
believe that this dialogue mechanism can be an important contribution toward the 
creation of these abilities” (2003: 10, emphasis added). 
Conclusion 
As this previous example illustrates, civil society has become a privileged site 
within various neoliberal modes of governance, and of intervention on behalf of the 
promotion of (“good”) governance. Civil society is constructed as a site for producing 
the subjects of neoliberal governance—that is, subjects who are ready to accept or, 
better, demand neoliberal globalization. In this sense, then, the promotion of 
“partnerships”, “participation”, and local “empowerment” are often seen as ways to 
generate and guarantee political support for neoliberal policies and programs such as 
those associated with “structural adjustment” (Paley 2001b; Schild 1998). That is to 
say, neoliberal globalization is produced in part through a form of governmentality 
that presents globalization as necessary and/or inevitable. As Foucault suggested in 
his analysis of neoliberalism, the neoliberal subject is one that is “eminently 
governable” on the basis of its “rationality,” “rational conduct [being] any conduct 
which is sensitive to modifications in the variables of the environment and which 
responds to this in a non-random way, in a systematic way” (2008: 269). In other 
words, the neoliberal subject is one who “accepts reality”. Of course, how that 
“reality” is defined and understood is crucial. Thus, the production of a “global 
reality”—of globalization as an unavoidable fact (as, for example, Frohmann claims 
is the case in Chile)—is an important element in a governmental assemblage that 
produces and governs subjects. 
Indeed, this novel and evolving form of governmental power does more than 
simply generate acceptance and/or support for neoliberal policies; it also seeks to 
operate at the level of subjectivity by producing entrepreneurial subjects. The 
deployment of political technologies such as micro-enterprises, as well as the 
generation of “civic projects” which are guided by a managerial ethos, have among 
their aims the transformation of citizens into “social entrepreneurs” (Boschee 1998; 
Fowler 2000; Peredo & McLean 2006) who are thoroughly invested in neoliberal 
capitalism (Paley 2001a). Thus, for example, the “reality” of globalization is seen as 
entailing and making necessary a competitive and entrepreneurial subjectivity. 
Ultimately, then, neoliberalism is based on and productive of a certain understanding 
of human nature and social reality. “It claims to present not an ideal, but a reality; 
human nature” (Read 2009: 26). And that human nature is a competitive one. In fact, 
the human subject, within neoliberalism, is viewed as a form of capital, a human 
capital. And as the bearer and source of human capital, the neoliberal subject can and 
should work on itself in order to achieve the best return on its own investment. That 
is, the neoliberal subject “is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself” (2008: 226). 
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However, it is not only individual subjectivity that is targeted in order to 
produce more socially entrepreneurial subjects; countries themselves are increasingly 
interpellated as political subjects that should be driven by an entrepreneurial ethos. 
Thus, for example, countries that are the target of development discourses and 
programs are exhorted to take “ownership” of their development, and encouraged to 
produce their own objectives and strategies for achieving those objectives.65  
Furthermore, as discussed above, civil society becomes an important political 
technology in that it can be used as a benchmark for measuring and evaluating the 
manner in which individual states are following the “best practices” for development, 
and are producing “good governance.” 
Furthermore, as argued in the preceding sections of this chapter, it is also at 
the global level that civil society is posited as an important element of a general form 
of global governance. Within what I have been describing as a global liberal political 
imaginary, civil society is seen as one of three fundamental sites, the other two being 
made up of the state and the market. At the global level, what is envisioned are 
“multistakeholder partnerships between governments (…), civil society organizations, 
and businesses (…)” that will together provide more effective and accountable global 
governance (Lehtomäki 2005: 2). In fact, it becomes clear that what are supposedly 
distinct sites—market, society, and state—interpenetrate each other and overlap to 
such a degree that it is difficult, or impossible, to locate the boundaries that separate 
them. At the same time, perhaps the most fundamental quality shared by all three 
domains is that, within the global liberal political imaginary they are all connected 
 
65 See, for example, OECD (2005).  
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with governance—with the government of subjects and their relations to self and 
others. Thus, in the next chapter, I will examine how discourses and practices of 
global governance draw on and reproduce neoliberal forms of governmentality. 
CHAPTER FOUR: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
 
Introduction 
Global governance represents the third domain of the global liberal political 
imaginary. In the previous two chapters, the “scaling up” of the other two domains of 
the liberal political imaginary – the market and civil society – were examined, as 
were the problems and implications associated with the discourses of globalization 
and global civil society. The analysis up to this point has also highlighted the way that 
the boundaries separating the three domains of the liberal political imaginary, while 
already containing numerous ambiguities at the domestic level, are often difficult to 
distinguish at the global level. The global market and global society interpenetrate 
each other and their boundaries become blurred. However, an important underlying 
element to both is the way they function as a form of governmentality—as a way of 
governing subjects and spaces. 
The idea of global governance, therefore, is particularly ambiguous. On the 
one hand, within the liberal political imaginary both the market and society are 
viewed as sources of order and governance. The market operates on the basis of a 
competitive logic that disciplines subjects by compelling them to behave in a 
competitive manner. Society is seen as having a civilizing function, as providing a 
check on the official sites of government, and networks of civil actors are seen as 
sources of authoritative rule making. However, a second source of ambiguity in the 
notion of global governance has to do with the difficulty in translating the traditional 
site of political authority – the state – to the global level. Indeed, it is precisely the 
absence of a world state, combined with the existence of mechanisms and structures 
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of political order and authority, which have prompted scholars and experts to speak of 
global governance rather than global government.66  
This chapter develops a critical examination of discourses and practices of 
global governance. This critical analysis operates on two “levels,” or focuses on two 
dimensions of “global governance.” In the first instance, the analysis focuses on 
theories and discourses of global governance, especially the logics and rationales on 
which they are based and also which they in turn help produce. In this regard, the 
analysis centers on global governance as a form of power/knowledge. In the second 
instance, and also very much related to the first, the chapter utilizes the Foucauldian 
governmentality framework to shed light on attempts at ordering social and political 
reality which do not appear in, or are occluded by, the “global governance” paradigm. 
These attempts at ordering social and political reality include, crucially, techniques 
and technologies of power that are productive of a specifically neoliberal form of 
subjectivity. This form of subjectivity can be extended to individual subjects, as well 
as to collective political actors such as nation-states. Following Foucault (Foucault 
1988b), I view the various assemblages of political rationalities, technologies, and 
forms of knowledge involved in producing modes of subjectivity as also involving 
operations and relations of power. In other words, the production of subjectivity 
represents a key element of governmentality. Thus, the second dimension of the 
critical analysis of global governance examines the production of nation-states as 
 
66 The shift in language from government to governance is a significant one, and will be discussed in 
more detail below. At the national level, this shift is often associated with the idea of ‘policy 
networks.’ See, for example, Rhodes (1997). In IR, Rosenau’s notion of “governance without 
government” is paradigmatic. Cf. Rosenau and Czempiel (1992). 
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neoliberal subjects, arguing that this represents a form of “global governmentality” 
that is left out of mainstream accounts of global governance. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section locates the notion of global 
governance within the broader problematique of order in International Relations 
theory. The second section examines discourses of “governance,” contrasting 
accounts of the rise of “government without government” with a Foucauldian 
governmentality approach. This section also critically analyzes discourses of 
governance for the ways that they help shape social and political reality. Further 
developing this idea, the third section examines modes of neoliberal “subjectivation,” 
or subject-formation, drawing on Foucault’s analysis of the connection between 
ethics and subjectivity. This section focuses on how discourses of governance are 
connected with notions of competitivity, which in turn, are increasingly the basis for 
understanding and framing social and political reality. As an example of this kind of 
neoliberal subjectivation, the fourth section looks at the phenomenon of  “nation 
branding”. The focus of the analysis will be on how nation branding operates as a 
governmental rationality and also as a technology of governance. Here the connection 
between subjectivity and governmentality will be elucidated. The concluding section 
will explore some of the implications that the examples of governmental rationalities 
discussed in this chapter have for our theoretical understanding of global governance 
and contemporary world order.
Global Governance and the Problem of Order 
The problem of how order is produced has been central to modern political 
thought, from Thomas Hobbes’s (1991) theorization of a state of nature that can only 
be overcome through the constitution of sovereign power and authority, to the 
sociological perspective of Talcott Parsons (1937), which emphasizes the way that 
order is produced in part through subjects’ embeddedness in social institutions and 
structures. The problem of order has also been central to the discipline of 
International Relations (IR), and has likewise been addressed from a number of 
different theoretical perspectives. Indeed, the problem of order in IR is closely related 
to the question that is said to be foundational for the discipline, namely: Why do wars 
occur and what are the conditions for peace?67 Furthermore, one of the central 
premises of IR as a discipline is that the problem of order is fundamentally different 
within national societies than between them, giving rise to the notion of the 
international system as an anarchical one.  
This position is perhaps best exemplified by Hedley Bull’s statement: 
“Whereas men within each state are subject to a common government, sovereign 
states in their mutual relations are not. This anarchy it is possible to regard as the 
central fact of international life and the starting-point of theorizing about it” (1966: 
35). The result is a picture of political reality based on a binary of politics within 
sovereign states vs. politics between them, or between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of 
the sovereign state (R. B. J. Walker 1993). Thus, continuing the legacy of Hobbes, 
“‘inside’, ‘order’ increasingly became a province of legal regulation within such 
 
67 In the early history of the discipline, this question was placed at the foundation of the study of world 
politics and, indeed, retrospectively presented as a question that has been at the heart of international 
thought since at least the times of Thucydides. Cf. Waltz (1959) The problem of war is also presented 
as the paradigmatic question for the discipline in a number of college textbooks. See, for example, 
Viotti and Kauppi (2010: 1). 
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states while ‘outside’, the whole problem became what could achieve ‘order’ in the 
absence of the legitimacy conferred by sovereignty” (Rengger 2000).  
In his study of international political thought regarding the problem of order, 
Rengger (2000) offers a helpful schema for categorizing the different responses to 
this problem. He identifies two broad “families” or groups of responses to the 
“problem of order”: one “family of responses” who view the primary task as one of 
“dealing with, solving and/or managing international relations in the light of [the 
problem of order]; and another “family of responses” which seeks, in different ways, 
to overcome or “end” the problem of order (22-24). In the first family, Rengger 
proposes the existence of “three basic sets of responses, each of which concentrates 
on one aspect…of contemporary world politics and locates in it the effective answer 
to the ‘problem of order’” (22). The first response, associated with political realism, is 
to propose the balance of power between sovereign states as the best way to mitigate 
the problem of order. The second response, associated with the English school of IR, 
presents international society or a society of states based on rules and norms as a way 
of managing the problem of order. The third response, associated with liberalism, 
offers institutions as a way of achieving international or global order through the 
promotion of cooperation (22-23, and passim). 
In the second “family,” Rengger locates two general sets of responses. The 
first includes Frankfurt school critical theory, some forms of feminist thought, neo-
Gramscian and “Western Marxist” approaches, is ultimately concerned with 
overcoming the problem of order—that is, with some kind of “emancipation.” For 
this group, contemporary forms of order are seen as oppressive, and a radical 
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transformation of the structures and arrangements of social and political life are called 
for (23-24; 143-172). The second group of responses includes post-structural and 
some varieties of feminist thought, as well as some forms of constructivism. Rengger 
argues that for this group, the problem of order is itself problematized. That is, the 
problem of order is not seen as one that can be managed, solved, or overcome. 
Rather, what is often crucial for a critical understanding of contemporary politics is 
the way that this problem is itself conceptualized—the basis on which the problem is 
made intelligible, the ideas and concepts which are mobilized in its construction, and 
the kinds of “solutions” which the problem in turn makes thinkable and thus possible 
(24, 173-188). 
As Rengger himself recognizes, this schema is far from unproblematic. Many 
of the various self-identified theoretical perspectives in IR do not map neatly onto his 
different categories. Also, Rengger’s description of post-structural responses to the 
‘problem of order’ is somewhat limited (a point which will be discussed further 
below) and at times reproduces the problematic notion that post-structural 
perspectives are limited in their effects to “tracing hidden meanings, untying false 
unities, and unsettling established discourses,” instead of being able to provide the 
basis for any kind of “ethico-political imperative” (184-185).68 Still, Rengger’s 
schema does offer a useful starting point for distinguishing among different 
conceptualizations of global governance, and for apprehending some of the 
 
68 Rengger quotes David Campbell (1998: 4 and chapter 1 in general) who, Rengger states, claims 
“that the interventions he practices have an ethico-political imperative to them.” However, Rengger 
argues that Campbell (and, by extension post-structural or non-foundational thinkers in general) is 
unable to offer any philosophical justification for their particular ethico-political position. Here 
Rengger appears to be repeating the well-rehearsed critique of post-Nietzschean perspectives made by 
the likes of Jürgen Habermas (1987) and Charles Taylor (1984).  
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implications those differences might hold for our understanding of potential practices 
of world politics.  
Theories and Discourses of Governance 
Although the word “governance” has existed for many centuries in English, it 
is only relatively recently that it has resurfaced and entered into common parlance.69 
In the social sciences, this has given rise to “governance theory,” which has become 
prominent in political science, international relations, and political sociology. One 
influential source for this trend has been the “Anglo-governance” model developed 
by political scientists such as R.W. Rhodes, which details “a shift that has taken place 
in government, from a hierarchical organization to a fragmented and decentralized 
entity that is heavily reliant on a range of complex and independent policy networks” 
(Marinetto 2003: 592; Marsh & Rhodes 1992; Rhodes 1996, 1997). As Rhodes notes, 
the term ‘governance’ has been put to diverse uses, referring at different times to: 
“the minimal state, corporate governance, the new public management, ‘good 
governance’, socio-cybernetic systems, and self-organizing networks” (1996: 652). 
For his part, Rhodes defines governance as “self-organizing, inter-organizational 
 
69 Indeed, while there exist texts containing the verb “govern” from the late 13th century, the earliest 
noun form of “govern” seems to have been “governance,” which was only later superseded by the 
word “government.” See “govern”, “governance”, and  “government” in The Oxford English 
Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online. Oxford University Press. 4 Apr. 2000, last accessed April 19, 
2010. An interesting history of the term “governance” is provided by the European Commission as part 
of its White Paper on Governance. The text, “Étymologie du terme ‘gouvernance’” (only available in 
French), points out that “governance” is derived from the Greek word kubernân, which refers to the 
control of a ship or a cart, and which Plato employed metaphorically to talk about the government of 
men (de oliveira Barata n.d.). As we will see below, Foucault argues that in fact Plato and the ancient 
Greeks did not contemplate the government of men, but rather of the city or polis—a distinction which 
Foucault believes is important for understanding modern political reason and modes of government 
(Foucault 2007a). 
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networks…that complement markets and hierarchies as governing structures for 
authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and co-ordination.”70 
Whereas Rhodes has applied this conceptual framework to the changing 
operations of government at the national and sub-national level, the concept of 
“governance” has also been utilized to understand forms of authoritative decision-
making that occur at the supra-national, international, and global levels of analysis. 
For example, studies of the European Union began to understand the latter as “a 
unique system of non-hierarchical, regulatory and deliberate governance” (Hix 1998: 
38).71 Similarly, within IR, the sub-field of international organization, which inquired 
into the conditions under which cooperation is possible within an anarchic system, 
and which earlier had witnessed a shift in its conceptual vocabulary from 
“transnationalism” and “complex interdependence” to international “regimes,” has 
seen the concept of “global governance” become its dominant organizing concept.72  
Despite some important differences among them, one common theme in these 
different conceptualizations of “governance” is that the term is being used to describe 
something that is fundamentally new in contemporary socio-political reality. And 
while the basis for this novelty is understood in different ways, another common 
theme is that a fundamental aspect of this new mode of order and rule is that it exists 
 
70 It should be noted that in different versions of social systems theory, particularly prominent in 
German scholarship, ‘governance’ is understood in terms of the steering and co-ordination of 
interdependent actors within complex rule systems. Cf. Kooiman (1993) and Mayntz (2003). 
71 See also Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch & Eising. 
72 One of the earliest advocates of the notion of “global governance” was James Rosenau (1992, 1995). 
This shift towards an emphasis on global governance in IR is perhaps best illustrated by the recent 
works of Robert Keohane, who has consistently had a major role in shaping the conceptual vocabulary 
of IR. See, for example, Keohane (2002).  
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outside of the traditional site of political authority, the state. That is, governance 
assumes its identity in large part based on the fact that it is not government.73 Or, to 
be more precise, “governance” is meant to describe forms of control and coordination 
that can be “distinguished from both the hierarchical and bureaucratic form of the 
state and the anarchical form of market organization” (Dean 2007: 48). 
At first glance, the governance approach, with its emphasis on “governance 
beyond the state,” (Wiener 2007) seems to have much in common with a 
governmentality approach (described in chapter one), with its emphasis on “political 
power beyond the state” (Rose & Miller 1992). Indeed, both governance theory, 
especially explorations of global governance, and Foucauldian governmentality 
studies came to prominence in the 1990s, a time when notions of government and 
governance were being problematized in diverse arenas. However, despite the fact 
that both governance theory and governmentality approaches focus on sources of 
authoritative rule outside the state, there are a number of key differences. 
To begin with, as was noted above, political studies that focus on governance 
tend to see the latter as a novel phenomenon, understood primarily in terms of a 
multitude of forces and processes that together have eroded the centrality of the 
national state as the primary locus of political power and authority (Rosenau 1999). 
However, this understanding of the diminished political capacity of the state in the 
face of multiple non-state sources of authoritative rule making (Hall & Biersteker 
2002) only makes sense if we accept the “statist political imaginary” (Neocleous 
 
73 As Rhodes points out, “governance…[is not] a synonym for government. Rather governance 
signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed 
condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed.” (1996: 652-653, original 
emphasis.) 
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2003) that supposedly characterized the previous political landscape. In this regard, 
contemporary theories of governance are, paradoxically, state-centric in that the 
novelty and analytical salience of the concept of governance is predicated on an 
understanding of the political that sees the state as the template for political power 
and authority, and all other forms as existing in opposition to the central political 
category of the state.74 In this sense, governance theory provides a perfect example of 
what Foucault famously referred to as the inability of political thought to “cut off the 
King’s head” (Foucault 1980a). A Foucauldian governmentality approach, on the 
other hand, does not operate on the basis of a perceived radical rupture in the locus 
and operation of political power. On the contrary, a governmentality approach  
argues that strategies of political rule, from the earliest moments of the 
modern nation state, entailed complex and variable relations between the 
calculations and actions of those seeking to exercise rule over a territory, a 
population, a nation and a microphysics of power acting at a capillary level 
within a multitude of practices of control that proliferate across a territory. 
(Rose 1999: 17) 
Thus, the notion of governmentality posits a complex imbrication of political 
technologies and rationalities, invented and assembled both within and without the 
state, which produced multiple, overlapping projects for governing subjects and their 
relations. Indeed, Foucault’s argument regarding the “governmentalization of the 
state”, which he traces to the eighteenth century, is based on the idea that the modern 
state has been shaped by a liberal governmentality “that is at the same time both 
external and internal to the state, since it…[allows] the continual definition of what 
 
74 A similar point is made in Sending & Neumann (2006). 
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should or should not fall within the state’s domain, what is public and private, what is 
and what is not within the state’s competence” (Foucault 2007a: 109). Therefore, not 
only does a governmentality perspective make problematic the idea of a radical 
rupture in the forms of social and political order claimed by theories of governance, 
but the conceptual categories which make those claims intelligible—binaries such as 
state/society, public/private, and domestic/international—are themselves treated as 
the outcome of historical processes and, crucially, of political contestation and 
struggle. 
The last point brings to the fore another important aspect of a Foucauldian 
governmentality perspective which distinguishes it not only from governance 
theories, but also from the majority of mainstream, positivist social science—namely, 
what I have described in previous chapters of this study as Foucault’s “critical 
nominalism.” From a critical nominalist perspective, the important issue is not so 
much whether the phenomena referred to in terms of “governance” is fundamentally 
novel, but rather what kinds of practices and subjectivities it enables and/or 
constrains—in other words, how “governance” operates as a form of governmentality. 
A critical nominalist approach historicizes and de-essentializes conceptual categories 
such as “the state,” “society,” “sovereignty,” and so on (Foucault 2008). The task, 
then, is to examine the authoritative statements and projects for governing subjects 
and spaces that employ these notions and their related vocabularies in order to better 
understand how our world is rendered thinkable and actionable (Dean 2007: 24-25). 
Furthermore, a Foucauldian governmentality approach offers a set of critical 
analytical tools to examine how discourses of governance impact our present reality. 
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Further developing this approach as it has been discussed in previous chapters, we 
can identify three, interconnected, analytical dimensions through which the 
governance discourse seeks to achieve an effect in the world: (1) the domain of truth, 
through which heterogeneous elements of reality are constituted as objects and 
subjects of knowledge; (2) the domain of power, through which subjects and objects 
are governed; and (3) the domain of subjectivity, “in which the subject experiences 
itself in a truth game in which it has a relation to itself” and to others (Foucault 1994: 
316; Foucault 1998c). In fact, it is these three dimensions that Foucault sought to 
bring together with the concept of governmentality, at least as he employed this 
concept in his later work (Foucault 1988b, 1988c, 1993, 2000a, 2005). Applying 
these three analytical dimensions to discourses of governance means focusing on, 
first, how they describe, and thus help shape, social reality—that is, the kind of social 
ontology they produce and the “regime of truth” (Foucault 2008: 17-19) to which 
they contribute. Second, the “truth effects” that are produced by discourses of 
governance are linked to “power effects,” as far as they suggest different construct 
specific problems, describe practices and invest them with purposes, propose specific 
kinds of solutions, and authorize certain forms of political practice and relations 
(Dean 2007: 74).75 Third, the constitution of subjects is related to the domains of 
truth and power. The discursive production of truth suggests and often produces 
certain forms of practices and relations between subjects. These “truth effects” ca
also provide the basis for subjects’ self-understanding—that is, what they take to be
n 
 
 
75 As Foucault put it in 1977, “My problem is to see how men govern (themselves and others) by the 
production of truth…[through] the establishment of domains in which the practice of true and false can 
be made at once ordered and pertinent” (1991: 79). 
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the truth with regard to their nature, their mode of being, and their purpose (Fouca
1988d). While Foucault’s focus was on individual human subjects, in this chapter I 
will examine the way that discourses of truth and relations and technologies of power 
are productive of a specific form of the political subject that has traditionally been 
understood as the main actor in world politics—the nation-state. Finally, I will look at 
how discourses of governance, the emergence of the contemporary neoliberal subject, 
and the “truth” of the global intersect to form a potent form of “global 
governmentality.” 
ult 
One powerful truth effect of the discourse of governance is the way that it 
(re)produces a certain social ontology—the ontology of the network. As others have 
pointed out, the network has become a common metaphor, or “metanarrative,” for 
describing contemporary forms social organization or society (Walters 2004). Thus, 
for example, at the same time that social scientists were discovering “governance 
networks,” business management experts and scholars were arguing that “the concept 
of a network, both as a metaphor and in terms of the tools and techniques of analysis 
it provides, reflects the nature and complexity of the multinational organization” 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal 1993). In fact, more recently, transnational corporations have 
been conceptualized as “networks of governance structures” (Yeung 1998).  
In their analysis of discourses of the network, geographers Helga Leitner and 
Eric Sheppard (2002: 150) highlight five qualities that are ascribed to networks, and 
which are particularly relevant to the present analysis. The authors show how various 
discourses of the network portray the latter as: “self organizing,” that is, “[evolving] a 
relational structure that is bottom-up rather than externally imposed”; “collaborative,” 
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that is, involving forms of cooperation and mutual orientation; “flexible,” that is, 
“continually subject to change” and with easy entrance and exit by the participants; 
and “topological,” which means that “networks evolve by creating linkages between 
participants who were not previously connected, thereby constructing mutuality 
between previously isolated actors.” Thus, an important “truth effect” of the network 
discourse is the way the network is portrayed as the ideal form of social organization, 
neither hierarchic nor anarchic, conducive to learning and innovation, more efficient 
and less bureaucratic than governments, and more cooperative and mutually oriented 
than markets (Leitner & Sheppard 2002: 150). Furthermore, these putative properties 
of networks are mobilized within discourses of governance, particularly as the 
network offers a powerful metaphor for both business and government, and provides 
a point of articulation for normative and ethical conduct in both domains. 
Another “truth effect” of the governance discourse is reflected in the notion 
that the changes in the forms of governmental action, represented by the end of “the 
governmental monopoly on the resolution of public problems,” calls for “a new 
paradigm”—for example, a paradigm of “new governance” and a “tools of 
government” approach (Salamon 2002). This truth effect is produced in part through 
the way that this discourse simultaneously describes, in an apparently neutral and 
“technical” manner, transformations in the functioning of government as if they were 
both inevitable and natural—that is, free of political struggle and contestation (Dean 
2007). Thus, when Lester Salamon writes that “the task of public problem solving has 
become a team sport that has spilled well beyond the borders of government agencies 
and now engages a far more extensive network of social actors—public as well as 
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private, for-profit as well as nonprofit,” (600, original emphasis), there is no 
indication given of the political struggles involved in this transformation of 
government. Neither is there any recognition of the role played by expert knowledge 
in bringing about this transformation (Mitchell 2002). 
At the same time, the truth effect of the discourse of governance is closely 
connected with the power effect. Thus, it is not only the “truth” that government 
increasingly is carried out by a network of public and private actors but also, as 
Salamon argues, that the participation of these diverse actors “must often be coaxed 
and coached, not commandeered and controlled.” In other words, the truth effect of 
describing the current state of affairs—the proliferation of governance by non-state 
actors—yields a power effect: it suggests a mode of directing the conduct of subjects 
that is indirect, in which the role of government is to “steer,” and not to “row” 
(Osborne & Gaebler 1992). Indeed, one significant “power effect” of the discourse of 
governance is the way that it has helped generate a range of conceptual and practical 
“tools,” or political technologies, such as the “New Public Management,” “Public-
Private Partnerships,” “benchmarking,” and so on (Osborne & Gaebler 1992; M. E. 
Porter 1990; Reinicke 1998). In fact, the power effect of this version of the 
governance discourse is perhaps most clearly illustrated by David Osborne and Ted 
Gaebler’s “Ten Principles” for “reinventing government,” a concept which was made 
the centerpiece of the Clinton administration’s proposed public sector “reforms” and 
which has spawned an entire industry of “tools” for government “reinvention,” 
including fieldbooks, workbooks, and report cards (Kettl 1998; Osborne & Colon 
Rivera 1998; Osborne & Gaebler 1992; Osborne & Plastrik 2000).  
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Finally, the discourse of governance is related to the constitution of a certain 
type of subject, specifically a neoliberal subject, which in turn is amenable to specific 
types of governmental intervention. Indeed, the discourse of governance, with its 
emphasis on the “steering” of subjects and their relations (with themselves and 
others) through multiple mechanisms and sites (both inside and outside of official 
state apparatuses), can be applied to a wide range of subjects, including individuals, 
organizations, and even nation-states. In other words, the governance discourse is 
intimately connected with the constitution and management of neoliberal subjects. In 
order to further develop this claim, the following section introduces Foucault’s 
conceptualization of the relationship between ethics and subjectivity. This, in turn, 
will provide the analytical framework for examining what I argue represents a 
significant transformation in what has long been considered the principal actor in 
world politics, the nation-state. 
Neoliberalism, Subjectivity and Ethics 
The discourse of governance both presupposes and helps constitute a specific 
form of political subject, a neoliberal subject that is governable on the basis of what 
Foucault described as “technologies of the self,” or the relationship between 
subjectivity and ethics (Foucault 1988b, 1997). However, it should be pointed out that  
Foucault’s conceptualization of ethics is not the standard one, either in traditional 
philosophy or in common parlance. Foucault defined ethics as “the kind of 
relationship you ought to have with yourself, rapport à soi, …which determines how 
the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions” 
(Foucault 1997: 263). Ethics, in turn, is connected with truth and subjectivity. This 
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can be seen in Foucault’s analysis of four aspects of ethical being, or the self’s 
relationship to itself: (1) the ethical substance, or that part of oneself that is taken to 
be the relevant domain for ethical judgment; (2) the mode of subjectivation (mode 
d’assujettissement)76, or the way in which subjects establish their relation to moral 
obligations and rules and recognize themselves as obliged to put them into practice; 
(3) the ethical work (travail éthique) that subjects perform on themselves, not only to 
bring their conduct into compliance with a given rule, but also to transform 
themselves into ethical subjects; and, finally, (4) the telos of the ethical subject, or the 
mode of being that will serve as the subject’s moral goal (Davidson 1994: 118; 
Foucault 1988c: 26-28). 
Foucault’s concern with the ethics of subjectivity and subject-formation was 
also linked to his reformulation of the concept of governmentality, where the latter is 
understood as “the surface of contact on which the way of conducting individuals and 
the way they conduct themselves are intertwined” (Foucault 1981a, quoted in Gros 
2005: 548 n.30),77 or as the “‘contact point’ where techniques of domination – or 
power – and techniques of the self ‘interact,’ where ‘technologies of domination of 
individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts 
upon himself and, conversely,…where techniques of the self are integrated into 
structures of coercion’” (Burchell 1996, quoting Foucault 1980b, original emphasis). 
 
76 Foucault’s term, mode d’assujettissement, is often translated as mode of subjection. However, I feel 
that ‘”ubjectivation” is a more appropriate translation of assujettissement, since it more easily connotes 
forms of subject self-formation than does “subjection,” which gives the impression of purely external 
forces at work. 
77 In the “Course Context” appended to Foucault’s 1982 lecture series, Frédéric Gros cites an early, 
unpublished draft of a lecture Foucault gave in New York in 1981. A later version of the lecture was 
published in the London Review of Books (Foucault & Sennett 1981). 
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Foucault’s examination of the relationship between ethics and subjectivity 
was for the most part restricted to the formation of individual, human subjects. 
However, the analytical grid of governmentality, understood as having to do with a 
domain of power relations implicated in the constitution of subjects that exist in 
ethical relations with themselves and others, offers a unique perspective on the 
problem of “global governance.” This is because subject formation need not apply 
only to individuals, but can also apply to collectivities—businesses, social groups, 
even nation-states and international, supranational, and “global” actors. Thus, a final 
and crucial difference between a governmentality approach and governance theory 
(including global governance) is that the latter takes the existence of these actors and 
the various “scales” in which they exist as given, while governmentality is concerned 
precisely with the ways subjects are formed within relations of power and games of 
truth that attempt to define the subject’s ethical nature and thus direct its conduct. For 
example, as discussed above, theories of global governance are intelligible largely 
through the understanding that the nation-state is losing its salience as the locus of 
political power and authority. However, this understanding is based on the idea that 
the state, while its power may wax or wane historically, exists as a fixed political 
subject. A global governmentality perspective, on the other hand, makes it possible to 
study the historically specific formation of the nation-state as a political subject, and 
to locate this in relation to broader general dynamics and structures of power in world 
politics, rather than attributing it to a vague notion of “globalization,” as do most 
theories of global governance.
Furthermore, a governmentality framework makes it possible to trace the 
connection between the shifting modes of subject formation and the governmental 
rationalities and technologies implicated in those transformations. In other words, a 
governmentality perspective helps shed light on the way that neoliberalism, as a 
rationality and technology of government, is implicated in the transformation of 
political subjectivity, including the political subject of the nation-state. This, in turn, 
represents not only a profoundly different perspective on the idea of “global 
governance,” but also, as discussed in the previous chapters, a unique perspective on 
the political phenomenon of neoliberalism. For example, the majority of political 
studies of neoliberalism understand the latter primarily in terms of a set of policies or 
“reforms”—trade and financial liberalization, privatization, deregulation, openness to 
foreign direct investment, a competitive exchange rate, fiscal discipline, lower taxes, 
and smaller government —or a political ideology that supports those policies and 
whose ultimate aim is to create a “market society.”78 The contribution of a 
Foucauldian governmentality perspective on neoliberalism is that it approaches the 
latter not as primarily a set of policies or an ideology that seeks to justify those 
policies, but instead as a complex assemblage that is based on, and also works to 
produce, a specific socio-political ethos, a particular image or theory of society, and a 
specific form of subjectivity. Of course, a great deal of social and political thought 
has investigated the connection between capitalist society and subjectivity (Althusser 
 
78 See, for example, Gill (1995), Harvey (2005), Peck (2004). Market society, as idea and ideal, can be 
traced back to early, or “classical,” liberal thinkers such as Adam Smith, who argued that it produced 
not only economic harmony, but also private virtue: “[W]henever commerce is introduced into any 
country, probity and punctuality always accompany it…. Of all the nations of Europe, the Dutch, the 
most commercial, are the most faithful to their word.” (A. Smith 1978) Of course, liberal thinkers like 
Smith were also concerned with the potentially negative effects of commercial society. For a 
discussion of Smith’s thinking in this regard, see Rosenberg (1990). 
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1971; Burawoy 1979; Deleuze & Guattari 1983; Marx 1977; Weber 1958). However, 
from a governmentality perspective, the relationship between liberal subjectivity and 
capitalism is not a direct or functional one, but rather has its own internal dynamics 
(Weidner 2009). 
Moreover, an important contribution of governmentality studies is their 
identification of significant transformations of subjectivity that have taken place 
within liberalism, such that neoliberalism can be seen as a fundamentally novel way 
of constituting, working on, and governing subjects. As noted in the second chapter of 
this study, Foucault argued that neoliberalism imagines the market and its subjects in 
a way that is quite different from classical liberalism. For the latter, the market is 
primarily a site of exchange between formally equal subjects. For classical liberalism, 
the primary task of government is to “supervise the smooth running of the market, 
that is to say…[to] ensure respect for the freedom of those involved in exchange” 
(Foucault 2008: 118). This follows from the assumption that the market is a naturally 
occurring domain of social reality, so that the main role of government, the prevailing 
governmental rationality, is laissez-faire. However, after a century that witnessed the 
rise of labor unions, business cartels and trusts, and state planning, neoliberal thinkers 
in the twentieth century came to the conclusion that the free market was not a 
naturally occurring phenomenon, but instead had to be produced. Furthermore, they 
emphasized the regulatory effects of market competition, and noted that it too was 
not, as eighteenth century liberals believed, “a natural given that must be respected,” 
but rather, as Foucault says, “an historical objective of governmental art” (2008: 120). 
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Foucault locates two radical and crucial transformations in governmental 
reason that take place in the context of twentieth century neoliberalism. First, as 
discussed in chapter two, German Ordoliberals displace the classical liberal 
delimitation of separate domains of the state and the market, and instead insist that 
the market, or rather the principle of competition, must “[constitute] the general index 
in which one must place the rule for defining all governmental action” (2008: 121). In 
fact, the neoliberals argued that the market form is prior to the political sphere, and 
that the market should be placed at the center of analysis, subsuming all political 
questions underneath it. Foucault describes this as a reversal of the relationship 
between state and market, in which the market itself becomes the foundation of the 
state (121). Thus, as Lemke (2001: 200) points out, “For the neoliberals the state does 
not define and monitor market freedom, for the market is itself the organizing and 
regulative principle underlying the state.... Neo-liberalism removes the limiting, 
external principle and puts a regulatory and inner principle in its place: it is the 
market form which serves as the organizational principle for the state and society.”  
Under this re-articulation of state and economy, the classic concept of laissez-
faire itself undergoes a similar transformation. The theory of state and economy does 
not call for a retraction of the state in order to secure a space of negative liberty in 
which one can act freely. Rather it becomes the purpose for government itself and a 
“permanent economic tribunal” (Foucault 2008: 247) against which all governmental 
activity is judged. Thus, as William Davies points out, “[whereas] liberalism sought 
to rationalize sovereignty as a condition of the economy, the jump made by neo-
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liberalism was to bring sovereignty within the scientific purview of economics” 
(Davies 2010: 65). 
American neoliberalism, Foucault points out, takes this “generalization of the 
economic form of the market” one radical step further, “generalizing [the principle of 
market competition] throughout the social body and including the whole of the social 
system not usually conducted through or sanctioned by monetary exchanges” (2008: 
243). At the same time, Foucault argues, American neoliberalism produces a radical 
epistemological shift, in which not only is the social, society, conceived of and 
apprehended in economic terms, but the unit of analysis, as developed by “Chicago 
School” economists (such as D. Gale Johnson (1960), Theodore W. Schultz (1961) 
and Gary S. Becker (1964)), “is not so much the individual, or processes and 
mechanisms, but enterprises” (Foucault 2008: 225, emphasis added). The result is “an 
economy made up of enterprise-units, a society made up of enterprise units” (225). 
Or, put differently, American neoliberal economics “is no longer the analysis of the 
historical logic of processes; it is the analysis of the internal rationality, the strategic 
programming of individuals’ activity” (223). 
This, in turn, makes possible the second major transformation in a liberal art 
of government: the postulation of the subject as a source of capital, as human capital. 
With this invention, the subject exists no longer as one merely pursuing some interest, 
but rather as a potential source of capital that can and should work on itself in order to 
achieve the best return on its own investment. In American neoliberalism, “homo 
oeconomicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself” (2008: 226, emphasis 
added). Furthermore, Foucault suggests, homo oeconomicus 
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is someone who accepts reality. Rational conduct is any conduct which is 
sensitive to modifications in the variables of the environment and which 
responds to this in a non-random way, in a systematic way, and economics 
can therefore be defined as the science of the systematic nature of responses to 
environmental variables. (2008: 269)79 
This aspect of the neoliberal subject—one “who accepts reality or who 
responds systematically to modifications in the variables in the environment”—makes 
possible a profound transformation in the art of government, for, as was mentioned in 
the previous chapter of this study, this new neoliberal subject “appears precisely as 
someone manageable . . . [as] someone who is eminently governable” (270). The 
consequence, Foucault argues, is that “[f]rom being the intangible partner of laissez-
faire, homo oeconomicus now becomes the correlate of a governmentality which will 
act on the environment and systematically modify its variables” (270-271). In other 
words, this new neoliberal subject makes possible the development of new forms of 
“governance.” Indeed, here we can see how Foucault’s analysis of neoliberal 
governmentality provides critical purchase for apprehending contemporary discourses 
and practices of “governance,” in that the latter are based on ways of directing the 
conduct of subjects that, as much as possible, are indirect, working through incentives 
and modifications in the subject’s environment.  
Returning to Foucault’s schema of the constitution of ethical subjects, 
outlined above, we can see how this new form of neoliberal political reason, based on 
the figure of homo oeconomicus, provides a “surface contact” between the subject 
and the power exercised on it, enabling novel forms of “governance” (2008: 252-
 
79 I return to this idea in Chapter Five. 
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253). Thus, with regard to the first element of ethical subjectivity, we can say that the 
“ethical substance” or prima material of neoliberalism is capital—human, or social 
capital. Second, the “mode of subjectivation”, or the mode of being that the subject 
must embrace or appeal to in orienting its conduct, is the competitive enterprise. This 
requires that the subject adopt an entrepreneurial—i.e., competitive, calculating, 
strategic—attitude towards its own ethical substance, its own capital. Next, this mode 
of subjectivation, the subject as an entrepreneur of itself, calls for specific kinds of 
“ethical work”—in the case of neoliberal ethical subjectivity, the work of increasing 
the value of one’s capital, of discerning which factors that can be understood as 
‘inputs’ into the subject’s stock of capital are or can be made to be productive. 
Finally, the “telos” of neoliberal subjectivity can be understood as the maximization 
of the subject’s value, or “self-worth” (Feher 2009).80 
Formulating neoliberal governmentality in this fashion allows us, then, to look 
more closely at the relationship between power and the subject, specifically the 
unstable and fluctuating “contact point” between techniques of domination (or 
subjection), and the actual practices of subjectivation by which neoliberal subjects govern 
themselves (Foucault 1993). In fact, there is a growing body of research that investigates 
the very specific forms of practice involved in the (self) government of neoliberal 
subjectivity (Binkley 2009a, 2009b; Cruikshank 1999; Gökarıksel & Mitchell 2005; 
 
80 This elaboration of the different elements of neoliberal ethical subjectivity draws on, but is in some 
respects different from, the analysis of “the ‘business ethics’ of entrepreneurial self-government” in 
Simon and Masschelein (2006). The authors identify four components: “The material or (moral) 
‘substance’ of this form of self-government is human (and social) capital, and, in particular, knowledge 
or competencies. The ‘mode of subjection’ of entrepreneurial autonomy is the ‘permanent economic 
tribunal’…the ‘work upon the self’ that is needed… [is to] invest in human capital…[and the] 
teleology…is…the production of satisfaction (through permanently looking for a suitable market 
position in life and investing in social relations) (297). 
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Hamman 2009; Laurie & Bondi 2005; MacLeavy 2008; K. Mitchell 2006; Ong 2006; 
Petersen & O'Flynn 2007; Read 2009). An important insight offered by this body of 
research is how discourses and practices of governance are closely bound up with 
rationalities and political technologies that are both productive of and brought to bear 
on neoliberal subjectivity.  
However, while much of this research program is interested in the transnational, 
or global, aspect of neoliberal subjectivity, the majority of the work focuses on individual 
subjects—e.g., workers, consumers, students and teachers. Yet, one of the “power 
effects” of this form of neoliberal subjectivity is that it is generalizable across a 
spectrum of actors and scales: individual persons; businesses; universities; non-
governmental organizations; networks; local, regional, national and supranational 
governments can all be understood as entrepreneurial subjects, as bearers of some 
kind of value that can (and must) be properly managed. In this sense, neoliberal 
subjectivity and associated governmental technologies are both mobile and labile. 
Most importantly these neoliberal “technologies of the self” can also be applied to 
what has long been considered the principal actor in world politics—the nation-state. 
In the following section, I present an example of one such neoliberal governmental 
technology – nation branding – that, I argue, represents not only a novel form of 
“global governance,” but also marks an important shift in the configuration of 
contemporary world politics.
Nation Branding as Neoliberal Governmentality 
 An important condition of possibility for the development of the practice of 
nation branding was a problematization of the idea of competition and 
competitiveness—principally with regard to multinational corporations and nation-
states—that took place in the 1980s and early 1990s. One of the most influential 
thinkers in this regard is Michael E. Porter, now a world-renowned management 
consultant and Director of Harvard University’s Institute for Strategy and 
Competitiveness. Beginning in the 1980s, Porter problematized the notion of 
international competitiveness, arguing that the competitiveness of international firms 
and nation-states could no longer be considered in isolation, but rather had to be 
understood as forming part of a global field of competitivity, with the nation-state 
acting as a “global platform” that helps determine a firm’s global competitive 
advantage (Porter 1985, 1986). This shift in thinking about the nature of competition 
in a globalizing economy, and the role of nations-states as platforms for firms to 
succeed in a globally competitive environment, formed the conceptual basis that 
Porter later applied to the problem of national economic development and 
productivity. The resulting book, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990, 
revised and updated in 1998), has been enormously influential.81 
One of the key concepts that Porter helped to develop and circulate is “the 
competitiveness of locations,” which argues that “as competition has spread and 
intensified… the prosperity of both companies and entire countries is dependent on 
the local environment in which competition takes place” (2008: xii). Significantly, 
Porter argues that the new nature of competition demands new forms of governance, 
and a rethinking of the traditional roles of government, business, and other social 
actors: “The new model of competitiveness reveals unfamiliar roles for companies in 
 
81 As Porter’s Harvard Business School biography states, “the book has guided economic policy in 
countless nations and regions” (Porter n.d.). 
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shaping their competitive context; the need for a new type of relationship between 
business, government, and other local institutions; and entirely new ways of thinking 
about government policy” (pp. xii-xiii).  
Furthermore, the idea that we have entered a “new era of global competition” 
(Drache & Gertler 1991), in which the state (and all other private and public actors) 
must act in a strategic and competitive fashion, has become wide-spread in various 
domains of expert knowledge. In IR and the related field of International Political 
Economy, the idea of the “competition state” (Cerny 1990, 1997)82 has increasingly 
gained currency, even as some have attempted to problematize the notion that forces 
of globalization provide little room for states to act other than in a competitive 
fashion (Cameron & Palan 1999; Fougner 2006; Palan 1998). One of the more 
powerful articulations of this notion is Phillip Bobbitt’s idea of the advent of the 
“market-state.” Bobbitt argues that, with the end of the Cold War and the rise of 
globalization, the form of the nation-state, whose legitimacy was based primarily on 
“its promise to provide the material well-being of the nation,” is being superseded by 
a market-state that “promises instead to maximize the opportunity of the people” 
(2002: 240, 211). Thus, “the market-state is, above all, a mechanism for enhancing 
opportunity” (p. 232), which is to say, that the role of the state is to help guarantee 
that society is governed by the rules of competition. In other words, there is a 
discursive field produced by discourses such as the competitive advantage of nations, 
the competition state, and the market-state that resonates with and helps reproduce the 
 
82 It should be noted that Cerny does not celebrate the transformation of the nation-state into the 
competition state, and that he offers a sophisticated and nuanced view of the factors contributing to this 
transformation. Nevertheless, in his analysis it is the pressures of globalization that, in the last instance, 
pressure states to conform to the competition model. 
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idea that there exist (or should exist) logics and mechanisms of governing subjects 
that are ultimately pegged to a logic of competition. 
Another important implication of this discourse of the transformation of the 
nation-state, whether in terms of the competition state or the market-state, is that it 
forms part of a reconfiguration of the political imaginary (Kantola 2006), one 
characterized by a shift from the “government” provided by the “traditional” form of 
the state, to the “governance” that is produced by a range of (public and private) 
actors. Within this political imaginary, the privileged subject is the entrepreneur, the 
one who embraces competition and is, as Bobbitt says, “a consumer of opportunity” 
(9. 230). Furthermore, on the basis of this form of subjectivity, neoliberal 
governmentality deploys a variety of “governmental technologies”, or mechanisms of 
“governance,” to encourage entrepreneurial conduct and thus ensure that competition 
functions as the overriding regulatory principle (Jaeger 2010: 58; Rose 1996). These 
mechanisms of governance include forms of expert knowledge as well as 
technologies of agency and performance, such as contractual devices and various 
forms of auditing and measuring performance (e.g. “benchmarking” and “best 
practices) (Burchell 1996; Dean 1999; Fougner 2008; Gleadle, Cornelius, & Pezet 
2008; Larner & Le Heron 2004; Shore & Wright 1999). 
This assemblage of forms of knowledge, techniques and technologies is often 
put to work in the context of discourses of governance that seek to transform the 
subject through a certain “mode of subjectivation” in which the subject recognizes its 
true ethical substance as consisting in a (potential) form of value, that can (should) be 
maximized. In the case of the nation-state, the maximization of its value is ultimately 
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to be undertaken with the view of enhancing the well-being of its population—most 
importantly, by providing the conditions for competitive growth to occur. One of the 
governmental rationalities that is connected with this mode of subjectivation is that of 
“good governance,” a discourse regarding the ethical organization and conduct of 
political actors who are, in its own language, “providers” of some form of “public 
good.” Although commonly used to refer only to collective actors (and not 
individuals), like other neoliberal technologies of the self, “good governance” is 
flexible regarding the subject it targets: any subject that can be considered an 
enterprise falls within its domain. A business, a charity organization, a nation-state, 
an international organization can all be the subjects of “good governance.” In 
international, or “global” governance, “good governance” has become a central 
element within an overall “development assemblage” that targets “under-developed,” 
“lesser developed,” and “developing” nation-states (Smith 2007). A work published 
by the Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Nations is illustrative of how the 
discourse of good governance has become integral to an overall “development 
assemblage” that targets (primarily) post-colonial societies: 
Good governance is a concept that has recently come into regular use in 
political science, public administration and, more particularly, development 
management. It appears alongside such concepts and terms as democracy, 
civil society, popular participation, human rights and social and sustainable 
development. In the last decade, it has been closely associated with public 
sector reform. Within…public management…it has been regarded as an 
aspect of the New Paradigm in Public Administration which emphasizes the 
role of public managers in providing high quality services that citizens value; 
advocates increasing managerial autonomy, particularly by reducing central 
agency controls; demands, measures and rewards both organizational and 
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individual performance; recognizes the importance of providing the human 
and technological resources that managers require to meet their performance 
targets; and is receptive to competition and open-minded about which public 
purposes should be performed by public servants as opposed to the private 
sector. (Agere 2000: 1) 
As this example illustrates, “good governance” is combined with discourses of 
democracy, civil society, and development to form an overall governmental 
assemblage that targets nation-states, particularly “developing,” or “post-colonial” 
nation-states, and that seeks to govern the latter by providing a model which they are 
meant to emulate, as well as a number of technologies for achieving that goal. 
Crucially, the latter include various mechanisms for “measuring” and “rewarding” 
“performance,” which are ultimately based on a logic of competitiveness. In fact, as 
others have observed, “good governance” operates as a form of “indirect rule” 
(Hindess 2004: 34), or “global governmentality,” directed principally by wealthy 
countries and various international organizations that “assist, advise and constrain the 
conduct of post-colonial states, through international financial institutions and also, of 
course, through that fundamental liberal instrument of civilization, the market” 
(Hindess 2004: 34).  
Furthermore, “good governance” has been integrated within broader 
assemblages of development, forming what some have called a kind of “global 
developmentality,” that seeks to “[steer] the conduct of persons, activities, and 
spaces through diverse authorities, knowledge expertise, and arenas of calculation” 
in conformity with the constantly shifting “development agenda” (Ilcan & Phillips 
2006: 1-2). Moreover, the “developmentality” of good governance is also connected 
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with discourses of the global, in that the various “reforms” of the state contemplated 
by good governance programs are justified in large measure as being necessary in the 
face of the “globalization of the economy” and the “special problems” these present 
to developing countries (S. Joseph 2001: 1011). 
However, while the connection between “good governance” as a technology 
of government and the various “reforms” or “structural adjustment” programs that 
have targeted post-colonial nation-states, has been the object of a fair amount of 
critical analysis (Abrahamsen 2000, 2004; Mercer 2003; Morison 2000; Orlandini 
2003), relatively little attention has been paid to the recently emerging governmental 
technology of nation branding. Indeed, what I seek to shed light on are the ways that 
previously existing discourses of “development” and “good governance” are 
reconfigured within the evolving domain of nation branding, and consequently, how 
the latter functions as a form of global governance or, more precisely, of “global 
governmentality,” in that its aim is to direct the conduct of individuals and 
populations. 
The term “nation branding” is relatively new, having received public and 
scholarly attention in the 1990s, largely as a result of the “Cool Britannia” campaign 
associated with the new Labour government that came to power under Prime Minister 
Tony Blair (van Ham 2002).  Within the last decade, the use of “brand consultants” 
and “branding techniques” by nation-states has become increasingly common, 
although there are no precise indicators for measuring this activity (van Ham 2008). 
As van Ham (2002, p. 250) points out, the spread of branding from the field of 
business marketing to “all aspects of public and private life” (if the distinction is even 
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valid) is becoming increasingly common, with numerous “self-help” experts 
exhorting their audience to “build your own life brand!” (e.g., Graham 2001; Peters 
1999, cited in van Ham, 2002,  p. 250). Indeed, the idea of the individual as a brand is 
a logical extension of the kind of entrepreneurial subjectivity examined above. And of 
course, this kind of subjectivity makes possible specific governmental technologies, 
or forms of “governance,” for directing its conduct. In fact, it is precisely in this 
regard that the intersection of the truth – power effects becomes visible, in that the 
universal applicability of the enterprise form to a wide range of actors makes possible 
their reconfiguration as “brands” to be managed and governed.  
A number of questions, therefore, arise. What happens when the nation-state 
is imagined as a brand? How is a “place” imagined as a (potential) source of value 
and also as a modality or locality of governance? What kinds of practices and 
relations are made possible or, alternatively, precluded, within this transformed 
political imaginary? Finally, how is the field of world politics transformed when the 
nation-state is reconfigured as a “brand-state”? Interestingly, these questions lay at 
the heart of a recent problematization of the question of nation branding that has been 
performed both by those who practice its arts and those who challenge its validity or 
normative desirability. In the following, I will examine two, interconnected, aspects 
of nation branding: (1) How it operates as a discursive practice and form of expert 
knowledge, and (2) How the issue of nation branding has been problematized both as 
a form of knowledge and as political practice. Ultimately, both these aspects of nation 
branding help to shed light on how it functions as a fairly novel governmental 
technology whose aim is to shape the conduct of states and their populations. 
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In order to analyze the way that the discourse of nation branding function as a 
form of expert knowledge, I draw upon Foucault’s framework for analyzing how 
discursive practices are transformed into scientific knowledge (1972b). Foucault 
described four different “thresholds” for the emergence of scientific knowledge. First, 
is the threshold of positivity, or “the moment at which a discursive practice achieves 
individuality and autonomy,” therefore forming a “discursive formation” that is 
distinctive from other “discursive formations” (p. 186, original emphasis for this and 
subsequent quotes). Second, “when in the operation of a discursive formation, a 
group of statements is articulated, claims to validate (even unsuccessfully) norms of 
verification and coherence, and when it exercises a dominant function (as a model, a 
critique, or a verification) over knowledge…the discursive formation crosses a 
threshold of epistemologization” (pp. 186-187). Third, when the statements of a 
discursive formation begin to obey a certain number of formal criteria and “laws for 
the construction of propositions…[the discursive formation] has crossed a threshold 
of scientificity. Finally, “when this scientific discourse is able, in turn, to define the 
axioms necessary to it, the elements that it uses, the propositional structures that are 
legitimate to it, and the transformations that it accepts...it has crossed the threshold of 
formalization” (187). 
Applying this analytical framework to nation branding, we can see that this 
form of knowledge aspires to “scientific status”, yet is still in a “pre-scientific” 
mode.83 That is to say, nation branding has clearly crossed Foucault’s first 
 
83 Although the term is also employed by Thomas Kuhn (1962), there are significant differences (as 
well as similarities) between Kuhn’s study of scientific knowledge and Foucault’s analysis. For a good 
overview, see Gutting (2003). 
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“threshold”, and possibly the second one as well, by constituting itself as a domain of 
expert knowledge, yet has not crossed the third and fourth thresholds. The first part, 
nation branding’s aspiration of scientific status, is evidenced by the existence of a 
number of texts—e.g., journal articles and monographs—that position nation 
branding as a unique form of technical knowledge, with its own terminology and 
related forms of expert practice. In fact, the launching of the scholarly journal Place 
Branding and Public Diplomacy in 2004, offers strong evidence of the formation of 
place branding, and the sub-category of nation branding84, as distinct field of 
knowledge. Moreover, the goal (whether or not it is achieved) of crossing Foucault’s 
second “threshold of epistemologization,” is clearly attested to in the publisher’s 
description of the “aims and scope” of the journal: 
To date the ways in which countries, cities and regions manage their 
reputations - or fail to do so - have been discussed in a fragmented way across 
a range of disciplines: from political philosophy to public relations, by way of 
public diplomacy, destination marketing, economics, social and cultural 
policy, international relations, public affairs, brand strategy, tourism 
promotion, inward investment promotion and export branding. Place 
Branding and Public Diplomacy provides a comprehensive, coherent forum 
with which to drive the subject forward by publishing authoritative, peer-
reviewed articles as well as news, debates, interviews, literature reviews, case 
studies and special features. It provides an international forum where 
practitioners, academic researchers, consultants, students, governments and 
 
84 It should be pointed out that nation branding has been formulated as a sub-field of the more general 
field of place branding. However, while there are clearly aspects which make nation branding a unique 
form of place branding (aspects which will be discussed further below), it will be assumed that, with 
regard to their status as expert forms of knowledge, what holds true for nation branding will also apply 
for place branding and vice-versa (except where noted). 
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the wider public can debate these issues and learn about best practice. 
(Palgrave-Macmillan n.d.) 
Similarly, the goal of advancing place branding across the thresholds of 
“scientificity” and “formalization” can be clearly seen in the editor’s forward to the 
first issue of Place Branding and Public Diplomacy. Thus, in his forward to the first 
issue, Simon Anholt (the self-described inventor of “place branding” and “nation 
branding”), lists the following aims of the journal: 
—to start a debate leading to a definition and a theory or theories of place 
branding 
— to create a body of knowledge about place branding and share best practice 
worldwide 
— to encourage more cross-fertilisation between the component fields of 
place branding 
— to create a set of ethical and professional standards for the field of place 
branding 
— to promote and disseminate the value of place branding for economic, 
social and cultural development. (Anholt 2004: 11) 
Here it is interesting to contrast place branding as a form of expert knowledge 
with the discourse of “brand management.” The concept of brand management—
preceding, and likely providing a condition of possibility for, the emergence of place 
branding—was first developed within the field of business management and 
marketing. It has since become a normalized branch of study and professionalization 
within this field, with the majority (if not all) major MBA programs offering 
specialized courses in brand management. Similarly, the main scholarly journal for 
the field, Journal of Brand Management, was launched in 1992, twelve years prior to 
place branding’s journal. In fact, it may be, at least in part, due to the newness of 
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place branding that it has not yet achieved (if in fact it ever does) the more 
normalized status of a domain of expert knowledge as has corporate brand 
management.  Indeed, part of the challenge for the discourse of place management is 
establishing itself as a domain of expert knowledge that is separate and autonomous 
from business marketing and advertizing. Thus, for example, Anholt describes two 
fundamental challenges that emerge from the need to distinguish place branding from 
business marketing and advertizing. First of all, there is the danger that government 
officials, “[hearing] that ‘having a brand’ is the latest thing…[will be] forgivably 
confused about the distinction between its outward signs (such as new slogans and 
logos) and the complex underlying strategy and long-term behavioural change which 
ought to underpin such ephemera; and thus…fall easily into the hands of one sort of 
marketing firm or another” (Anholt 2004: 5). Moreover, Anholt explains, since 
business marketing and place branding are different forms of expert knowledge, 
governments that fail to appreciate the distinction and hire regular business marketing 
firms will likely get  
a slogan and a logo, with nothing much behind it, and probably very little 
connection between it and the nation’s long-term development plans, too little 
political will or clout for it to be sustained or taken seriously, too little 
investment for it to become properly established in the minds of the 
‘audience’, little understanding of who this audience actually are or what their 
current perceptions of the place brand are and very little real coordination or 
common purpose between the various stakeholders. (2004: 4-5). 
Consequently, one of the goals of establishing place branding as a distinctive 
form of expert knowledge is to establish “standards” and “best practices”. That is to 
say, achieving the status of expert knowledge requires the formalization of the rules 
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which govern the production of true statements within the expert field (Foucault 
1972b). At the same time, this enhances the ability of this form of expert knowledge 
to function as a form of “governance,” or governmentality, by providing the technical 
“know-how” that informs governmental practices. However, there is another, more 
fundamental problem involved in establishing place branding as an expert form of 
knowledge—specifically, an ethical problem—“ethical” in the colloquial sense of 
right-vs-wrong, and not exactly in the Foucauldian sense of the subject’s relation to 
itself, although as we shall see, this is also implicit in the problematizations of place 
and nation branding. The question, as Anholt succinctly puts it, is “whether it is right 
to do place branding” (2004: 6, original emphasis). 
Part of the answer that place branding experts such as Anholt have offered can 
be found in the second half of the journal’s title: place branding and public 
diplomacy. Formulating place branding, and more specifically nation branding, as a 
form of public diplomacy is one strategy for addressing both the specificity of this 
domain of expert knowledge, and also its desirability. Although not a new term, 
recent discourses of public diplomacy define the latter in terms of a transformation in 
world politics, where “soft power,” communication, and persuasion become 
increasingly important, and conversely, “hard power” and military might become less 
so (Keohane & Nye 1998; Nye 2004, 2008; Potter 2002). Thus, for example, echoing 
many of the utopian visions of the impact of the Internet and the “information 
revolution,” Keohane and Nye argue: “The ability to disseminate free information 
increases the potential for persuasion in world politics” (1998: 94). Other versions of 
this discourse locate the increased importance of the “new public diplomacy” in 
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relation to the “communication revolution” and “the rise of a more activist [global] 
civil society” (Melissen 2005: 4). Thus, for example, Evan Potter argues: “In a 
globalized world, public opinion matters more than ever. With publics more 
distrustful of government, demanding greater transparency and input into policy 
making, governments can no longer count on ‘spin’ to overcome communication 
challenges” (2002: 48-49).  
In other words, with the onset of globalization and the information revolution, 
the soft power of branding becomes more important, as the ability of states and other 
actors to control information declines and the need for credibility rises. Indeed, it is 
an informed and politically active civil society that is envisioned as “governing,” in a 
sense, the governments of the world by demanding greater transparency and 
accountability.85 Indeed, the relationship between idea of public diplomacy as the 
expression of a global civil society and the liberal dream of the civilizing effect of 
public opinion is perhaps best expressed by Manuel Castells, who argues that the 
“new public diplomacy” is not about advancing the national interest by employing a 
form of “soft power,” but rather is a way of “[harnessing] the dialogue between 
different social collectives and their cultures in the hope of sharing meaning and 
understanding,” or in other words, an element in the constitution of a “global public 
sphere” (2008: 91). 
 
85 It is worth noting that this discourse echoes the eighteenth century liberal vision of the central role of 
social trust (or “natural sympathy,” in Adam Smith’s terminology) in commercial society (Silver 
1990), early twentieth century liberal visions of the power of public opinion to deter war (Angell 
1910), and visions of the positive impact of global civil society in world politics discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
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The second way that the political technology of place branding has been 
presented as normatively desirable is by framing it as a tool for the economic 
development of poor countries. Thus, for example, Anholt describes place branding 
as “a means of ‘hacking’ one of the first world’s most potent and effective tools of 
wealth creation (after all, brand value, according to some accounts, may represent as 
much as one-third of all the wealth on the planet) and pressing it into the service of 
the countries which most need growth” (2006: 1). Place branding is thus presented as 
a powerful “tool” for development that, “like any other tool, is itself ethically neutral: 
it is the use to which the tool is put that determines whether it complies with 
[normative ideals] or not” (2006: 2). Moreover, Anholt claims, in reality nations are 
being branded all the time, whether they like it or not. Thus, Anholt argues: 
The alternative to ‘doing’ nation branding is not not doing nation branding: 
the alternative is allowing others to do the branding for you. As long as public 
opinion matters — and it matters terribly, because the public is the market — 
then it is not only legitimate but also vital for countries to do whatever is in 
their power to ensure that public opinion is as fair, as accurate and as positive 
as it possibly can be. Countries which do not do this run the risk of being 
saddled with a brand which does not suit their aims or interests at all, and 
which is very likely based on ignorance, hearsay, confusion or long-past 
events. (2006: 2, original emphasis). 
In other words, a nation is always already a brand. This, in turn, offers a 
powerful response to those who object to the very idea that a nation can be considered 
as a kind of product to be marketed and “branded.” Thus, for example, Michel Girard 
argues that, in a country like France, “the idea of re-branding the country would be 
widely unacceptable because the popular feeling is that France is something that has a 
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nature and a substance other than that of a corporation… A country carries specific 
dignity unlike a marketed product” (Girard 1999, cited in Olins, 2002, p. 241). The 
response to this critique by nation branding expert Wally Olins illustrates the lability 
of the notion of branding, which allows it to integrate a number of heterogeneous 
elements: 
The France of the Revolution was a completely different entity from the 
France of the Bourbons. Not only was the traditional nobility exiled and 
dispersed, the royal family executed, a republic proclaimed, religion 
excoriated, and an entire social and cultural system turned on its head but 
every little detail changed too. The tricolour replaced the fleur de lys, the 
Marseilles became the new anthem, the traditional weights were replaced by 
the metric system, a new calendar was introduced, God was replaced by the 
Supreme Being and the whole lot was exported through military triumphs all 
over Europe. In other words the entire French package was changed. You may 
not like the term, you may prefer to talk about a new or reinvented nation or 
state, but if revolutionary France was not a new brand I do not know what is. 
(Olins 2002: 243) 
While comparing the French revolution to an exercise in re-branding may 
seem fanciful, the more general claim that is reflected in Olins’s argument is 
fundamental for the discourse of nation branding—namely, that like it or not, what 
Girard refers to as basically the “essence” of the nation—its history, heritage, and 
culture—are in fact strategic components that form the “value” of a nation, i.e. its 
“brand” (Ying 2005). Again, the central claim is that, while the term “branding” has a 
commercial and marketing origin, the reality that the term refers to is essentially a 
trans-historical reality. This, in turn, is connected with the way that proponents and 
practitioners of nation branding respond to a different kind of critique, one that is 
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aimed at the more phenomenon of branding tout court. The most prominent example 
is Naomi Klein, whose written work (Klein 2000) and political activism has offered a 
powerful critique of corporate branding practices. Klein’s critique is in fact an 
indirect one, since her target is really the kinds of business practices associated with 
the rise of corporate branding, and the consequences of those practices.  
For the most part, the response to this critique, and Klein is often cited in the 
nation branding literature, is to reframe the issue that is at the heart of Klein’s 
critique, namely the issue of social justice. Thus, for example, Anholt’s response is to 
reframe the issue, first by agreeing with Klein that for the majority of large, 
successful corporations,  
their real expertise is in product design and marketing and this is where they 
invest most heavily. The less profitable parts of their enterprise, such as 
sourcing the basic raw materials, manufacturing and finishing the products, 
are farmed out to wherever they can get the required quality for the lowest 
price—and it’s almost invariably in the second or third world. (Anholt 2005a: 
14) 
However, Anholt argues, while Klein and others have rightly identified a 
source of injustice, they have failed to realize that the best solution is not to eliminate 
branding, but rather to recognize it as a powerful tool that needs to be made available 
to poor, developing countries in order to more successfully compete with the 
wealthier countries (14-18). The solution offered is branding as a tool for achieving a 
“brand new justice” (Anholt 2005a). Thus, Anholt argues, nation branding “is a vital 
technique for…governments in the developing world to learn if they wish to use the 
forces of globalization to their advantage rather than remain perennially its victims” 
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(Anholt & van Gelder 2003: 56). According to the discourse of nation branding, the 
solution for underdevelopment and poverty, for global inequality, is to first recognize 
that each nation-state exists in a global environment marked by competition (Anholt 
2005a). Next, nation-states need to act strategically in order to succeed. Success is 
defined in terms of attracting capital and increasing economic growth.  
Moreover, success depends on adopting a global (both in the sense of 
“comprehensive” as well as “planetary”) strategy that takes into account all of a 
nation’s (potential or actual) assets, and leverages these so that they can be translated 
into value for the nation. Thus, while it is important—indeed, crucial—for the 
businesses located in developing countries to utilize the technology of branding to 
compete against the more dominant businesses (in both local and export markets), 
this is not sufficient (Anholt 2005a: 16-17). What is required is “a consistent, 
imaginative and well-managed national brand strategy” (2005a: 17, original 
emphasis). Furthermore, nation branding experts argue, critics like Klein, while they 
are correct to reject branding as a form of “spin” that attempts to manipulate 
consumers, fail to realize that nation branding is not, ultimately, about marketing a 
country, but rather revealing and highlighting the truth of a country. This is a crucial 
element in the discursive assemblage of nation branding, and requires further 
explication.  
According to Anholt, there are six fundamental elements that form the basis of 
people’s perception of a country: (1) “the things the country does, and the way it does 
them”; (2) “the things the country makes, and the way it makes them”; (3) “the way 
the country looks — or people think it looks”; (4) “the way other people talk about 
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it”; (5) “the company it keeps”; and (6) “the way the country talks about itself” 
(2005b: 345). Anholt argues that “[t]here is a common misconception that nation 
branding is mainly about the last item in the list — in other words, that the image of a 
country can be built through paid-for communications, through attractive logos and 
clever slogans” (2005b: 345-346). However, Anholt stresses, communicating the 
image of a nation is only a small part of building its brand: 
Just as advertising cannot sell a product which does not deliver on its 
promises or which people do not need, so a country cannot build its reputation 
by singing its own praises or spewing out endless information about its 
wonderful products, investment opportunities, people, places and 
achievements. In today’s world, information is virtually valueless because 
there is so much of it… In the end, if a nation wants to change its brand 
image, it must learn to behave differently. (2005b: 346, emphasis added) 
As the last sentence makes clear, nation branding is a way of governing 
nation-states, of inciting them to behave differently. This becomes even more evident 
when we look at the specific technologies developed within the nation branding 
assemblage. Not surprisingly, one such technique is a metric, originally called the 
Anholt-GMI Nation Brands Index, now the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index 
(or NBI). The NBI, Anholt explains, calculates the value of a nation-brand as “the 
sum of people’s perceptions of a country across six areas of national competence”: 
Tourism, Exports, Governance, Investment and Immigration, Culture and Heritage, 
and People (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: The nation brand hexagon. Source: Anholt (2005b: 334) 
 
The Nations Brand Index functions as a governmental technology, or 
mechanism of “governance,” in two ways: by constructing a ranking of the overall 
“value” of nation brands; and by suggesting the domains or elements of a nation’s 
brand value, which are thus areas where nations need to “perform” as well as they 
can. Thus the NBI helps operationalize nation branding as a mode of governmentality 
which, as D. Asher Ghertner points out (and as has been outlined in previous chapters 
and above), “functions by constructing and making intelligible categories of 
knowledge,” authorizing these categories through expert “truths,” “investing… 
[them] with significance and problematizing them such that they appear to require 
improvement via technical intervention,” and making them the basis on which the 
diverse desires of subjects can be recruited into a shared normative framework (2010: 
186). Furthermore, as Ghertner argues, governmental programs such as nation 
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branding “are effective to the extent that they produce governable subjects—
[subjects] who evaluate and act upon the social world through lenses provided by 
government. An essential component of guiding the interests of target population 
groups is thus the joint exercise of crafting intelligible fields for governmental 
intervention and problematizing such fields so as to make certain ‘deficiencies’ 
emerge as improvable” (2010: 186). 
In constructing an index, or ranking, of nation brands, Anholt is thereby able 
to offer a general model for “what kind of country tends to have powerful brand 
values: a stable, liberal, democratic Western state with a tendency to neutrality, often 
producing several well-known branded products and with a strong international 
presence in the media” (Anholt 2005b: 344). Thus, this form of governmentality 
seeks to govern nation-states by providing a “technical” measure of the “value” of 
nations, and suggesting what specific qualities are necessary for a country to improve 
this “value”. Like Anholt-GfK, the marketing firm FutureBrand produces a “Country 
Brand Index” and, although it employs a somewhat different methodology, it also 
makes the claim that “globalization is redefining the way a country brand is 
established and maintained” (FutureBrand 2009: 17). FutureBrand also argues that “a 
country’s reputation is defined not just by its attractiveness as a travel destination or 
the efforts of its tourism marketing but also by its governance, its economic policies, 
its role in global diplomacy and the quality of its export products” (2009: 17). 
Thus, as both the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index and FutureBrand 
Country Brand Index illustrate, nation branding operates as a form of governmentality 
that suggests to the subject various forms of (self) governance with the aim of self-
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improvement. Indeed, the internal governance of a country emerges as a crucial 
element for determining the value of a nation’s brand. Thus, for example, 
FutureBrand suggests that  
Countries seeking to expand their exports or attract inward investment today 
need to be concerned about a variety of reputational factors beyond 
geographic location and the quality and cost of their labor forces. These 
include adopting acceptable labor standards and the rule of law, supporting 
sound environmental practices, tackling corruption and transnational crime, 
protecting intellectual property, promoting open trade regimes, and offering 
transparency and sound political governance. (2009: 17) 
Similarly, branding consultant Keith Dinnie argues that nation branding “should be 
treated as a component of national policy, never as a ‘campaign’ that is separate from 
planning, governance, or economic development” (2008: 23). Dinnie goes on to 
explain that his nation branding consultancy work “now involves building and 
training teams consisting of head of state or government, cabinet ministers and CEOs 
of key corporations, in the principles of competitive identity…If brand management 
is put into a silo of ‘communications’ or ‘public affairs’, there is little it can do. But 
when it informs policy-making and becomes implicit in the way a country is run, it 
can dramatically accelerate change” (2008: 23, emphasis added). 
What is more, just as every element of a subject has the potential to affect that 
subject’s value, behaving strategically—managing the brand—requires taking all of 
these elements into account. In terms of managing the brand of a nation, this means 
that everything that makes up a nation is potentially a source of (increased or 
decreased) value: 
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A national brand strategy determines the most realistic, most competitive and 
most compelling strategic vision for the country, and ensures that this vision is 
supported, reinforced and enriched by every act of communication between 
the country and the rest of the world.  
Those acts of communication include the kinds of brands which the country 
exports; the way it promotes itself for trade, tourism, inward investment and 
inward recruitment; the way it behaves in acts of domestic and foreign policy 
and the ways in which these acts are communicated; the way it promotes and 
represents and shares its culture; the way its citizens behave when abroad and 
how they treat strangers at home; the way it features in the world’s media; the 
bodies and organizations it belongs to; the countries it associates with; the 
way it competes with other countries in sport and entertainment; what it gives 
to the world and what it takes back. (Anholt 2005a: 17, original emphasis) 
In other words, nation branding, as a form of governmentality, offers a 
comprehensive vision within which potentially every aspect of a nation can be 
governed on the basis of a logic of competitive advantage. It provides a grid of 
intelligibility within which potentially each and every element that makes up a nation-
state can be evaluated in terms of its contribution to (or deduction from) the 
competitive value of the nation. Furthermore, this form of political technology, in 
combination with related discourses and practices of development, good governance, 
and civil society, opens up “a relatively open-ended and experimental problem-space 
of how to govern”: that is, of finding the appropriate techniques for a government 
oriented by a problematic of competitive advantage (Burchell 1991: 141, original 
emphasis).86 And, as has been mentioned above, the success of this mode of 
 
86 This quote, from Burchell, has been modified. The original, commenting on Foucault’s discussion of 
the development of the concept of civil society within a liberal technology of government, reads 
“…oriented by a problematic of security.” 
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governmentality can be measured by the degree to which diverse subjects can be 
integrated into the general governmental assemblage—that is, their desires, actions, 
and relations can be integrated within a general system for producing value.  
This would certainly seem to be the goal of nation branding: to provide an 
overall governmental logic for directing the conduct of subjects. This is illustrated by 
the idea that nation branding should be a point of reference for modifying both the 
behavior of the internal elements of a country and the country’s perception in the eyes 
of the outside world. As Jeff Swystun, the former Global Director of Interbrand (one 
of the world’s leading branding firms) observed, “Brands should be both inspirational 
and aspirational. Inspirational to the internal audience, so you are motivating them to 
behave along the brand’s values and guidelines. Aspirational so it takes you to a 
future point” (Shikoh 2006). Or, as Swystun says, “Place Branding is actually a 
misnomer, it’s actually about people branding” (Shikoh 2006). As Melissa Aronczyk, 
in her interviews with place branding experts, points out: 
the primary responsibility for the success of the nation brand lies with 
individuals: the nation’s citizens, members of the diaspora, or even non-
citizens in distant locations who may find cause to engage with the nation 
andtherefore wish to have a stake in its success. For national citizens in 
particular, the key function is to “live the brand” – that is, to perform attitudes 
and behaviors that are compatible with the brand strategy. By “immers[ing]” 
themselves in the brand identity, citizens carry “the microbes of the brand” 
and “infect” those with whom they come into contact. This role is described 
variously as a “brand ambassador,” “brand champion,” “brand exemplar,” or 
“brand carrier”…. As respondents continually took pains to convey, the nation 
brand may be augmented and made visible through its logos, slogans and 
promotional campaigns, but these are not effective forms of communication 
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without the wholehearted participation of its representatives. Nation branding 
is, at its core, a concerted and comprehensive strategy by national citizens of 
all strata of society to assimilate and communicate this new national identity 
on an ongoing basis. (2008: 54) 
In Latin America, the country that seems to have gone the furthest in 
developing and adopting a fairly comprehensive nation branding strategy is Chile. In 
fact, Chile has much in common with what is perceived by branding experts as one of 
the more successful examples of nation branding—the re-branding of Spain in the 
1990s (Dinnie 2008: 29). For Spain, the problem, for which nation branding was the 
proposed solution, was to overcome its image, inherited from the long period under 
the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, as an “isolated, autarkic, poverty-stricken, 
authoritarian anachronism” (Preston 1999). The “re-branding” of Spain, branding 
experts point out, was the product of more than just an advertizing campaign: it was 
also “the result of fundamental changes in its political, economic and social systems” 
(Ying 2005: 14). Like Spain, Chile too in the 1990s was a country seeking to shed the 
image of its authoritarian past and re-insert itself into the “community of nations” 
(Morandé 2003). 
One of the most important symbolic moments in the re-branding of Chile 
came in 1992, just three years after the transition from the military dictatorship of 
Augusto Pinochet to a democratically elected government, when Chile participated in 
the Universal Exposition of Seville, Spain. To mark its re-emergence within the 
international community, Chile chose as its symbol an iceberg, taken from Antarctica 
and shipped to the Expo in Seville. One of the messages that came from this choice of 
symbolic representation was that Chile is “a cold, businesslike country unlike its 
 184 
 
informal and less modern neighbors” (S. Dillon 1992). As Eugenio Garcia, director of 
the Santiago marketing firm that conceived the project, commented, “We form part of 
an imprecise thing that is called Latin America, and there are negative judgments 
about that. We are trying to shed that image” (quoted in S. Dillon 1992). At the time, 
however, this image of Chile provoked internal debate, with some arguing that rather 
than a symbol of modernity, the iceberg recalled the absurdity of the character in 
Gabriel García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude (1998) who manufactures 
ice in the remote swamps of Macondo (Pinedo 1996).87 Nevertheless, despite the 
dissenting voices, the message was unmistakable: Chile was showing the world that it 
had entered the circle of economically stable and productive nations. As one of the 
organizer’s of Chile’s pavilion at the Expo commented, “We are not arriving with the 
attitude of a Second- or Third World nation, rather Chile is arriving under maximum 
conditions of equality” (quoted in Valle 1992, my translation). Or, as the Chilean 
newspaper La Tercera put it, the iceberg and Chile’s Expo pavilion show the world 
the “Chile of today, with citizens that create, that use technology, and are capable of 
having an attractive life” ("Chile Estará En La Expo Sevilla '92"  1991). 
More recently, the government of Chile began a more comprehensive nation 
branding campaign, hiring Interbrand to develop a comprehensive branding strategy 
(ProChile 2005). After extensive research and planning, Interbrand came up with the 
slogan “Chile, All Ways Surprising,” (Chile sorprende, siempre) with an 
 
87 Chilean sociologist Tomás Moulian locates the symbolism of the iceberg in relation to what he calls, 
following Jean Baudrillard  (1994) the “whitewashing” (blanqueo) of Chile: “Like a gigantic petrified 
whale, the iceberg was brought from the seas of the Antarctic to serve in Seville as the representation 
of Chile Today (Chile Actual). The iceberg was the sculpture of our metamorphosis…[it] established 
before the eyes of the world the transparency of Chile Today…. In the iceberg there was no trace at all 
of blood, of the disappeared…not even the shadow of Pinochet. It was as if Chile had just been born” 
(1997: 34-35, my translation). 
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accompanying logotype in shades of purple, violet, and ochre (meant to convey the 
image of Chile’s geographical and ecological diversity) (ProChile 2005).  
Furthermore, Interbrand suggested a strategy that was based on a matrix of three 
central concepts to be communicated to Chile’s diverse audience: 
1. An overwhelming geography, diverse and transparent 
2. Warm, efficient and enterprising people and 
3. A stable country, open to the world, with solid institutions where 
people keep their word. (ProChile 2005)88 
As the ProChile (a sub-ministry of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is in 
charge of promoting Chilean exports) website explained, the branding campaign led 
by Interbrand “is part of a strategy of international insertion which the country has 
embarked upon and complements all the public and private initiatives and activities 
that take place at the global level, including international trade agreements, scientific 
and technological exchanges, promoting exports, attracting investment, and 
promoting the arts and culture” (ProChile 2005). Furthermore, the slogan and graphic 
image, it is argued, “reflect a modern and enterprising country that is always on the 
go, a country that is inserted in the world and that innovates without breaking with its 
traditions” (ProChile 2005). Importantly, the branding initiative is seen as having 
both an external and internal dimension. With regard to the latter, the expectation is 
“to generate an identification and appropriation strategy of the Country Image, 
communicating the ‘why’ and the ‘what for’ of a Brand for Chile, producing unity 
surrounding a message and a unique image, and permitting institutions, associations 
 
88 All translations from ProChile are mine. 
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and representatives of the public and private world and the civil society to be part of 
the Brand Chile, adopting it and using it in a committed way” (Abarca Lucero 2009). 
Conclusion 
As the example of Chile demonstrates, the political technology of nation 
branding functions as a form of governmentality: it constructs a domain of 
knowledge, suggests appropriate modes of subjectivity and behavior, and employs a 
number of calculative practices to produce the desired governmental objectives. It is 
also flexible and can be employed in tandem with any number of “ethical 
imperatives”: sustainable development, environmental protection, gender equality, 
and so on (Dinnie 2008: 170-176). At the same time, as Aronczyk points out, “The 
field of nation branding is still in its infancy. Very few nation-states are deemed to 
have successfully implemented a coherent and functional brand and recorded 
measurable results for branding initiatives” (2008: 57).89 Chile seems to meet the first 
set of requirements, having implemented a coherent branding strategy. However, I am 
not aware of any data that measures the results of that campaign. Furthermore, the 
degree to Chile is typical of other nation branding experiences is not clear, and calls 
for further research.  
At the same time, we must be careful to distinguish between the programmatic 
statements of those involved in promoting nation branding and the actual impact of 
those programs. In this regard, it is useful to recall some of the critiques made of 
Foucault’s analyses, particularly of those technologies of power he described in terms 
 
89 Although we can easily speculate that this will soon change if nation branding and the governance/ 
governmentality on which it is predicated continues its present trajectory. 
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of a “disciplinary society” in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977). The charge 
made against Foucault was that his description of the various disciplinary 
technologies of power in general, and Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon in particular, 
were never fully implemented and put into effect, and that the historical reality does 
not match the programmatic statements that are the objects of Foucault’s analysis 
(Giddens 1982; Habermas 1987). This critique is also based on the mistaken idea that 
for Foucault the prison is the model of social control in modern, disciplinary societies 
(to which scholars such as Giddens then object, “but the prison is not the same as the 
factory and the school” (1982: 222-223)). However, the prison is decidedly not, in 
Foucault’s analysis, “the exemplar of power as discipline,” as Giddens would have it 
(223). Rather, as Foucault has pointed out, he first encounters Bentham’s Panopticon 
in his studies of architectural plans for hospitals in 18th Century France. Indeed, it is 
the birth of social medicine and social hygiene, largely directed at the problems of the 
plague and epidemic disease which, Foucault argues, provide many of the 
techniques—strict spatial partitioning, careful surveillance, detailed inspection and 
order—that form the basis of the “disciplinary diagrams of power” (Elden 2003: 243; 
Foucault 1977: 231). Indeed, as Gilles Deleuze points out, Foucault’s studies of 
madness, crime and sexuality have taught us how to think about power in terms of its 
“dispositions, maneuvers, tactics, techniques, functionings” (Foucault, cited in 
Deleuze 1988: 25). 
It is in this sense that we can apprehend the political technology of nation 
branding as an element in a more generalized diagram of power, one that Deleuze 
(1992a) described in terms of a “society of control.” While the term “control” seems 
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to suggest something along the lines of Foucault’s “disciplinary society,” Deleuze 
actually describes the gradual breakdown of disciplinary mechanisms, and their 
replacement by more fluid, de-centered, mechanisms of power that are increasingly 
immanent to the social body. Crucially, these power mechanisms operate through 
variable combinations and productions of desire, lifestyle, anxiety and fear, and have 
the market as their ultimate paradigm (Deleuze 1992a). I will elaborate on this further 
in my discussion of neoliberal subjectivity and capitalism in the consluding chapter. 
However, here I want to conclude with some observations regarding the implications 
that nation branding as a governmental technology has for understanding power and 
the question of order in contemporary world politics. 
My claim is that the political subject that is the nation-state is being 
transformed within a discursive field and a field of political technologies and 
rationalities in which all subjects are (potentially) constituted as competitive, 
enterprising subjects. Moreover, I wish to argue that the brand-nation is itself 
symptomatic of a more generalized transformation of our political present, one that is 
increasingly characterized by a neoliberal mode of governance in which the conduct 
of subjects is directed through technologies of the self that elicit a strategic and 
competitive comportment and ethos. The analysis presented here, therefore, lends 
support to the theoretical position developed by a number of scholars of world 
politics that prevailing notions of global governance fail to capture a significant 
aspect of the functioning of power in contemporary world politics, namely how 
neoliberal modes of governmentality structure the field of world politics in part 
through “technologies of the self” that help shape the subjectivity of international 
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actors. Thus, for example, Alexander Wendt’s (1992) formulation of how the 
international system is structured by (and in turn structures) states through the latter’s 
intersubjective understandings of the international political environment in which 
states find themselves (i.e. his claim that “anarchy is what states make of it”) requires 
reformulation. The reformulation suggested here is “nation-states [and political 
subjects in general] are what technologies of power make them.”  
To be clear, when speaking of subjectivity in the Foucauldian sense, I am not 
speaking of forms of identity—especially “state” or “national” identity—in the sense 
used within certain types of constructivist IR analysis (Adler 1997; Hopf 1998; 
Kowert 1998). While identity might be applied to a particular, individual subject—or, 
conceivably, a nation-state—subjectivity instead refers to the multiple, contingent, 
shifting discourses and practices through which subjects are constituted (Strozier 
2002). Moreover, the emphasis is on the emergence of the subject through “power-
knowledge” relations. It is in this sense that the discourse and practice of nation 
branding acquires its significance, for it suggests not only a reformulation of the 
principal subject of modern politics, the nation-state, but also of the related 
technologies for governing the subjects of contemporary world politics. 
Thus, rather than speaking of global governance, I believe it makes more 
sense to speak of global governmentality. The latter does not presuppose the 
existence of something—a scale, level of analysis, or place—called the global, but 
rather recognizes the constitution of the global through a number of discursive 
practices, and critically examines the ways that this “global” space is put to work as 
part of governmental technologies that aim to direct the conduct of subjects. In this 
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regard, the notion of global governmentality shares some common elements with 
another critical conceptualization of contemporary world order, namely Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri’s description of “Empire” (Hardt & Negri 2000). However, 
whereas the analytical framework of global governmentality suggests the existence of 
technologies and rationalities of power that, on the one hand, draw on and reproduce 
discourses of the global, and on the other hand, are “global” in scope or ambition, 
insofar as they target all of social reality, Hardt and Negri’s thesis is that there has 
emerged a new form of global sovereignty that is fundamentally different from that of 
the nation-state. Moreover, their argument, resting as it does on a revolutionary 
Marxist praxis, sees this global form of sovereignty – Empire – as containing a 
number of (necessary) contradictions which will (necessarily) result in a global 
communist subject who will ultimately create a post-Empire social reality (Hardt & 
Negri 2000). 
The vision of world order advanced by the kind of global governmentality 
framework developed in this study, in contrast, is more skeptical of the possibility for 
actually achieving the kind of global sovereignty imagined by Hardt and Negri—or, 
for that matter, by the proponents of global governance. This is because, ultimately, 
within the political ontology on which the notion of global governmentality rests, the 
various governmental projects that are observed appear not as the inevitable outcome 
of macro-historical processes, but rather as the contingent, contested outcomes of 
numerous struggles and forms of problematization. Furthermore, the various political 
technologies and rationalities that are developed within governmental programs are 
not univocal and do not lead to only one kind of social and political arrangement. 
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Rather, governmental technologies can be put to various uses, can be problematized 
within different contexts. Thus, far from representing a new form of global 
sovereignty, neoliberalism, as Aihwa Ong suggests, should be “conceptualized not as 
a fixed set of attributes with predetermined outcomes, but as a logic of governing that 
migrates and is selectively taken up in diverse political contexts” (2007: 3).  
Consequently, and as Foucault suggested, rather than beginning with an 
assumption of order and stability, the production of order—the arrangement of the 
elements that constitute social reality—must be seen as processual, the result of 
countless actions, reactions, and interactions, a never-ending stabilizing and 
destabilizing of the components and contours of the social realm. When various 
elements of social reality are more or less stabilized, this is the result of power. This 
is the productive aspect of power that Foucault described. Seen in this light, 
neoliberalism and the global political imaginary are forms of power. As they operate 
in the world, novel forms of meaning and being are produced: connections among 
certain elements are made while others are cut off, new possibilities are created and 
others are foreclosed—at least in certain sites and for a while.  
Ultimately, the challenge is to apprehend globalism and neoliberalism—
assemblages that are not quite two sides of the same coin and yet which, in different 
contexts, overlap and become blurred together—as projects that strive towards 
universality, without actually attributing universality to them. Refusing to accept at 
face value the totalizing claims made by the discourses of globalization and 
neoliberalism does not necessarily require a focus on the specific, contingent, and 
local to the exclusion of broader dynamics and structures. Rather, what are required 
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are modes of analysis that “undo the naturalization of dominant perspectives of 
aggregate processes by offering more concrete and inclusive, though also decidedly 
open, accounts of large-scale transformations, paying heed to the unevenness of 
geohistorical change” (Pederson 2003: 245). In this way we might “take on the 
challenge of freeing critical imaginations from the specter of neoliberal conquest—
singular, universal, global”. By paying attention to “the effectiveness, and the 
fragility, of emergent capitalist—and globalist—forms”, new political terrains can be 
imagined, creating “new sources of hope, and, of course, new nightmares” (Tsing 
2005: 77).
CHAPTER FIVE: GOVERNMENTALITY, CAPITALISM, SUBJECTIVITY 
In the present study I have examined how neoliberalism functions as a form of 
governmentality—as a way of governing subjects and spaces. The governmentality 
framework was employed to address some of what I have argued are significant 
shortcomings of the majority of studies of neoliberalism. The latter tend to treat 
neoliberalism as either a set of policies (privatization, trade liberalization, 
deregulation, and so on) or an ideology that seeks to justify or generate support for 
those policies (Harvey 2005). Drawing on Foucault’s analysis of the post-World War 
II transformations in liberalism (2008), I have suggested instead that neoliberalism is 
better understood as a governmental “assemblage,” or a complex combination of 
various forms of knowledge, subjectivities, political rationalities, and techniques. 
Throughout this study, I have sought to show that these assemblages of 
governmentality provide the conditions of possibility for the various policies and 
ideologies associated with neoliberalism. 
At the same time, in this dissertation I have sought not only to apply a 
governmentality framework to international relations and the question of how 
neoliberal globalization is transforming the world we live in, but also to refine and 
reformulate a Foucauldian approach to world politics. One area where I sought to 
further advance a Foucauldian framework has to do with the constitution of the global 
as a fundamental part of the contemporary political imaginary. I proposed the concept 
of a neoliberal global political imaginary in order to capture some of the ways that 
neoliberalism is constitutive of the way that social and political reality is understood 
and experienced. The idea of a neoliberal global political imaginary thus functions as 
a heuristic device that opens up an analysis of the relationship between various 
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neoliberal governmental assemblages and the constitution of a global space and 
global subjects. Moreover, in this study I analyzed three “sites” that I claim form the 
basis of the neoliberal global political imaginary: the global market, global civil 
society, and global governance. I have argued that this represents a transformation 
and transposition of the liberal political imaginary, based on the three domains of the 
state, society, and the market, onto a “global” space. 
One of the findings of this study is that the boundaries that separate the 
market, civil society, and the state—already problematic at the national level—
become blurred and increasingly overlap at the “global” level. Indeed, it is the 
“global” itself that functions as something of a “master signifier” (J.K. Gibson-
Graham 2000: 98) by stabilizing the various relations of difference that exist among 
the sites and scales of the neoliberal political imaginary. Thus, the present study has 
demonstrated how the global functions as a form of governmentality—a mode of 
governance that suggests and normalizes a certain understanding of social and 
political reality. Furthermore, consistent with a Foucauldian mode of analysis, the 
idea of the global, while lending itself to certain governmental practices and projects, 
has no clear-cut essence. Indeed, it can be mobilized for such diverse purposes as 
global environmentalism, global humanitarianism, or the subjection of all social 
relations to the logic of a global market. Thus, as I have argued throughout the 
present study, it is the intersection of discourses and practices of the global with 
neoliberal governmental assemblages that must be apprehended in order to better 
understand our political present. 
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More specifically, a key finding of the present study is that neoliberal 
governmentality contributes to and draws upon discourses of the global in a way that 
reproduces and amplifies what I claim is the central logic of contemporary 
neoliberalism, namely a logic of competition. Put differently, neoliberal governmental 
assemblages mobilize the idea of a global reality, suggest that this global reality is 
characterized by competition, and offer a number of techniques and strategies by 
which the subjects of this global space can behave in an appropriately competitive 
fashion. Moreover, this framing of the global as a space of competition makes 
possible a wide range of governmental interventions, both direct and indirect. That is, 
there exist a number of neoliberal governmental technologies that are predicated on 
the existence of a global, competitive social reality, and which mobilize this “reality” 
in order to shape and direct the conduct of subjects and/or to incite subjects to govern 
themselves.  
Furthermore, this brings to the fore another key finding of the present study, 
namely that among the various elements of neoliberal governmental assemblages, the 
production of subjectivity plays a crucial role. This finding, in turn, suggests an 
important area for future governmentality studies of world politics: investigating the 
production of neoliberal subjectivities as forms of “global” governmentality. As the 
preceding chapter on global governance sought to demonstrate, subjectivity as a 
conceptual category need not be applied only to individual persons; it can also be 
applied to “collective subjects” such as the nation-state. Indeed, as the case of nation 
branding illustrates, the production of the nation-state as a competitive, 
entrepreneurial subject involves a number of governmental techniques and 
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technologies. Thus governmentality studies can contribute to our understanding of the 
functioning of mechanisms of power in world politics by analyzing the various 
governmental assemblages that seek to direct the conduct of others—or for subjects to 
direct their own conduct—through the production of competitive, entrepreneurial 
forms of subjectivity. 
While an analysis of modes of subjectivation, or the production of 
subjectivity, can strengthen governmentality studies and aid our overall understanding 
of contemporary world politics, it also raises another question—one that has been 
largely ignored by Foucauldian scholars. This is the question of the relationship 
between capitalism and subjectivity, particularly as the former relates to structures 
and relations of power. This may seem to contradict the argument made throughout 
this study that one of the strengths of governmentality accounts of neoliberalism, 
including neoliberal modes of subjectivation, is that a governmentality framework 
does not reduce the latter to the requirements of capital. However, it is possible that, 
in eschewing the kinds of analysis often associated with Marxian political thought 
and which treat neoliberalism as epiphenomenal or secondary to the underlying 
reality of global capitalism, governmentality scholars have avoided any consideration 
of the ways that capitalism is productive of forms of governmentality and of 
subjectivity. Thus, I wish to argue that an engagement with some of the theoretically 
innovative research programs that are investigating the connections between 
capitalism, neoliberalism, and subjectivity, without reducing the question of 
neoliberalism to a function of capitalism, can further advance a Foucauldian 
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perspective on world politics and help shed light on of the fundamental dynamics and 
structures of power in the world today. 
In the following section, I examine one theoretical framework that has offered 
innovative and productive accounts of the connection between capitalism, 
neoliberalism and subjectivity: Italian post-post-autonomist thought. One reason I feel 
this is important is because, despite the strong resonances between this theoretical 
“school of thought” and post-structuralist and Foucauldian approaches, the latter have 
largely ignored the contributions of the former. The other reason for focusing on 
Italian post-post-autonomist thought is that there are some potentially productive 
complementarities between the latter and Foucauldian governmentality studies. 
Indeed, as I will show, a great deal of the work being done by younger theorists draws 
freely on both post-structural and Marxian theoretical/political traditions, thereby 
ignoring and breaking down some of the walls that have been erected between them. 
However, I wish to be clear that I am not arguing for a wholesale incorporation of 
Italian post-post-autonomist thought into a Foucauldian governmentality framework. 
There are some fundamental divergences, which I will also mention in what follows. 
This is also one more reason for a critical engagement with this largely ignored 
perspective—to illuminate possible areas of convergence, but also to be aware of the 
difficulties that any simple combination of different theoretical approaches might 
entail. 
Italian Post-Marxist Thought: Subjectivity and Capitalism 
For the most part, scholars working from some kind of Foucauldian 
framework—whether from a biopolitical or governmentality perspective—have not 
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made capitalism a central part of their analysis. What is more, their work has often 
reproduced the idea that there is a fundamental opposition between Foucault’s work 
and Marxist thought. What is often ignored is that there already exists a group of 
thinkers who have drawn on Foucault’s work in order to formulate theoretical and 
political responses to the current capitalist order. Beginning in the 1970s, Foucault’s 
work inspired a number of critical Italian theorists to rethink the nature of capitalist 
development and capitalist social relations, leading some to speak of an “Italian 
Foucault” (Coté 2003).90 The most prominent of these thinkers is Antonio Negri, 
whose work together with Michael Hardt (2000, 2004) has generated a great deal of 
discussion in a number of fields, including International Relations (Barkawi & Laffey 
2002; Callinicos 2002; Passavant & Dean 2004; Shaw 2002; R. B. J. Walker 2002). 
Hardt and Negri’s thesis regarding the emergence of a new form of global 
sovereignty – “Empire” – is by now quite well-known and needs no further 
elaboration. Less well known, however, is the large body of critical theoretical work 
that has provided innovative accounts of contemporary capitalism through a re-
reading of the Foucauldian concepts of biopower and biopolitics. While a thorough 
review and discussion of this work is beyond the scope of the present study, I do wish 
to highlight a couple of elements of this area of scholarship in order to suggest how it 
can enrich already existing Foucauldian accounts of world politics—particularly by 
incorporating capitalism and its connection with subjectivity into the analytical 
framework. 
 
90 There is in fact a substantial literature in Italian social and political thought that engages with 
Foucault. Unfortunately, as of the time of writing, most of it remains un-translated. 
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The body of political thought I discuss here has been referred to variously as 
post-Marxist, Workerist, post-Workerist, Post-autonomist, and post-Post-autonomist 
Marxism. The thinkers mentioned I discuss below all have connections to the 
Workerist political movement (Potere Operaio) that was active in the 1960s and early 
1970s in Italy, and out of which was born the autonomia movement of Italian 
workers, students, and feminists.91 Here I will use the terms “post-Marxist” and 
“post-post-autonomist Marxism” synonymously to describe critical thinkers that have 
been associated with these movements in Italy and have also sought to move beyond 
traditional Marxist political thought in trying to apprehend recent transformations in 
capitalism. 
One of the foundational premises for post-post-autonomist Marxism is the 
inversion of the idea found in many Western accounts of capitalism that emphasize 
“only the dominant and inexorable logic of capital. Its accumulative logic, unfolding 
according to ineluctable (even if finally self-destructive) laws, figures as the unilateral 
force shaping the contemporary world” (Dyer-Witheford 1999: 65). Against this idea, 
post-post-autonomist Marxists have emphasized the creative power of labor and the 
reactionary nature of capital.  
Far from being a passive object of capitalist design, the worker is in fact the 
active subject of production, the wellspring of the skills, innovation, and 
cooperation on which capital depends. Capital attempts to incorporate labor as 
an object, a component in its cycle of value extraction, so much labor power. 
But this inclusion is always partial, never fully achieved. Laboring subjects 
 
91 Many of the issues related to workerist and post-autonomist thought are discussed in the special 
issue “Italian Post-Workerist Thought” in SubStance 36, no.1 (2007).  For a history of this political and 
intellectual movement, see Wright (2002). Many of the political and theoretical debates that 
surrounded this movement are discussed in Hardt (1996) and Lotringer and Marazzi (2007).  
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resist capital’s reduction. Labor is for capital always a problematic ‘other’ that 
must constantly be controlled and subdued, and that, as persistently, 
circumvents or challenges this command. (Dyer-Witheford 1999: 65) 
Related to this is the idea that the struggle by workers to escape the command 
of capital and achieve autonomy provokes capital to restructure the production 
process and the division of labor in order to reassert its command. This is captured by 
the notion of class composition, which “addresses both the “technical” organization 
of the working class within the capitalist mode of production and the forms of 
“political” subjectivity that emerge within the working class” (Mecchia & Henninger 
2007: 3). This reworking, or inversion, of the notion of the composition of class and 
its relation to the composition of capital, has led to the argument that  
given a certain level of capitalist development, transformations in political 
composition precede and determine transformations in technical composition. 
This means that the labor struggles accompanying the emergence of a new 
political subject force entrepreneurs to implement processes of economic 
restructuring. In the workerist interpretation, such economic restructuring 
constitutes an attempt to contain the revolutionary transformations that 
capitalist development produces and depends on, even as these 
transformations continually call into question capitalism’s material 
foundations, private ownership of the means of production, and 
entrepreneurial command over alienated labor. (Mecchia & Henninger 2007: 
3) 
The importance of the notion of class composition came to be felt by the 
Italian workerist movement when the struggles that had been largely organized 
around the large industrial factories in the 1960s gave way to new strategies by 
capital such as the introduction of technological innovations and organizational 
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restructuring in order to lessen capital’s dependence on organized labor. At the same 
time, “student struggles and the emergence of both a highly combative feminist 
movement and new, strongly politicized youth cultures had shifted the terrain of 
struggle away from the factory” (Mecchia & Henninger 2007: 4). Taken together, 
these two developments—the reorganization of capitalist production understood as a 
shift from a Fordist to a post-Fordist capitalist regime, and the emergence of new 
social movements and subjectivities—provided the political impetus for post-post-
autonomist Marxists to reconsider both the changing political configuration of 
capitalism and its related means of domination, as well as the potential sites and 
subjectivities of resistance to that domination (Toscano 2004: 200-201). 
Some of the main concepts that have been developed by Italian post-post-
autonomist thinkers to apprehend the changing nature of capitalist production and 
control, and the political possibilities associated with the latter are the concepts of 
immaterial labor, general intellect, and the real subsumption of labor under 
capitalism. Immaterial labor can be understood as “the kind of labor that produces 
‘the informational and cultural content of the commodity’… [and] which, by its very 
nature, foregrounds the ability to activate and manage cooperation, in all of its 
affective, communicational and informational senses, for the sake of intensified 
productivity” (Lazzarato 1996: 133, cited in Toscano 2007: 73). Thus, under 
contemporary post-Fordist global capitalism, the production of value increasingly 
depends on the properties of human being: language, communication, creativity, 
knowledge, affect, cooperation, and so on. Note that while the concept was originally 
developed to describe both the technological changes—computerisation and 
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informatization—and the kind of labor associated with the informational or cultural 
worker (Lazzarato 1996), Feminist thought has also called attention the ‘other side’ of 
immaterial labor—‘affective labor’ that “covers a vast terrain of human interaction 
and trafficking, actual or virtual: health service, child care, domestic work, online 
dating, correspondence marriage, immigrant sex work, entertainment, tourism, digital 
information, and so on” (Lu 2007: 4).92  
Furthermore, and related to the previous point, under conditions of post-
Fordist capitalism, the labor power that capital attempts to exploit is increasingly 
based on the human capacity for language, communication, and cooperation. For 
post-post-autonomist Marxists, this form of labor power is represented by the term 
general intellect.93  The hypothesis is that the communicative and cooperative 
potential of human subjects are increasingly central to both capitalist production and 
reproduction (Virno 1996). Thus, the notion of general intellect highlights the fact 
that under contemporary capitalism “wealth is no longer the immediate work of the 
individual, but a general productivity of the social body— dispersed through 
technologies and human bodies, connected in new, shifting assemblages” (Terranova 
2006: 29). This, in turn, points towards the final key conceptual category, the real 
 
92 See also Hardt (1999) and Weeks (2007).  
93 The term is taken from the “Fragment on Machines” in Notebook VII of Marx’s Grundrisse: 
“Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules etc. These 
are products of human industry; natural material transformed into organs of the human will over 
nature, or of human participation in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human 
hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. The  development of fixed capital indicates to what degree 
general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the 
conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and 
been transformed in accordance with it.” (Marx 1973: 706) 
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subsumption of labor under capitalism—again, a term introduced by Marx94 and 
refashioned by post-autonomist Marxism. Initially theorized by Marx as a tendency 
within capitalism to subsume the social factors of production, post-autonomist 
Marxists have analyzed contemporary capitalism as presenting conditions of an 
“actually existing real subsumption” (Read 2003: 127), where increasingly “the 
creation of wealth no longer depends on working time narrowly defined, but 
coincides with the whole time of life…it is the whole of social life – from child 
rearing to new forms of sexuality, from making music or videos on one’s home 
computer to watching TV, from inventing new ways of dressing to making up a new 
way of speaking – that produces wealth” (Terranova 2006: 29). 
Finally, these concepts—immaterial labor, general intellect, and real 
subsumption—map out a new social and political terrain of command and control as 
well as contestation and resistance. It is in this context that the argument has been 
made that “capitalism has become biopolitical” (Toscano 2007: 82, emphasis added). 
Of course Hardt and Negri’s argument regarding the biopolitical nature of production 
under global capitalism is by now well known. However, it is less commonly 
understood that this idea is not unique to Hardt and Negri, and it is increasingly 
informing a number of critical studies into the changing nature of contemporary 
capitalism (Cooper 2008; Lu 2007; Nadesan 2008; Read 2003). Nor is there any 
necessary connection between biopolitical capitalism and Hardt and Negri’s claims 
 
94 Marx contrasts the real subsumption of labor by capital with the merely formal subsumption in the 
first volume of Capital. He fleshed out in more detail the concepts of formal and real subsumption in 
the appendix to Capital titled “Results of the Immediate Process of Production”. See Marx (1990: 
1019-1038). 
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regarding the new imperial nature of sovereignty and the immanence of the multitude 
to the new terrains of biopolitical production.95  
It is also important to note that all of these concepts and their deployment 
within critical thought and political action are very much contested, not only by 
different forms of Marxian political thought, but also within the Italian post-workerist 
tradition. Obviously this very brief discussion of some central elements of post-
autonomist Marxist thought cannot do justice to the complexity of the theoretical and 
political issues involved or the debates they have generated within radical leftist 
thought. However, there are two implications regarding subjectivity and power that 
we can discern from this Italian “school” of Marxist though which might resonate 
with and help strengthen Foucauldian accounts of contemporary social and political 
life. 
The first implication that can be drawn from post-autonomist theorizations of 
real subsumption under contemporary capitalism has to do with, on the one hand, the 
processes and mechanisms involved in subjectivation and, on the other hand, the 
nature of subjectivity itself. More specifically, one of the insights of post-autonomist 
thought is that under contemporary capitalist production and reproduction, power acts 
on subjects in ways that work directly on pre- or sub-individual elements, such as the 
affective and libidinal structures of the subject (Lazzarato 2004; Virno 2003: 82-
 
95 Note that while for thinkers such as Negri and Lazzarato, conditions of real subsumption mark a 
biopolitical phase of capital, for Virno capitalism was biopolitical from the very beginning. See Virno 
(2003: 81-84). Note also that Negri distinguishes between the biopower of capital and the potential 
biopolitics of the multitude—a distinction that parallels the difference between potenza (potentiality) 
and potere (power) (Neilson 2004). 
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83).96 This can be seen both in the realms of work as well as consumption. In the 
former, Virno highlights the ways that three dimensions of the contemporary 
worker—the self-employer, the professional, and the possessive individual—are 
produced through the mobilization of affective dispositions and “linguistic-relational 
capacities” (Virno 2007: 45).97 Crucial for Virno is the fact that the nature of work 
under contemporary capitalism requires not so much a certain set of skills or 
knowledges but rather the cultivation of certain personal traits and dispositions, 
qualities—most importantly, the capacity for directing one’s life as an enterprise—
which are learned not in the spaces of work (or at least not primarily there) but in the 
extra-work spaces of social life. To put it differently, the place where the subject 
learns a relationship to itself that is homologous to the relationship between an 
entrepreneur and her business is not the work place. Or it might be more accurate to 
say that the work place is no longer confined to the factory or the office but is now 
diffused throughout social space.98 
While Virno emphasizes the fact that the contemporary working subject needs 
to be constructed, Lazzarato points out that the consumer is also not a naturally 
existing subject but also must be constructed. This also represents a shift in the 
dynamics of capitalism. Whereas under industrial capitalism the business created 
products and then tried to market and sell them, businesses nowadays are concerned 
 
96 For a discussion of the “affective turn” in social theory in general, see the essays collected in Clough 
& Halley (2007).  
97 See also Virno (2003: 84-93). 
98 “Economy cannot be conceived within the time or place of the ‘factory-office’. It has rather become 
spatially boundless and temporally endless: it is impossible to make the distinction between working 
time and free time, it is difficult to say where or when the actual act of production is being carried out, 
what is work and what is not, what creates value and what does not” (Virtanen 2004: 209). 
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less with the production and marketing of particular products than with the cultivation 
of a brand. In this regard, we can note the connection with the analysis of nation 
branding in the preceding chapter, particularly the ways that nation branding experts 
(and branding experts in general) substitute the notion of the brand for the idea of the 
product to be marketed or the nation whose international image needs to be enhanced. 
For Lazzarato the company that best represents this shift is Benetton, whose publicity 
campaigns famously produce images not so much of commodities but of social 
subjects (“the AIDS patient, the newborn infant, the ship filled with Albanian 
refugees”) whose relation to the company brand is left to the viewer’s imagination 
(Lazzarato 2007: 91). What we are witnessing, Lazzarato argues (2007: 91), is that  
publicity does not serve merely to provide information about markets, but to 
constitute them. It enters into an “interactive” relationship with the consumer, 
addressing itself not only to her needs but above all to her desires. It addresses 
itself not only to her passions and emotions, but also directly interpellates 
“political” rationality. It produces not just the consumer but the “individual” 
of immaterial capitalism. It engages in dialogue with her convictions, values, 
and opinions, and has the courage to interpellate her where the political fears 
to go. Publicity is one of the most important forms of social and political 
communication at this turn of the century. Publicity as such increasingly 
occupies “public space,” animates it, provokes it, arouses it. The enterprise 
produces “meaning” directly. 
Under these conditions of capitalist production of value, Lazzarato argues, the 
distinction between consumption and production become problematic since  
the actions of the consumer (her desires and values) are directly integrated, as 
a creative moment, into the social network of the enterprise…[Marketing] 
constructs the product and solicits forms of subjectification. The consumer is 
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no longer the passive mass-consumer of standardized commodities, but the 
active individual involved with the totality of her persona: to this end, it is 
necessary to “know” and solicit her ideology, lifestyle and conception of the 
world…Capitalism is no longer the capitalism of production, but of the 
product. Marketing is no longer merely a technique for selling, but a 
mechanism that is constitutive of social relations, information and values for 
the market—one that integrates the techniques and “responsibility” of the 
political.  (91) 
It is not difficult to think of other examples where the “consumer” is put to 
work in the creation of value: from the participants in reality television shows to 
social networking websites such as MySpace and Facebook. In short, within this 
tendency towards immaterial labor, “our communication and our cultural practices 
are not only constitutive of social relations but are also a new form of labor 
increasingly integral to capital relations” (Coté & Pybus 2007: 92)99 Furthermore, as 
the concept of enterprise becomes attached not only to businesses but also to the 
whole range of social entities, from the individual to the nation to the international 
organization, so too is the concept of the brand and the concern for its management 
increasingly applied to all social actors (du Gay 2000; Salzer-Mörling & Strannegård 
2004). Indeed, as was discussed in Chapter Four, within the discourse of nation 
branding, all subjects can be viewed as potential sources of value for the nation’s 
brand. Additionally, it is important to keep in mind the crucial role of the different 
forms of communications media in the process of subjectivation described above. For 
Lazzarato, the subject who engages in the activity of consumption “is not reduced to 
 
99 In this regard, Deleuze’s comment that “Marketing has become the center or ‘soul’ of the 
corporation” seems prescient (1992a: 6).  
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the act of buying and carrying out a service or a product,” but instead is incited to 
identify with and belong to a certain social imaginary. This imaginary, in turn, is 
constructed in part through advertising, which produces “a prompt to assume a form 
of living, i.e. a way of dressing, having a body, eating, communicating, residing, 
moving, having a gender, speaking, etc.” (Lazzarato 2003) 
A second implication we can draw from post-autonomist theorizations of 
recent transformations in capitalism has to do with the functioning of power and its 
relation to subjectivity. With the notions of immaterial labor and real subsumption, 
we are already contemplating a shift from Fordist production where capitalist 
command is centered on the factory, to a post-Fordist form of capitalism where 
“laboring processes have moved outside of the factory to invest the entire society”, 
producing in effect a “social factory” (Hardt & Negri 1994: 9). Moreover, as 
capitalist production becomes more dispersed, likewise the accompanying 
mechanisms of control extend throughout the social body; thus regulation is 
increasingly “cultural” or, in Foucault’s terminology micropolitical. Here again, 
subjectivity is a crucial terrain for the operation of power. The dispositifs or 
assemblages of power that have emerged with contemporary capitalism rely less on 
the techniques that Foucault described in terms of disciplinary power; rather they 
operate increasingly through self-regulation, through the “technologies of the self” 
(Foucault 1988b), including those associated with nation branding that were 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
Finally, it is striking to notice how Foucault’s critical reading of neoliberalism 
resonates with post-autonomist analyses of the new dispositifs of power and 
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mechanisms of control associated with contemporary capitalism as well as with 
Deleuze’s theorization of “post-disciplinary society” or a “society of control.”100 Let 
us take, for example, a moment from Foucault’s May 21, 1979 lecture, in which he 
seems to slip into an almost Deleuzian language in an attempt to find the conceptual 
vocabulary for describing the implications of the novel forms of power associated 
with what was then a novel form of neoliberalism: 
You can see that what appears on the horizon of this kind of analysis is not at 
all the ideal or project of an exhaustively disciplinary society in which the 
legal network hemming in individuals is taken over and extended internally 
by, let’s say, normative mechanisms. Nor is it a society in which a mechanism 
of general normalization and the exclusion of those who cannot be normalized 
is needed. On the horizon of this analysis we see instead the image, idea, or 
theme-program of a society in which there is an optimization of systems of 
difference, in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in which 
minority individuals and practices are tolerated, in which action is brought to 
bear on the rules of the game rather than the players, and finally in which 
there is an environmental type of intervention instead of the subjugation of 
individuals. (2008: 259-260) 
In the written manuscript for the lecture quoted above, Foucault elaborates 
further the new configuration of power as it relates to what he describes in terms of a 
new “human technology.” Here Foucault identifies 
a massive withdrawal with regard to the normative-disciplinary system. The 
correlate of the system formed by a capitalist type of economy and political 
institutions indexed to the law was a technology of human behavior, an 
“individualizing” governmentality comprising: disciplinary control 
 
100 Briefly mentioned in Chapter Four, pp. 190-191. 
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(quadrillage), unlimited regulation, subordination/classification, the norm. 
Considered overall, liberal governmentality was both legalistic and 
normalizing, disciplinary regulation being the switch-point between the two 
aspects…[complicated by] the ultimate incompatibility between legal forms 
and normalization. This system no longer seems to be indispensable. Why? 
Because the great idea that the law was the principle of governmental frugality 
turns out to be inadequate (…) (260) 
Foucault continues by observing that within neoliberal governmentality the 
law cannot function as the ultimate principle of governmental rationality. The law, 
therefore, needs to be reconceptualized; it needs to be understood as having a distinct 
form and function. The form is prohibition and constraint. The function is to establish 
the rules of the game in order to “[enable] everybody to be a rational subject, i.e., to 
maximize the functions of utility” (260, emphasis added). This then raises the 
problem, Foucault suggests, of “[h]ow to remain within [a system of the] Rule of 
law? How to rationalize this enforcement, it being understood that the law itself 
cannot be a principle of rationalization?” The answer that neoliberal thought comes 
up with, Foucault suggests, is “through the calculation of costs, the utility of the law 
and the cost of its enforcement, and by the fact that if you do not want to get out of 
the law and you do not want to divert its true function as rule of the game, the 
technology to be employed is not discipline-normalization but action on the 
environment. Modifying the terms of the game, not the players’ mentality” (2008: 
260). 
Remarkably, Foucault here seems to anticipate what Deleuze a decade later 
will describe as the shift from disciplinary society to a society of control, an account 
of transformations in the operations of power that, as was mentioned above, has had a 
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major impact on many post-autonomist Marxist thinkers. The picture that emerges 
from this theorization of the shift from disciplinary society to a society of control 
involves a complex relationship between mechanisms of control and subjectivity. At 
the end of the May 21, 1979 lecture, we can see Foucault grapple with this problem. 
In the written text of the lecture, after he discusses the argument made by American 
neoliberalism in favor of regulation through environmental techniques – especially 
the manipulation of supplies and demands – Foucault asks: “But does this mean that 
we are dealing with natural subjects?” (261) In other words, what are the qualities 
specific to the subject that neoliberalism must assume to exist in order to formulate 
technologies which aim to govern the subject? Or, alternatively, is it that rather than 
starting from a given conceptualization of the subject, neoliberalism institutes a 
“fictional” subject—fictional in the sense that there does not exist a natural subject to 
be worked upon, but rather the subject is the result of a combination of factors, 
including the governmental technologies proposed by neoliberal thought. 
Whether Foucault himself reached the latter conclusion, this would seem the 
correct one; the neoliberal subject is not a natural subject, at least not the natural 
subject of classical liberalism. The constitution of calculation as a comprehensive grid 
of intelligibility for all human action and interaction does away with the need for the 
kind of “anthropological categories and frameworks developed by the human and 
social sciences” (Gordon 1991: 43).101 The only characteristic that is ascribed to 
 
101 This argument is made most forcefully in Becker (1976: 8): “The economic approach is a 
comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behavior, be it behavior involving money prices, or 
imputed shadow prices, repeated or infrequent decisions, large or minor decisions, emotional or 
mechanical ends, rich or poor persons, men or women, adults or children, brilliant or stupid persons, 
patients or therapists, businessmen or politicians, teachers or students.” 
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human subjects is the ability to make choices that take into account the reality in 
which the subject finds herself. This is the subject of rational choice. However, in the 
writings of Becker and other neoliberal thinkers, reason is understood not as a 
universal category that could under ideal circumstances be determined by, for 
example, determining whether the optimal choice was made with regard to the 
desired outcome and the given conditions. The quality of the decision will vary 
according to the value of the human capital available; behaving rationally is defined 
in a minimal sense as acting in a non-random way in light of a given reality. “Homo 
oeconomicus is someone who accepts reality” (2008: 269).102 Or, as Becker writes, 
“Even irrational decision units must accept reality and could not, for example, 
maintain a choice that was no longer within their opportunity set. And these sets are 
not fixed or dominated by erratic variation, but are systematically changed by 
different economic variable (…)” (1962: 167). 
What is crucial, however, for neoliberal governmentality is that the subject not 
only exercise her capacity for rational choice, but that this choice be made within a 
social setting where she alone is responsible for, and bears the consequences of, the 
outcomes of that decision. This is made clear in Becker’s recent discussion of the 
attempt by some to shift blame for the so-called “sub-prime” loans from the 
borrowers to the lenders. Becker is quite explicit that individual responsibility is a 
crucial foundation for a liberal, market society: 
Successful attempts to shift the responsibility for bad decisions toward others 
and to society more generally create a “moral hazard” in behavior. If 
 
102 See also the conclusion of Chapter Two (p. 133) and Chapter Three of this study (pp. 157-158). 
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individuals are not held accountable for decisions and actions that harm 
themselves or others, they have less incentive to act responsibly in the first 
place since they will escape some or all of the bad consequences of their 
actions. It does not matter greatly whether this moral hazard resulted from the 
shifting of blame for unsuccessful actions to the “mall print” in a contract, to 
an abused childhood, to a mental state, or to many other efforts to shift 
responsibility away from oneself. 
An important foundation of the philosophy behind the arguments for 
private enterprise, free economies, and free societies more generally, is that 
these societies rely on and require individual decision-making and 
responsibility. This philosophy not only emphasizes the moral hazard reasons 
to require individual responsibility, but also “the use it or lose it principle,” a 
colloquial expression indicating that various mental and physical capacities 
wear down and erode if they are not used on a regular basis. This principle 
implies that people who are accustomed to having other persons or 
governments make their decisions for them lose the ability to make good 
decisions for themselves. Free societies lead to better decision-making partly 
because men and women accumulate more experience at making decisions 
that affect their well-being and that of others. (Becker, n.d.)103 
We can see here a profound ambivalence within neoliberalism. On the one 
hand human nature is assumed to be that of the rational, calculating subject. On the 
other hand, there is also the fear that this natural capacity needs to be instilled, 
fostered, protected against outside forces that could erode it, such as paternal 
protection from the state: with regard to human capital, one must “use it or lose it.” 
Thus, as has been indicated throughout the present study, much of neoliberal 
governance is about creating the conditions that encourage, and indeed make 
 
103 I thank Nicholas Kiersey for calling this article to my attention. 
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possible, the rational, calculating subject. Here we can find an imperative for 
government—to make sure that individuals are responsible for their actions, that they 
are rewarded for good decisions and punished for bad ones. Indeed, as Lazzarato 
(n.d.) argues,  
Liberalism is first and foremost neither an economic theory nor a political 
theory; it is rather an art of government that assumes the market as the test and 
means of intelligibility, as the truth and the measure of society... By market 
we do not mean “commodification”. According to Foucault… the market is 
not defined by the human instinct to exchange… by market we must always 
understand competition and inequality, rather than equality of exchange. Here, 
the subjects are not merchants but entrepreneurs. The market is therefore the 
market of enterprises and of their differential and non-egalitarian logic. 
Finally, recalling Foucault’s comment that the neoliberal subject is defined as 
one who “accepts reality” (and Becker’s related observation that this subject must 
accept its “opportunity set”) it thus becomes crucial to better apprehend the nature of 
this “reality”—a reality which provides the terrain and grid of intelligibility for 
governing the neoliberal subject. As the analysis presented here has already 
suggested, an important element of this “reality” is that it is a “global” one, 
characterized by the need for subjects to act in an entrepreneurial, competitive 
fashion. Related to this is the idea that each subject is the bearer of capital who must 
seek to maximize its own self-value and, as a consequence, must take into account the 
“rules of the game.” As was discussed in the previous chapter, the neoliberal subject 
is not only potentially a human individual, but can also be a “collective subject” such 
as a nation-state. Thus, for example, a nation-state can be imagined as the bearer of a 
capital that must be managed the same way a brand is managed. This, in turn, makes 
 215
possible a whole range of governmental technologies and strategies for governing 
those subjects who accept this “reality” as self-evident, as an implicit “order of 
things” (Foucault 1973). 
Conclusion: Bringing Capitalism Back In 
The governmentality approach to studying social and political life is perhaps 
best understood not as a full-blown theory but rather as a certain methodology for 
approaching a specific problem-space, namely: how, on the basis of what 
rationalities, and through what kind of techniques and practices are subjects 
governed?104 For the most part, governmentality scholars have focused on neoliberal 
forms of governmentality. In their analyses of neoliberalism, governmentality studies 
have avoided what are seen as a problematic reduction of neoliberalism to the 
interests of an easily identifiable class or group of institutions, as might be seen in 
some forms of Marxian analysis. The understanding of neoliberalism within 
governmentality scholarship is based on the assumption that whatever connection 
may exist between, on the one hand, particular rationalities and techniques of 
government and, on the other hand, capitalist modes and relations of production, we 
cannot deduce the ways that the former are formed and operate from the latter. In this 
regard, governmentality scholars have followed, in a certain sense, Foucault who 
detailed the emergence of disciplinary forms of power that, while clearly 
interconnected with capitalist production and social relations, could not be explained 
solely in those terms:  
 
104 However, see Merlingen (2006) for an argument in favor of describing governmentality in terms of 
a theory. 
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[Capitalism], as it was established in the nineteenth century, was obliged to 
elaborate a set of political techniques, techniques of power, by which man was 
tied to something like labor—a set of techniques by which people’s bodies 
and their time would become labor power and labor time so as to be 
effectively used and thereby transformed into hyperprofit. But in order for 
there to be hyperprofit, there had to be an infrapower. A web of microscopic, 
capillary political power had to be established at the level of man’s very 
existence, attaching men to the production apparatus, while making them into 
agents of production, into workers. (2000b: 86)105  
Thus, Foucault’s work has often been viewed as “a radical departure from or even as 
a critique of many of the methodological and political assumptions” “of both Marxist 
analysis and socialist strategy” (Smart 1994: 208). 
However, it is important to keep in mind the intellectual and political context 
in which Foucault was working—one where leftist thought was dominated by a 
certain form of Marxism, which aspired to provide a general theory of social and 
political reality in which capitalism functioned as a kind of general explanatory grid 
for all historical developments. At least this is the way Foucault has described the 
context for his complex and ambiguous relationship with Marxist thought (Foucault 
1980c, 1988a, 1991c), leaving aside the accuracy of this portrayal of Marxism in the 
1960s and 1970s. Coincidentally, some of the concerns and critiques Foucault had 
about Marxist thought were shared by many of the post-workerist and post-
autonomist thinkers discussed here. Furthermore, these thinkers have found 
Foucault’s concept of biopolitics to offer a powerful analytical lens for apprehending 
recent transformations in global capitalism. What is more, a number of elements 
 
105 See also Foucault (1990: 141).  
 217
found within Foucault’s analysis of contemporary neoliberalism seem to parallel 
many of the descriptions of the forms of power and subjectivity immanent to global 
capitalism as described by autonomist Marxist thought. Finally, governmentality as a 
general approach to political analysis has proved flexible enough to develop in 
tandem with other compatible theoretical approaches such as actor network theory.106 
As I see it, there are two possible ways that governmentality approaches could 
take on board the treatments of contemporary capitalism presented by autonomist 
Marxist thought. One way would be to integrate a Foucauldian approach within a 
more general Marxist political problematic of a critical investigation of capitalism, as 
scholar such as Jan Selby (2007) have called for. I find this move problematic, 
however. To begin with, contrary to what some have argued, the idea of incorporating 
Foucauldian analyses of the “how” of power into broader Marxist questions of the 
“why” of power (“the ceaseless accumulation of capital, and attendant conflicts 
amongst capitalists, classes and states” (Selby 2007: 339)) is premised on a dubious 
assumption: namely that there necessarily exists an objective “how” of power that can 
be discerned a priori and independent of the analysis we carry out. For Foucauldian 
scholars who find value in the French philosopher’s historical nominalism, the idea 
that capitalism predetermines the “why” of power is unlikely to be very convincing. 
 Just as problematic is the idea that Foucauldian analyses can offer fruitful 
investigations of the “ascending” forms of micropower, while Marxist theory can 
usefully detail “how power also “descends” from the state in the form of interests, 
strategies and decisions” (Selby 2007: 339-340). This ignores Foucault’s argument 
 
106 See for example Kendall (2004).  
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that rather than “taking as a primary, original, and already given object notions such 
as the sovereign, sovereignty, the people, subjects, the state, and civil society,” we 
should start with the different discursive and material practices that both make it 
possible to speak of “the state” and also for the state to achieve a degree of discursive 
and material “reality” (2008: 2-3).107 In fact, it is precisely in part as a response to 
this methodological challenge, Foucault argues, that he felt the need to invent the 
concept of governmentality—a notion, he stresses, that is meant to serve as an 
analytical grid for examining a diverse array of power relations regardless of the 
particular site or scale. Thus, he argues, “the analysis of micro-powers, or o
procedures of governmentality, is not confined by definition to a precise domain 
determined by a sector or the scale, but should be considered simply as a point of 
view, a method of decipherment which may be valid for the whole scale, whateve
size” (2008: 186).
f 
r its 
ality 
parable.” 
 
108 Or, as Lazzarato (n.d.) argues, “Liberal macro-government
is only possible because it exerts its micropowers upon a multiplicity. These two 
levels are inse
In fact, herein lays one of the strengths of a governmentality approach—the 
way it “brackets the world of underlying forces and causes, and instead [examines] 
the different ways in which the real has been inscribed in thought” (Larner & Walters 
2004a: 16). Thus, for example, rather than taking for granted the existence of 
something called “the global” that forms the basis for ideas such as globalization, a 
107 In a later lecture Foucault (BB: 77) claims, “the state does not have an essence. The state is not a 
universal nor in itself an autonomous source of power. The state is nothing else but the effect, the 
profile, the mobile shape of a perpetual stratification (étatisation).”  
108 While Foucault here speaks of scale, his methodological argument resonates with the proposal by 
some human geographers (for example, Marston, Jones III & Woodward 2005, 2007) to abandon the 
notion of scale in favor of a “flat ontology.” See the discussion in chapter one of this dissertation. 
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governmentality approach instead views globalization as “one particular political 
imagination amongst many, rather than the underlying logic of an epoch or the 
outcome of global pressures such as international competitiveness” (Larner & Walters 
2004a: 18). This means that discourses of the global—globalisation, global 
governance, global civil society—are thus seen as a particular form of 
power/knowledge that makes possible and also forecloses different kinds of political 
practices and arrangements.109  
For a number of reasons, these incompatibilities would unlikely be resolved if 
the type of Marxist framework into which a governmentality perspective were to be 
integrated is autonomist rather than, say, neo-Gramsican. Trying to work within such 
overly broad conceptual categories as Empire and Multitude, as Hardt and Negri do, 
would likely strip a governmentality approach of much of what it has to offer to 
social and political analysis, particularly its nominalist methodology (as discussed in 
previous chapters of this study).  
For this reason, a second possible way for governmentality studies to take 
seriously autonomist Marxism’s analysis of contemporary capitalism seems 
preferable. This could consist of a critical engagement with many of the theoretical 
claims made by autonomist Marxist thinkers regarding the changing nature of 
capitalism and related changes in the operations of power and its relation to 
subjectivity. This need not take the form of a wholesale importation of the conceptual 
apparatus of autonomist Marxism. Indeed, as Nigel Thrift (2007: 48) argues, terms 
 
109 The idea that space is not a natural, but rather a socially constructed, phenomenon is not unique to a 
Foucauldian perspective. See for example (Lefebvre 1991; Soja 1989) For a critical genealogy of the 
global, see (Cosgrove 2001) 
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such as “immaterial labor” are dispensable. The phenomena and trends they point 
towards—for example the way that capital increasingly seeks to draw on and make 
productive the various components of human subjectivity—are areas that easily lend 
themselves to investigation from a governmentality framework. Indeed, there are 
already a number of scholars in diverse disciplines who draw inspiration from 
Foucault and autonomist Marxist thought—as well as from other theoretical traditions 
and schools of thought (Cooper 2008; Nadesan 2008; Nealon 2008; Read 2003, 
2009).  
In conclusion, what is being proposed here is to widen the space of inquiry to 
which governmentality studies are directed. So far this research program has 
produced a number of richly empirical studies, in a range of disciplines and fields of 
study, regarding the different governmental projects that seek to shape and directing 
social reality. However, if we consider the basic notion of governmentality—the 
conduct of conduct and the structuring of the field of action for possible conduct—
then it becomes clear that by failing to incorporate capitalism into our analyses, we 
leave out a wide range of social and political phenomena that are directly concerned 
with governing subjects and their relations today. There are obviously a wide range of 
theoretical resources available for expanding the domain of analysis of 
governmentality to the contemporary forms of capitalist power and subjectivity, a 
discussion of which is beyond the scope of the present study (Amin & Thrift 2003; 
Bayart 2008; R. H. Brown 2003; Comaroff & Comaroff 2001; J. K. Gibson-Graham 
2006; Thrift 2005). The aim of this concluding chapter has been to open up a critical 
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engagement with one such theoretical body—autonomist Marxist thought—and 
hopefully push governmentality studies in new directions. 
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